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Political Science Quarterly

MAY 11 1992

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Spring 1992

Demetrios Caraley — Washington Abandons the Cities

Kerry Mullins
Aaron Wildavsky — The Procedural Presidency of George Bush

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $35.00 a year. Three years, $95.00. Students, $24.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $75.00 a year. Foreign postage, $8.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Volume 107 Number 1, Spring 1992.
Postmaster—Send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Reviews Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

DEMETRIOS CARALEY examines the Reagan and Bush administrations' cutting back of federal grants to large cities and people who live there. He concludes pessimistically that without strong economic growth, the American democracy has little capacity to deal with serious problems felt by minorities such as those who govern and who live in large cities.

KERRY MULLINS and AARON WILDAVSKY seek to explain inconsistencies in President George Bush's behavior and policies as a consequence of his adherence to principles of "inclusive heirarchy" tinged with fatalism. These principles lead the president to try to reconcile conflicting interests without a synthesizing "vision thing" to guide and explain his actions. They deem Bush's belief in the importance of procedures worthy but not a substitute for a sense of direction.

LOUIS BOLCE, GERALD DE MAIO, and DOUGLAS MUZZIO analyze the proposition that the Republican party can attain long-term majority status if it can attract 20 percent of the black vote. Their examination of 1988 presidential and congressional exit poll data of black voters reveals that such prospects are dim.

GRAHAM T. ALLISON, JR. and ROBERT P. BESCHEL, JR. address the question of whether the United States can promote democracy abroad. They disagree with those who argue that the United States cannot do much to promote political plurality and the development of democratic institutions and offer a number of concrete measures that the U.S. government and society can take.

ATHAN THEOHARIS surveys the FBI's emergence as an autonomous agency, effectively independent of oversight by either the president or attorney general, by tracing the evolution of the FBI's wiretapping authority and particularly sensitive FBI wiretap uses.

MARTHA L. COTTAM writes about the policy conflicts in the Carter administration as it developed responses to the unfolding Nicaraguan revolution. She explains those conflicts as the result of differing world views among three Carter administration policy advocacy groups.

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Washington Abandons the Cities

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

The New Federalism of the Reagan and Bush administrations has succeeded in reversing fifty years of American domestic policy by cutting back the constellation of federal grants to local and state governments that the federal government used to help poor people and needy city jurisdictions. These cutbacks accelerated the drift of large cities, especially the older ones of the East and Middle West, into underserviced, violence-ridden, crack-infested, homeless-burdened, bankruptcy-skirting slum ghettos. On top of this, the Bush administration's inability to maintain economic prosperity combined with its unwillingness to engage in traditional countercyclical spending through grants to city and state governments has brought many cities their worst fiscal and service crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Even at the beginning of the Reagan administration in 1981, the social and economic conditions in the nation's large cities had not been robust. Poverty rates, the percentage of city populations living in poverty areas,[1] and violent crime rates had been high both in historical terms and in comparison to suburban rings where better-off families and thriving businesses were moving. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Among some subgroups of the central city population, the poverty rate was so high as to be almost unbelievable: for black children under age six in female headed families: 75 percent; for similar white children: 62 percent. The economic bases of central cites had been weak and unable at existing tax rates to generate the revenues needed to maintain—let alone improve—their low

[1] The census bureau defines poverty areas as census tracts where over 20 percent of the population is below the poverty threshold. The rest of the population in those tracts, while not poor itself, is exposed to the many destructive behaviors and attitudes of the poor.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY is Janet Robb Professor of the Social Sciences at Barnard College and the Graduate Faculties of Columbia University. He has published books and articles on both national and urban politics and policies.

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FIGURE 1



quality of housekeeping services or to maintain and rehabilitate their aging infrastructures. These central cities had not been able to eliminate or even stop the expansion of slum neighborhoods with their deteriorating housing and ineffective schools in which large numbers of minority poor lacking jobs and job skills were concentrated. Nor had central cities been able to stop white flight or black, middle-class flight to the suburbs.

Moreover, during the Reagan administration, three sets of additional unhealthy conditions developed that were concentrated in large cities and imposed still greater burdens on their governments. First was the twin epidemics of crack-cocaine addiction and the routine murders and other violent crimes associated with its selling and use. Second was the AIDS epidemic with the horrors it imposed on its victims and its expensive public health costs. The third morbific development was the major expansion of homelessness—not only down-and-out individual males but entire families—and of large-scale begging on the streets and other public places.

Finally, in the Bush administration, the economic recession beginning in 1989 in the Northeast and then spreading to the nation as a whole caused drastic

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FIGURE 2



shortfalls in city-generated revenues leading to crushing deficits in city budgets and savage cutbacks in services and programs.

The remainder of this article will examine the two myths on which the Reagan/Bush New Federalism ideology was based, the extent and impact of cuts in grant programs to city governments and poor people, and the prospects for the federal government turning around from simply abandoning large cities to resume the role of what I call the bailer-out-of-last-resort.

Political Myths and Political Realities

The language of the Reagan/Bush administration's New Federalism cutback policy has contained many allusions about returning to local and state governments the power to make choices about what mix of taxes, essential housekeeping services, amenities, and benefits and services for the poor their citizens should have. Local and state governments, it was argued, are closer to the people than is the federal government. This position rests on two myths: every city and state jurisdiction has enough taxable resources to be afforded a real choice, and the

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federal government's intervention to fund grants to localities and states and individual benefits for the poor has been a usurpation that took place against the wishes of city and state officials and electorates.

The Superiority of Local Choice Myth

The myth that every city government with its limited geographic tax reach had the same real choice of what services, amenities, poverty benefits, and taxes it wanted to provide and impose was simply false. Every study of the capacities of city and state governments by the Census Bureau, Congress, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and scholars in universities and think tanks provides evidence to demonstrate that falsity.[2] (See Figure 3.)

One set of statistics easily available from the 1980 census and reflecting conditions at the beginning of the Reagan administration shows that the richest city, San Jose, had a median family income of $25,598—over twice the income of Newark's $11,989.[3] When suburban rings are also included in the comparison with large cities, eleven suburban rings—those of Washington, DC, San Jose, Chicago, New York City, Detroit, Houston, Newark, Milwaukee, San Francisco-Oakland, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle—had median incomes higher than the city of San Jose.[4] At the other end of the scale, of the twenty-five places with the lowest median income, twenty-two were central cities and only three were suburban rings—those of El Paso, Tampa, and Albuquerque. When the poverty rate is examined as one measure of the need for expensive services and programs, the range again is extremely wide—from 32.8 percent for Newark to 3.4 percent for Milwaukee, a difference of 9.6 to 1. Finally, when we calculate the amount of median family income available to be taxed for each percent of poverty, as an indicator of fiscal capacity and hence of the ability to make real choices, the range becomes tremendous. The Washington, DC suburban ring has

[2] One of the first such analyses appeared in this journal. See Richard P. Nathan and Charles Adams, "Understanding Central City Hardship," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976): 47–62; see also Katherine L. Bradbury, Anthony Downs, and Kenneth A. Small, *Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982); Peggy Cuciti, "City Need and the Responsiveness of Federal Grant Programs," Report of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on the City, 95th Congress, 2d sess., 1978; and Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., "Four Perspectives on Urban Hardship," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Fall 1989): 483–508.

[3] These statistics are calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census of Population, Vol. 2, Subject reports, PC80-2-2, Poverty Areas in Large Cities* (Washington, DC: 1984), Tables S-2 and S-3.

[4] The numbers given by the Census Bureau for the "Remainder of Metropolitan Area" or suburban rings are, of course, only statistical artifacts and represent no real governmental jurisdiction. Each ring may have from twenty to a hundred suburban municipalities, which themselves vary in capacity. But the differences between central cities and the aggregate of local governments in suburban jurisdictions is so wide that it is not misleading for the Census Bureau to make comparisons between central cities and their suburban rings as wholes.

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FIGURE 3

DISPARITIES IN RESOURCES AND NEEDS

42 Largest Cities and Their Suburban Rings



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$5,375; the city of Newark has only $366 for each percentage of poor in their populations, a difference of 14.7 to 1. Figure 3 and the appendix show the great disparities even among central cities in resources relative to their poverty needs and the great disparities between central cities and suburban rings, with broad concentration of cities in the high need/low resources quadrant and suburban rings in the high resources/low poverty need quadrant.

Clearly, real choices are open only to wealthy jurisdictions with modest poverty needs, while poor jurisdictions have choices only in theory. In actuality, poor jurisdictions do not choose but are simply forced into the provide-less, cut-more, and tax-more, vicious circle that, as will be explained, makes cities less and less attractive to families and businesses wealthy enough to move away.

The Federal Usurpation Myth

In reality, almost all federal programs were taken on because city or state officials indicated either an unwillingness or an incapacity based on a mismatch between resources and needs to deal with the problem to which the federal program was responding. State and local government participation has been voluntary in virtually all grant programs; indeed, local and state governments did not get supplanted by a federal bureaucracy but were the governments that actually administered, albeit subject to federal regulations, the programs receiving federal aid. Also, federal grant and individual aid programs were not developed in a vacuum by some federal establishment insulated in Washington, DC, with little contact or awareness of local and state conditions and needs. Generally, federal programs were developed in full consultation with local and state officials who both testified and lobbied on different aspects. They also were approved by a Senate whose membership is elected from the fifty states and a House of Representatives elected by 435 local subdivisions of states. In this kind of governmental system, no federal program that has strong opposition in many states or localities can pass. Thus the federal involvement with social welfare and other grants to local and state governments reflected not a usurpation, but the traditional pattern in American government that if a serious domestic problem is to be solved, all levels of government including the federal must join in a cooperative effort to cope with it.

Moreover, the Founding Fathers foresaw this potential expansion of the federal role. James Madison, no friend of federal usurpation, asked rhetorically in *The Federalist* Nos. 45 and 46:

> . . . if . . . the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a government, . . . that such government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might

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> enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? . . . [A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter . . . .
>
> If . . . the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due. . . . .[5]

The Impact of the Reagan/Bush Cuts in Federal Aid

During the depths of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal government began to take on major responsibilities toward the poor and toward local and state governments.[6] Over the decades, especially in the 1960s, it added various, mostly categorical, social welfare programs to cover more categories of activities and individuals defined by the federal government as being most in need. It raised funding levels. It established grant programs that delivered aid directly to local governments, bypassing the state governments of which local governments were legal creatures. It established block grants and skewed allocation formulas for grant programs in order to target funds more to the so-called hardship cities and areas (those older and larger urban areas with large poverty populations primarily in the East and Midwest snowbelt) rather than spread those funds evenly among all cities and states. It amended eligibility standards from time to time to make it easier to qualify for individual benefits such as welfare, food stamps, and housing assistance. It increased benefit levels both to raise the minimum assistance being provided to the poor and needy and to compensate for inflation.

When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, the main problem areas for which there were major federal grant and social welfare spending programs were:

- poverty and unemployment among families and individuals: grants for cash welfare payments (Aid to Families with Dependent Children or AFDC), food stamps, housing assistance, legal services, medical services (Medicaid), and public

[5] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 288-289, 295.

[6] Some limited and sporadic forms of federal assistance to local and state governments date to the early 1800s. Federal financial aid programs to cities and states are based primarily on Congress's so-called spending power, which derives from Congress's constitutional authority "to lay and collect taxes . . . to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." (Article I, Section 8.) As Congress exercised it since adoption of the Constitution and as the Supreme Court eventually ruled in 1936 in the case of *U.S. v Butler*, 297 U.S.1(1936), this clause permits the spending of federal monies not only in the substantive areas that Congress can regulate under its various enumerated powers but also for any purpose that comes within the meaning of the broad terms "general welfare" or "common defense" of the United States.

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service jobs and job training (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act or CETA);

- physical decay and deteriorating economic bases of cities: community development block grants (CDBGs), urban development action grants (UDAGs), and economic development (EDA) grants and loans to local governments;
- education: grants to local school districts for compensatory services for disadvantaged students;
- transportation: grants to local and state governments for highways and for mass rail and bus transportation; and
- general purpose financial assistance: general revenue sharing payments to local governments.[7]

Fortunately for needy cities and poor persons, not all the cutbacks proposed between 1981 and 1991 by the Reagan/Bush administrations were adopted. But as Table 1 and Figure 4 show, the cuts in grant programs that benefited city governments were drastic: from 1980 to 1990 a cut of 46 percent or some $26 billion in constant 1990 dollars. As a consequence, the vast majority of large central cities of metropolitan areas were hurt; the disparities that already existed between rich and poor local and state jurisdictions got larger; and all of the previous factors in combination produced a constant ratcheting down of city services generally and an inability to raise the level of benefits and services for the poor, except in medical coverage. Finally, the economic recession beginning in 1989 in the Northeast and spreading broadly since 1990 further aggravated the situation by sharply reducing the revenues generated by city governments themselves and thus produced budget deficits that had to be eliminated with still more rounds of cutbacks in services and programs and increases in taxes.

The vast majority of large central cities were hurt.

Especially in the East and Midwest, central cities were already suffering in 1981. They had the greatest mismatch between needs for poverty-related services and benefits, for the improvement of housekeeping services, and for maintenance or replacement of aging infrastructures, on the one hand, and the availability of fiscal resources to pay for them, on the other. Consequently, they were heavily dependent on federal and state aid. In fiscal 1980 at the end of the Carter administration, six large cities—Newark, Baltimore, Buffalo, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and New York City—had from 50 to 69 percent of their general expenditures funded by federal and state aid, while another eleven cities received federal and state aid covering 40 to 50 percent of their general expenditures. By 1989 only three—Baltimore, Newark, and Buffalo—got over 50 percent of their expendi-

[7] Not all the funds expended through these programs went only to large cities or poor people living in them; large city governments and their poor residents got very large proportions of most of these grants.

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TABLE 1

Trends in Federal Grants for Poor People and Poor City Governments Outlays in Constant 1990 Dollars (In Millions)

	1980	1990	CHG80–90 (%)	CHG80–90 ($)
Benefits Primarily to Individuals				
Medicaid	22,138	41,103	86	18,965
Housing assistance	7,257	13,561	87	6,304
Welfare payments	10,983	12,246	12	1,263
Supplemental feeding (WICS)	1,137	2,197	93	1,060
Food stamps	13,808	13,793	−0	(15)
Child nutrition prgm	5,363	4,978	−7	(385)
Community services prgm	868	350	−60	(518)
Justice assistance	799	244	−69	(555)
Totals	62,352	88,472	42	26,120
Totals excluding medicaid	40,214	47,369	18	7,155
Benefits Primarily to Governments				
General revenue sharing*	10,832	0	−100	(10,832)
Public service jobs & job training	9,820	3,042	−69	(6,778)
Community development block grants	6,189	2,818	−54	(3,371)
Social services block grant	4,383	2,749	−37	(1,634)
Urban mass transit	4,963	3,728	−25	(1,235)
Compensatory education	5,345	4,437	−17	(908)
Local public works	660	0	−100	(660)
Economic development asst	717	160	−78	(557)
Urban development action grants**	357	209	−41	(148)
Federal aid highways	13,760	13,854	1	94
General antirecession assistance***	0	0		
Totals	57,026	30,997	−46	(26,029)
* Large-city part of gen. rev. sharing (cities > 300,000):	1,758	0	−100	(1,758)

** UDAGs were terminated in 1988 and outlays will drop to zero in early 1990s.

*** General antirecession assistance had been $2.664 billion in 1978

Source: Calculated from *Budget of the United States Government, fiscal year 1992*, Part Seven, Historical Tables 11.3 and 12.3.

tures from federal and state aid, with the top percentage dropping to 55 for Baltimore. The number of cities getting from 40 to 50 percent dropped from eleven to two—Milwaukee and Boston. The aid New York City received dropped from 52 percent of its general expenditures in 1980 to 36 percent in 1989. Indeed, if New York City had held on to the same percentage of its general expenditures funded by federal and state aid in 1989 as in 1980, it would have had some $4 billion more to spend and not had a budget crisis in 1990 and 1991, when it was forced to cut services and raise local taxes.

When aid from the federal government alone is looked at and in programs where aid went directly to city governments of cities over 300,000 in population,

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FIGURE 4



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FIGURE 5



from 1980 to 1989[8] the total amount of such aid dropped by some $1.8 billion from an aggregate of $5.2 billion in 1980 to $3.4 billion in 1989, a 35 percent cut. When adjusted for inflation, the cut is much sharper, a drop of over $5 billion in 1989 dollars. Still another way of looking at the impact is in terms of what the average percentage of these large cities' expenditures was covered by federal aid: in 1980 it was 22, and by 1989 it had dropped to 6. (See Figure 5).

The elimination of some targeted federal categorical programs that provided aid to city governments directly—general revenue-sharing payments and urban development action grants—and the diminution of others—like community development block grants, economic assistance grants and loans, and mass transit grants for capital and operating expenses—meant that cities had to look to their states for replacement of such aid or cut their own services further. Yet in no state was the population of large cities—for the purposes of this analysis those

[8] The figures for fiscal years ending in calendar 1989 are the most recent available from the Census Bureau. All the comparisons of federal and state aid come from the annual publication, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances*, Series GF, No. 4, (Washington, DC: various years).

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of 300,000 or above—anywhere near a statewide majority. This meant that these cities had little leverage either in elections for governors or in state legislative bodies where voting strength is based on population. Indeed, it was in part because state governments did not in general treat their large cities fairly, but even at times exploited them in the allocation of state aid, that direct federal-local government funding relations developed during the New Deal and post-World War II eras.

Furthermore under the Reagan/Bush New Federalism, the states themselves also lost federal aid and were required to allocate more of their own revenues as matching dollars to AFDC and Medicaid. The latter was the one grant program for the poor that continued to grow sharply. Rather than being in a fiscal position to deliver more state aid to their local governments to compensate for loss of federal aid as the Reagan administration had predicted, states were hard pressed simply to generate new revenues to replace the federal aid they themselves lost, especially since many of them followed the federal example after 1981 and cut income tax rates. As a result, aid for welfare, other poverty-related benefits and services, and general operations that came to large cities from the states also came into jeopardy. State aid as a percentage of city expenditures just held steady between 1980 and 1989 at 16 percent and in no way replaced the cuts from the federal governments. (See Figure 5).

The disparities that already existed between rich and poor local and state jurisdictions got larger.

The assignment to localities and states of more funding responsibilities for social welfare programs and for general governmental operations meant that there was a tremendously wide range in the ability to replace federal aid with funds generated by local and state taxes even in a prosperous national economy. Jurisdictions with high taxable resources and low concentrations of poor people—for example, thriving high-tech areas and high-income suburbs—had the capacity to keep services high, to continue to provide (if they chose) the preexisting levels of benefits to the small concentrations of poor people within their borders, and to keep tax rates low. Jurisdictions with low taxable resources and high concentrations of poor people—for example, the larger, older declining cities primarily of the East and Midwest with high concentrations of ghetto poor and snowbelt states with high levels of structural unemployment—had little or no capacity to substitute locally- and state-generated revenues for lost federal aid.

Many of these poor local jurisdictions were already in 1981 imposing high taxes relative to the low level of services they provided. Some had tax rates approaching or actually at state legislative or state constitutional limits. All were subject to local city charter requirements and state legislative or state constitutional mandates for annual balanced budgets. And all feared that increases in local taxes, even if technically possible, would be counterproductive by providing greater

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incentives for mobile, high-income families and prosperous businesses that still remained to move out. By moving out, these families and businesses would be avoiding tax increases for themselves and further eroding the fiscal capacity of the jurisdictions they left. Such erosion would cause further increases in the tax rates to make up for a smaller tax base and/or cause further reduction of services and benefits. There was thus a strengthening of the vicious circle for wealthy jurisdictions to become even wealthier and fiscally stronger as they attracted still more upper-income families and prospering businesses. And as the other part of that circle, poor jurisdictions became poorer and incapable of continuing even the lower levels of services and benefits they previously provided as they lost still more of their economic base and also lost targeted federal aid such as all of general revenue sharing, all of urban development action grants, and significant amounts of community development block grants and mass transit grants.

All of the previous factors in combination produced a constant ratcheting down of city services generally and an inability to raise the level of benefits and services for the poor except in medical coverage.

As some jurisdictions were perceived as having low tax/high essential services/low poverty services profiles, other jurisdictions in order to stay competitive or to meet balanced budget requirements found it necessary or expedient to reduce services and benefits to the poor and their neighborhoods even more in order to keep their own low tax/essential services/poverty services mix competitive. This stimulated still more jurisdictions to cut poverty services to remain competitive. In their spending on welfare, for example, states, which are allowed to set benefit levels but also mandated to match up to 50 percent of their costs, either cut those levels or did not increase them to keep up with inflation.

The so-called safety net programs—welfare payments, food stamps, Medicaid, child nutrition, and supplemental feeding for women, infants, and children (WIC)—were able as a whole to resist cuts between 1980 and 1990 even when measured in constant dollars. The special standing of these programs was officially recognized both in the Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings Act of 1985 (GRH) and in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) by making them exempt from automatic cuts through sequestration.[9] But even the level of spending on pro-

[9] The GRH mandated a balanced budget by 1991 through cuts in spending and set deficit reduction targets for each year until 1991. To enforce the deficit reduction process, the act provided that if the targets were not met by the regular legislative and appropriations processes, automatic sequestration orders would be issued making across-the-board spending cuts sufficient to meet the deficit targets. It required that half the cuts come from military programs and half from domestic programs, but protected some domestic programs like social security, AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, and WIC (a special food program for women, infants, and young children). The BEA was Title XIII of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 which incorporated into law the fall 1990 White House-congressional budget summit agreements. It relaxed in two major respects the constraints of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings for fiscal years 1991–1995: There was no longer a calendar deadline for reaching

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grams for poor persons in 1980 was not decreasing but allowing the rate of poverty in cities to increase. Therefore, the very major accomplishment—as compared to other domestic programs—of not taking cuts in these programs for central city poor individuals and families did not produce any improvement in their fortunes. Despite the growth in total spending, the average AFDC benefit dropped from 1980 to 1990 in terms of constant 1990 dollars from $3506 to $3218 per family and from $1205 to $1116 per recipient. For food stamps the average benefit dropped from $719 to $690. The only major exception was the extension of Medicaid coverage to pregnant, working poor women and their small children who were not on welfare. Together with the rapid rise in medical costs, this forced a major 86 percent or 19 billion, 1990 constant dollar expansion of spending for Medicaid between 1980 and 1990. (See Figure 4 and Table 1.)

Ironically, even this expansion of Medicaid coverage was a two-edged sword in its impact on city governments. On the one hand, it went against the thrust of the Reagan/Bush administration's cutback policy of not improving grant and aid programs for the poor and therefore helped cities by making some of their working poor families eligible to receive free medical care. On the other hand, this federal generosity was expensive for states and some local governments. Medicaid, like AFDC, requires matching funds from all states with the matching rate for many states with large cities being close to or at the maximum of 50 percent. In some states, the state requires part of those matching funds to come from local governments. The most costly situation for city governments is in New York where federal rules require the state to match 50 percent of Medicaid spending with its own funds and New York State itself requires its cities and other local governments to absorb one-half of the nonfederal share—again the highest matching rate—or 25 percent of the total bill.[10] This helped produce a fiscal 1989 budget expenditure for Medicaid in New York City of some $2.6 billion.

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a balanced budget. Instead declining budget-deficit targets allowed a deficit of $83 billion by fiscal 1995. Separate spending caps were set for each year in three areas of spending—defense, international, and domestic—at a level that would reduce the overall budget deficit by a specified amount. But those caps were in a sense floating, since they could be revised to reflect changing economic and technical assumptions. Within each of those caps, changes up or down could be made in discretionary spending or in taxes as long as the net impact canceled out—referred to as the pay-as-you-go process. To enforce these caps, there was provision for very complicated sequestration procedures that would originally apply only in the broad category breaching the cap, but with Social Security, AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, child nutrition, and WIC still exempt from sequestration. In the fourth and fifth year of the BEA the separate caps would be replaced by one overall cap so that cuts and additions could be made across the categories of defense, international, and domestic spending. There was also a provision for breaching the spending caps if the president designated that extra spending was for emergency purposes. The entire sequestration process could be suspended if Congress passed a joint resolution (requiring presidential approval or an extraordinary majority to override a veto) recognizing very low or no economic growth, since revenue loss would prevent the deficit reduction targets from being met.

[10] The matching rate in 1992 for Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia was 50 percent; the lowest rate of matching was for Mississippi at 20 percent. Of states with large cities, only the following required

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Even more important for city governments, the flip side of protecting individual safety net benefits for the elderly and poor was that in order to meet the GRH deficit targets and BEA spending caps, the unprotected domestic grant programs like community services, job training, mass transit, community development block grants, community development action grants, general revenue sharing, and economic development, took disproportionately large cuts, and those domestic discretionary programs became in the aggregate a smaller and smaller part of the remaining budget.

Sometimes the cuts in unprotected programs for city governments were made not even in order to help safety net programs for poor people. In 1988, Congress eliminated all funding for community development action grants and ended that program in order to provide a major funding increase for NASA's space station.

The economic recession beginning in 1989 in the Northeast and spreading broadly since 1990 further aggravated the situation by sharply reducing revenues generated by city governments themselves and thus produced budget deficits that had to be eliminated with still another round of cutbacks in services and programs and increases in taxes.

This recession also reduced the revenues of the state governments and by expanding welfare and Medicaid rolls, forced states to use more of their revenues as matching dollars in these programs. Thus at best the states' ability to replace funds cut by the federal government was restricted and at worst state governments were forced to make cuts in previous levels of their own aid to local governments. In the fall of 1991, for example, the Michigan legislature abolished all relief or welfare that was not AFDC and thus was not partially federally funded; this meant that single men or women or couples without children would receive no cash assistance. Other states—including traditionally progressive ones like New Jersey and New York—were considering and adopting similar reductions of welfare benefits in the winter of 1991–1992.

In addition, because of a combination of what I call the Washington "don't bother us, we're broke" mentality with respect to domestic problems and the Reagan/Bush ideology of abandoning city and state governments to sink or swim on their own, the federal government did not in 1990 or 1991 legislate antirecession, countercyclical programs like emergency public works, emergency public service jobs, or countercyclical cash payments. Congress had done this over President Gerald Ford's veto in 1976 and again with President Jimmy Car-

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matching of the state share: California, 10.8 percent; Colorado, 42.7 percent; Indiana, 40 percent; Minnesota, 15 percent; New Jersey, 25 percent; New York, 50 percent; and Ohio, 5 percent. Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, *Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1991 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 609–611, Tables 13 and 14.

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ter's support in 1977 and 1978; various kinds of countercyclical spending were traditional in earlier post-World War II recessions. The antirecession package voted by Congress in 1976 and 1977 sent about $8.5 billion to city and state governments which if emulated during the 1990-1991 recession would have amounted to $17 billion in 1990 dollars.

The Future of Bailer-Out Federalism and Central Cities

For the some fifty years preceding the Reagan/Bush administrations, American federal aid policy was based on the premise that only the federal government could afford to fund benefit and services programs for poor people and grants programs for poor cities and states. It was considered right and just for the federal government to do so. Unlike that of a particular city or state, the federal government's tax reach is all encompassing; taxpayers cannot move to lower-tax jurisdictions to reduce the amount of their income taken by taxes. From World War II to the 1970s, the federal government had the most productive tax system, able to raise increasingly larger increments of revenue with each increment of economic growth or of inflation. Only the federal government is allowed to run a deficit in its annual budget and thus is capable through borrowing of spending more than it raises in revenues. And only the federal government's expenditures, tax rates, and borrowing are never subject to public referenda. Finally and most importantly, it was widely felt that the federal government was ultimately the bailer-out-of-last-resort for keeping services and benefits in all localities and states above some minimal threshold and for intervening to help with major problems that could not or were not being successfully addressed by local or state governments.

The amount of federal aid was never enough to turn cities around and solve the problems of concentrated slum poverty, drugs and crime, and aging infrastructure. Furthermore, money alone could not cure all problems, especially those requiring complicated changes of attitudes and behavior to improve learning in schools, reduce welfare dependency, and bring down crime rates.[11] But the level of federal aid made available directly to cities and indirectly through state governments at least kept conditions from deteriorating as rapidly and explosively as they have over the past ten years. It was also important to city officials and populations that the federal government cared.

Starkly put, the Reagan/Bush administrations' ideological posture was that it no longer wanted, could not afford, and did not deem it legitimate to be the ultimate subsidizer of poor people and poor local and state jurisdictions. The one exception was to actually expand Medicaid coverage to working poor, pregnant

[11] See Demetrios Caraley, "Is the Large City Becoming Ungovernable" in Robert H. Connery and Demetrios Caraley, eds., *Governing the City* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1969), 206-223; Demetrios Caraley, *City Governments and Urban Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), chaps. 17-20.

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women and their small children and to increase the maximum refundable earned income tax credit for working poor families. Both of these steps were designed to give incentives to some working poor families to keep working and not become welfare recipients. One of the central premises of the Reagan/Bush administrations' cutback policies was that it was precisely the federal tax system's productivity in taking a larger and larger tax bite out of the economy that had caused the economy of the 1970s to be so sluggish. With the stagnant but still inflationary economy of the 1970s, that bite was not coming out of real economic growth but out of the living standards of the broad middle class as it was subjected to inflation-driven bracket creep. The overriding domestic objective of the Reagan administration was, therefore, to spur vigorous economic growth with tax cuts and to rely on that projected economic growth to trickle down and take care of the problems of the poor.

The prospects for cities seeing a return once again to a more benevolent, bailer-out-of-last-resort federal government essentially depends on the federal government's self-perceived and actual budgetary constraints. It also depends on political factors such as party control in the White House, distribution of party strength in Congress, and the disposition of the American population between central cities and suburbs and between the Northeast-Midwest snowbelt and the southern and western sunbelt. Finally and perhaps most fundamentally, it depends on elite beliefs and broad public opinion—essentially the dominant public philosophy—about the responsibility of the federal government for dealing with problems of individual and family poverty and distress and for alleviating extreme disparities among local and state governments in fiscal stability and services delivered for each tax dollar collected.

Budgetary Constraints

To understand how fiscal conditions affect federal funding of programs for poor cities and poor people, it may be useful to flash back to the 1960s, when the federal government's condition was not one of fiscal stringency but of plenitude. Writing in 1966, Walter W. Heller, who had been chairman of President John F. Kennedy's and President Lyndon B. Johnson's Council of Economic Advisers, postulated that with a continuously growing economy, the then existing rates of the federal tax system would produce built-in average increases in revenues of $7 to $8 billion a year in excess of those needed to meet rising federal expenditures.[12]

Unfortunately for the treasuries of city and state governments, the escalation beginning in 1965 of the war in Vietnam absorbed all the expanded revenues that became available. But even as expenses for the Vietnam war began to contract between 1969 and 1972 with the reduction of the American ground force commitment, no new fiscal or peace dividends became available to be diverted to social

[12] Walter W. Heller, *New Dimensions of Political Economy* (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 3.

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welfare needs. First, the general reduction in personal and corporate income taxes that had been legislated in 1964, 1969, and 1971 seriously weakened the previous capacity of the federal revenue-raising system to generate large amounts of new revenues year after year. Second, just as federal tax collections were showing a substantially smaller automatic annual growth, expenditures for domestic programs, of which social security transfer payments and social welfare-oriented Great Society grant programs were a big chunk, began in 1965 to increase much more sharply than in the past and faster than the growth in the nation's economy.

The implication of these trends for domestic social welfare programs was simply that with the existing federal tax structure and even a nonrecessionary economy the projected automatic growth in domestic expenditures alone had begun to exceed the projected annual gain in revenues yielded by economic growth. Any new or expanded social welfare grant programs could not, therefore, be funded by the federal government painlessly out of fiscal dividends but had to come at the expense of other programs, from acknowledged tax increases, or from de facto bracket-creep tax increases. Another alternative for the federal government was financing new and expanded programs through continuously larger budget deficits. But that alternative too was not painless, since it was believed in the 1970s that an annual budget deficit of even $50 billion carried unacceptable inflationary effects.

Despite continued budget deficits through the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations ranging from a low of $8 billion in fiscal 1974 to highs of $70.5 and $72.7 billion in 1976 and 1980,[13] the Reagan administration went into office in 1981 with a commitment to a major increase in defense spending and a major cut in individual and corporate income taxes. Part of the Reagan justification for the tax cuts was that it would in fact cost nothing with respect to the deficit, since the extra income kept by individuals and corporations would according to supply-side economic theory stimulate enough new economic activity to generate more new revenues than the revenues forgone by the tax cut. Politically neutral technical experts at the Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxes forecast in 1981, however, a massive loss of revenues, beginning at $37.7 billion in 1982 and climbing to $267.7 billion in 1986.[14]

In short, through its tax cuts and its increased defense spending, the Reagan administration created unprecedented large budget deficits – an average of $193 billion a year over its eight years. It tripled the size of the national debt inherited from President Carter and all his predecessors from $994 billion to $2.8 trillion by 1988[15] and produced in Washington a mentality of being constantly broke. The GRH and BEA reinforced that outlook by prohibiting any increases in a

[13] *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1992, Part 7, Historical Tables* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Table 1.1.

[14] Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer, eds., *Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1984).

[15] *Budget, Historical Tables*, Table 1.1.

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spending program without compensating decreases in other programs or finding new sources of revenues. Proposed cutbacks and eliminations of social welfare programs, not spending increases and new initiatives, became the Washington agenda in the discussion of federal domestic programs. Victories in Congress for supporters of federal aid became simply saving a program from termination or having it take a smaller cut than that proposed by the Reagan or Bush administration as opposed to improving or expanding a program's quality. In this austere climate of opinion, even pro-aid Democrats went along with some cuts in order not to appear fiscally irresponsible against a backdrop of $200 to $300 billion annual deficits.

Political Factors

The importance of the party affiliation of the president and of the distribution of party strength in the two houses of Congress comes from the fact that since the 1930s, Democrats in Congress (with the exception of the southern Democrats) and Democratic presidents have supported the expansion of the federal government's role in social welfare programs for the poor and grant programs for distressed local and state governments. Republicans in Congress (with some exceptions among eastern Republicans) and Republican presidents have not.[16]

The most important political consideration for the prospects of increased city aid is whether there will ever again be a liberal, pro-city Democratic president serving with Congresses that will have heavy Democratic majorities and whether Democrats will be as pro-city as in the past. This prospect depends on whether the elections to the presidency in 1980 and 1984 of Ronald Reagan and in 1988 of George Bush reflect that a new long-term Republican electoral majority for the presidency has emerged, committed to ideological conservatism and to a reduced federal role in domestic affairs in principle and unrelated to short-term budgetary stringencies.

In the past three decades a twofold population trend has weakened the political strength of the urban East and Midwest. Within metropolitan areas, the older cities have been losing population to their suburbs. Within the nation, the East and Midwest have been losing population to the South and West. In 1990, only 30 percent of all Americans lived in central cities, while a smaller 18 percent lived in really large central cities of 250,000 or more. A full 48 percent of Americans lived in the outside-central-city or suburban portions of metropolitan areas, and 22 percent lived outside of metropolitan areas entirely.[17] Furthermore, the percentage of the white population that lived in central cities in 1990 was even

[16] See Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976): 19-45.

[17] Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 175, *Poverty in the United States: 1990* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), Table 1.

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lower—26 percent—meaning that 74 percent of the politically and economically dominant population lived in suburbs and rural areas. On the other hand, majorities of the black population—56 percent—and of the Hispanic population—52 percent—lived in central cities and experienced directly various degrees of city distress.[18]

The decline in the proportion of the population living in large cities results in a steadily decreasing number of members in the House of Representatives who represent central city districts. In the 95th, 96th, and 97th Congresses (1977–1982) only 105 districts (or 24 percent)—not even a plurality of districts—was predominantly central city. 125 (or 29 percent) were predominantly suburban, 132 (or 30 percent) rural, and 73 (or 17 percent) mixed. In the 98th Congress (1983–1984) after the reapportionment of the House to reflect the 1980 census, the number of the districts that remained predominantly central city dropped to only 94 (or 22 percent), while the predominantly suburban districts increased to 137 (or 31 percent). Of the remaining districts, 85 (or 20 percent) were rural and 118 (or 27 percent) were mixed. Even among the seats held by northern Democrats before the 1982 reapportionment, the 70 districts that were predominantly suburban slightly exceeded in number the 66 that were predominantly central city. There were also thirty-five northern Democratic constituencies that were predominantly rural. As a result of the 1990 census and the required decennial reapportionment, the 103d Congress, to be elected in 1992, will have a still smaller number of members from central cities.

In the 95th, 96th, and 97th Congresses, the suburban northern Democrats were almost as supportive of pro-city positions (averaging 88 percent) as were the central-city northern Democrats (90 percent). Even the rural northern Democrats' votes were substantially pro-city (80 percent).[19] How long northern Democratic House members from suburban and rural constituencies will continue to share the policy outlook of the Democratic central-city representatives, who are ceasing to be the dominant contingent in the northern Democratic membership, is an open question. But it is difficult to conceive of a rise in the Democratic suburban and rural level of pro-city support, so the probability is that the level will drop.

Some signs of things to come may be the House and Senate floor votes in 1988 that tried to restore some appropriations for Urban Development Action Grants, after the appropriations committees had cut them out entirely. In the House a small majority of Democrats voted for an amendment to restore some funds—51 percent (northern Democrats 66 percent, southern Democrats 19 percent). But

[18] Calculated from ibid., Table 8.

[19] This analysis is based on a long-term study of congressional voting behavior and urban programs during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. Findings were previously reported in Demetrios Caraley, "Carter, Congress, and the Cities" in Dale Rogers Marshall, ed., *Urban Policy Making*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 71–98; and Demetrios Caraley and Yvette Schlussel, "Congress and Reagan's New Federalism," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 16 (Winter 1986): 49–79.

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a majority of Republicans plus a minority of Democrats were able to outvote it and keep UDAGs dead. In the Senate not even a majority but only 48 percent of all Democrats (60 percent of northern Democrats and 24 percent of southern Democrats) voted to restore funds for UDAGs.[20] When general revenue sharing was killed in committee in 1985, there was not even an attempt to save the program by Democratic-sponsored floor amendments.

The decline in the proportion of the population living in the Northeast and Midwest has resulted in a decreasing number of representatives from those regions. As a result of the 1980 census, the states in the East and Midwest lost, and those in the South and West gained, seventeen seats. The losers were New York (five seats), Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio (two seats each), Michigan, New Jersey, Indiana, Missouri, Massachusetts, and South Dakota (one seat each). The gainers were Florida (four seats), Texas (three seats), California (two seats), New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Oregon, Tennessee, Nevada, and Washington (one seat each).

Within states the major central-city losers were St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Jersey City, Newark, and New York City. While such sunbelt central cities as Phoenix, Albuquerque, San Antonio, Houston, and San Jose gained seats, sunbelt suburban areas captured the most representatives—a net of twenty-three seats, eight in Florida alone. (It should be noted that even greater losses than those of central cities were suffered by rural areas both in the snowbelt's Midwest and in most states of the sunbelt.) In short, the loss of seats were in the East and Midwest, which gave a relatively high level of support to programs of poor persons and poor cities. The gains were in the West and South, where except for the western Democrats there have been only low levels of support.

As a result of the 1990 census, the Northeast and Midwest will again lose seats while the South and West will gain, for a net change of 16. The winners will be California (seven seats). Florida (four seats), Texas (three), and Washington, Georgia, Arizona, and North Carolina (one seat each). The biggest losers are the Northeast's and Midwest's urban states: New York (three); Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (two each for a total of eight); and New Jersey and Massachusetts (one each). Other states that will lose one seat each are Kansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, and West Virginia.

Because the Senate is never reapportioned, the impact of present population trends is more difficult to nail down. Senators in general, even Democratic senators from states with large cities, will inevitably have to recognize the increasingly suburban character of their overall constituencies. According to the 1980 census, after three decades of suburbanization, in only one state—New York—did the combined populations of all central cities of over 50,000 constitute a majority of

[20] CQ House Vote #196 and CQ Senate Vote #244, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 100th Congress, 2d Session, 1988* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1989).

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the population. On the other hand, in 1980 eleven states—Massachusetts, Florida, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Illinois, Delaware, Maryland, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and California—had majorities of their populations in suburban areas including some small suburban cities. Politically, therefore, senators are not able to afford the reputation of being out-and-out champions of large cities and of the disproportionately large concentrations of poor and blacks who live there.

Finally, the increasing suburbanization and the westward and southward flow of the population affects the intensity of presidential leadership in favor of increased federal aid to its poor and its large cities. In a nation in which after each decennial census, fewer electoral votes come from the East and Midwest and where suburban populations are increasingly in a position to outvote the residents of large cities, presidents will not find it electorally profitable to assign policy and budgetary priorities to programs that can be perceived as basically benefiting those cities and the poor who live there. Democratic presidents, whose traditional followings have included the poor and the black and others who live in large cities, will be caught in a double bind, no doubt finding it much harder to ignore the needs of those city dwellers since they constitute the bedrock of Democratic presidential strength and are essential for capturing the Democratic presidential nomination.

In 1976, for example, President Carter's victory depended on the almost two-to-one majorities or better he received in such cities as New York, Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Oakland, and Baltimore. Substantial parts of those majorities came from black voters, who were estimated as having cast 90 percent of their votes for Carter nationally. The large majorities built up in New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Toledo, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Kansas City accounted for Carter's statewide margins of victory in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Missouri, without which he would not have had the electoral votes to win the presidency.[21] When Carter sought reelection in 1980, he again needed and sought strong support among large-city and black electorates and again received very large majorities in such cities as New York (70 percent), Chicago (72 percent), Philadelphia (63 percent), Detroit (82 percent), Baltimore (77 percent), San Francisco (62 percent), Boston (62 percent), New Orleans (59 percent), St. Louis (69 percent). Yet because of the large-scale erosion of his support outside of central cities, in no case except Baltimore and Maryland did Carter's large city-wide majorities enable him to carry the state and its electoral votes.[22]

Walter Mondale in 1984 also cultivated large-city and black constituencies, even though that opened him to the charge that he was catering to special interests.

[21] Calculated from Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray, *America Votes 12, 1976*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1977).

[22] Calculated from Scammon and McGillivray, *American Votes 14, 1980*.

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But Mondale, too, while succeeding in amassing large majorities in many big cities—for example, New York (61 percent), Chicago (65 percent), Detroit (81 percent), Baltimore (72 percent), San Francisco (68 percent), and St. Louis (65 percent)—nevertheless lost every state with large cities except his home state of Minnesota.[23]

In 1988, Michael Dukakis, who at no time in his campaign proposed increased federal aid for poor cities and poor people, won some states—Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington State, and Wisconsin—by scoring large majorities in their largest cities. Yet Dukakis lost other states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—despite the majorities he won in their largest cities; these majorities were not, however, as large as Carter's or Mondale's, which may reflect his ignoring urban needs in his campaign.[24]

Public Philosophy in Elite and Public Opinion

There is the possibility of an even more fundamental, long-term threat to resumption of a benevolent bailer-out federalism. This would be the case if there has developed a new public philosophy among political elites and in broad public opinion that opposes efforts by the federal government to redistribute resources from persons, government jurisdictions, and geographic areas of relative affluence to those of relative poverty and distress in order to reduce wide disparities within the nation. Such a philosophy may be reaching not only Republican but also Democratic members of Congress and Democratic aspirants to the presidency. Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that there is essentially no turnover in Congress, only 163 of 435 members of the House and 50 of the 100 senators serving in 1991-1992 also served as long ago as the last years of the Carter administration—1979-1980—and therefore have personal recollection of being part of a body that considered it normal to help needy governmental jurisdictions and poor people.

Certainly nothing in the 1984 and 1988 elections suggested that many Americans were demanding that cuts in federal aid to local and state governments and social welfare spending be restored, despite government statistics and other studies showing a rise in the percentage of the population in poverty. To the extent that they took domestic policy into account, most Americans seemed willing, in exchange for renewed economic growth and tax cuts, to tolerate a disproportionately large share of growth going to families with income in the highest quintile. They also seemed to tolerate a permanent lowering of the economic floor below which the conditions of the poor and the services of large city governments had not been allowed to drop in the 1970s.

[23] Calculated from Scammon and McGillivray, *America Votes 16, 1984*.
[24] Calculated from Scammon and McGillivray, *America Votes 18, 1988*.

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Another part of such a new sink-or-swim public philosophy would be an acceptance by Americans of the view that localities and states have to operate on their own, regardless of how meager their economic base might be relative to the service and program needs of their citizens. This would be so despite the fact that some jurisdictions with terrible conditions might be imposing higher taxes than those with the best conditions.

Will the Bush administration quickly succeed in restoring—as the Reagan administration had maintained from 1982 to 1988—economic growth leading to at least the perception of improvement in standards of living for middle-class Americans? If it should do this and continue to prevent general tax increases, the Reagan/Bush administration's policy of reducing support for the nonworking poor and reducing or eliminating aid to city and state governments might become permanently embedded in the national consensus.

Is Another Scenario Possible?

If on the other hand, the 1989–1992 recession drags on and continues to bring sharp economic dislocations, there may be a shift from reducing the federal benefactory role and from economic and tax policies disproportionately favoring high-income people and large corporations toward more traditional Democratic policies for dealing with recessions. Such policies would include increased federal spending to stimulate the economy and to provide public service and public works jobs for the unemployed both through direct federal spending and through grants to local and state governments in order to provide countercyclical impact. This would be difficult, even for Democrats, if the size of the budget deficit were still massive, since such spending might temporarily increase the deficit. (See Figure 6.) But a recessionary economy that does not spend for countercyclical programs also increases the deficit by reducing revenues and increasing uncontrollable spending for those brought into unemployment and poverty. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union makes possible over time substantial reductions in the defense budget and permits savings in defense beginning in fiscal year 1994 to count as pay-as-you-go increases in domestic spending. The BEA could also be amended to allow it even for the fiscal 1993 budget appropriations being considered during the 1992 congressional session.

Even then there probably would not be a climate of opinion in favor of reviving and restrengthening federal grants to city governments and other social welfare programs to the spending peak they had reached in 1978. There would be the need to be highly selective about what programs to concentrate on and thus to target federal aid both to truly needy people, and also only to truly needy local jurisdictions.

The major vehicles for delivering federal aid to local jurisdictions should be two formula grants, one a countercyclical program to trigger in and out according to some preset high level of unemployment and another program for structural fiscal distress to compensate for high levels of poverty and low taxable resources.

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FIGURE 6


NATIONAL BUDGET DEFICITS, INTEREST ON THE DEBT, AND COMBINED BUDGETS OF 50 LARGEST CITIES (>300,000 IN POPULATION)
Billions of dollars
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
ANNUAL DEFICITS
INTEREST ON NATIONAL DEBT
COMBINED CITY BUDGETS
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
MASSIVE INCREASE IN DEFICITS AND INCREASE IN INTEREST PAYMENTS ON NAT. DEBT HAVE REDUCED LEEWAY IN FED.SPENDING

Unlike the original revenue sharing program passed in 1972 that made payments of varying size to every single general purpose local government and to all state governments, a high threshold of need or distress should be set for a jurisdiction to be eligible to receive any aid at all. Above that threshold, the sharper the distress, the deeper should be the subsidy. Traditionally, with a major exception for agricultural subsidies, Congress has not looked with favor on grant programs that do not potentially benefit a majority of congressional districts and states. But the reality of limited resources might change the mindsets of members of Congress sufficiently for them to allow targeting of those scarce resources sharply.

For this to happen, political leaders, commentators, and other opinion elites will have to articulate and reaffirm in elite and public opinion a philosophy that stresses the federal government's role as a benevolent bailer-out of last resort, somewhat like a giant insurance company, available for compensating individuals and governmental jurisdictions hit by short- or long-term emergencies beyond their powers to control.

After all, the actions of city governments did not cause the high rates of poverty, welfare dependency, violent crime, AIDS, homelessness, and the esca-

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lating cost of medical care. Nor did city governments cause the national recession that has savaged their revenues. Among all political leaders, the president has the largest capacity to command media and public attention and reshape the nation's public philosophy to have more concern for the problems of distressed city governments and the people who live within their jurisdictions.

Events, when explained in the proper framework, can also remind Americans of their self-interest in a strong and non-broke federal government, given the transitory nature of much good fortune and the vulnerability to problems and distress of persons and jurisdictions once thought to be permanently well-off and advantaged. Such events include the economic distress suffered in the mid-1980s by sunbelt cities and states because of the decline of oil prices, the protection of savers through the bailout of the savings and loan industry, the aid for repairing the damage caused by Hurricane Hugo on the East coast and by the San Francisco earthquake, the financing of the Gulf war, and the budget crises of such recently economically high-flying states as Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California.

After ten years of Reagan and Bush administration rhetoric, political leaders at some point will need to reeducate Americans to believe again that federal government programs can and have worked. Political and other opinion leaders must also persuade Americans that although it is an unpleasant fact of life to pay taxes, taxes are not some great punishment justifying massive rage against political leaders who support tax increases on the reality-based principle that there cannot be governmental services and programs without people paying taxes to fund them. To paraphrase King Lear's advice to his daughter Cordelia, Nothing will come of nothing: think again.

There must emerge political leadership to point out the paradox and inconsistency of arguing, as President Bush did in his 1991 State of the Union message, that government bureaucracies cannot be trusted to achieve desirable domestic goals and values but foreign policy organs and military forces—these bureaucracies somehow are not called that—can. There is another important paradox and inconsistency to which leaders must call attention. We have shown by deed that we can train minority youth from big city slums to operate, maintain, and repair the most complicated military weapons and equipment; yet many political leaders still argue it is impossible to train such youth in skills that will bring them good jobs in the civilian economy and that it is a waste of money to fund programs that try to do so.

Fortunately for the overall good of the nation, in the United States poor people and highly distressed local government jurisdictions are only a minority. This would be a surprise to James Madison who was worrying in *The Federalist* No. 10 about a tyranny by a majority faction of poor against a minority of the wealthy and about the expropriation of the rich by the poor. Madison could not have conceived of the present situation where any tyranny is one of an insensitive majority of well-off or well-enough-off that ignores the minority which is poor. If a democracy is to remain stable, the majority must be humane enough to take care of minorities who have serious problems and who because of those problems

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and lack of numbers will never have political strength to impose their own policy solutions through their own political power. The ultimate power of a desperate minority that feels permanently abandoned and lives without hope is an escalation of violence, crime, drug use, begging, and out-of-wedlock children—all already much too high. While this behavior is primarily self-destructive, it also hurts city governments by making large cities less and less attractive to those who would choose to live in them but have the economic capacity to move, even if reluctantly, to more attractive locales.

Realistically, the bottom line is this: For the majority in America to feel generous enough to sacrifice part of its income as taxes to ameliorate the conditions of poor cities and poor people not just as an antirecession expedient, two things have to happen. The economic condition of that majority would have to be improving sharply and the president must be urging the majority to want to help. The economic growth required is more than the selective kind of the Reagan years, which delivered real improvements in the standard of living only to the top quintile of earners in the population.[25] Generosity toward poor people and needy city governments requires truly vigorous economic growth that will bring tangible and substantial improvements in the standard of living of those earners in the middle three quintiles who have been working harder and harder in the past ten years just to stay even.*

[25] See Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, *Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1991 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1204, Table 35.

* This article is a revised and condensed version of a paper delivered at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC. I thank Scott Adler, Vilma Caraley, Michael Delli Carpini, Melissa Elstein, Anne Newland, Richard Pious, Judith Russell, and Robert Shapiro for reading and commenting on drafts of this article. I also thank Scott Adler, Judy Aks, Melissa Elstein, and Priya Nanda for various kinds of research assistance.

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APPENDIX

City or Suburban Ring S = suburban ring	*Median Family Income*	*Percent Population in Poverty*	*Median Income per Percent of Poverty*
Newark	$11,989	32.8	$366
El PasoS	$12,584	26.1	$482
Atlanta	$13,591	27.5	$494
Miami	$13,355	24.5	$545
New Orleans	$15,003	26.4	$568
Baltimore	$15,721	22.9	$687
Birmingham	$15,210	22.0	$691
St. Louis	$15,265	21.8	$700
Norfolk	$14,779	20.7	$714
Cleveland	$15,991	22.1	$724
El Paso	$15,746	21.2	$743
Buffalo	$15,432	20.7	$746
San Antonio	$15,859	20.9	$759
Memphis	$16,921	21.8	$776
Detroit	$17,033	21.9	$778
Boston	$16,062	20.2	$795
Philadelphia	$16,388	20.6	$796
Tampa	$15,350	18.7	$821
New York	$16,818	20.0	$841
Cincinnati	$16,800	19.7	$853
Chicago	$18,776	20.3	$925
Oakland	$17,651	18.5	$954
AlbuquerqueS	$16,227	16.8	$966
Washington, DC	$19,099	18.6	$1,027
Pittsburgh	$17,499	16.5	$1,061
Jacksonville	$17,646	16.0	$1,103
Columbus	$18,612	16.5	$1,128
Tucson	$17,395	14.7	$1,183
Norfolk—Virg.BeachS	$18,391	15.5	$1,187
Los Angeles	$19,467	16.4	$1,187
Akron	$18,031	15.0	$1,202
Austin	$19,531	15.8	$1,236
Fort Worth city	$18,237	13.9	$1,312
MemphisS	$20,686	15.4	$1,343
Long Beach	$19,650	14.2	$1,384
Dallas city	$19,703	14.2	$1,388
Milwaukee	$19,738	13.8	$1,430
JacksonvilleS	$18,546	12.8	$1,449
Minneapolis	$19,737	13.5	$1,462
Toledo	$20,220	13.6	$1,487
Portland	$19,501	13.0	$1,500
Kansas City	$20,034	13.2	$1,518
San Francisco	$20,911	13.7	$1,526
Nashville	$19,366	12.6	$1,537
MiamiS	$20,203	12.5	$1,616
Albuquerque	$20,061	12.4	$1,618
San Diego	$20,133	12.4	$1,624

continued

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APPENDIX (continued)

City or Suburban Ring S = suburban ring	*Median Family income*	*Percent Population in Poverty*	*Median Income per Percent of Poverty*
Oklahoma City	$19,565	12.0	$1,630
Charlotte	$20,258	12.4	$1,634
BirminghamS	$20,159	11.8	$1,708
Houston	$21,881	12.7	$1,723
Omaha	$20,458	11.4	$1,795
Indianapolis	$20,715	11.5	$1,801
TampaS	$16,841	9.3	$1,811
Phoenix	$20,365	11.1	$1,835
Tulsa	$19,615	10.4	$1,886
St. Paul	$20,743	10.9	$1,903
NashvilleS	$19,987	10.4	$1,922
AustinS	$22,189	11.4	$1,946
Seattle	$22,096	11.2	$1,973
LA—Long BeachS	$22,182	11.2	$1,981
San DiegoS	$20,429	10.3	$1,983
Tulsa	$20,956	10.4	$2,015
Wichita	$20,893	10.2	$2,048
TucsonS	$21,525	10.4	$2,070
PhoenixS	$20,605	9.9	$2,081
CharlotteS	$19,630	9.1	$2,157
San AntonioS	$21,386	9.8	$2,182
New OrleansS	$21,775	9.9	$2,199
Oklahoma CityS	$20,488	9.0	$2,276
Honolulu	$23,712	10.0	$2,371
Virginia Beach	$21,809	8.9	$2,450
HonoluluS	$23,422	9.1	$2,574
AtlantaS	$22,694	8.3	$2,734
St. LouisS	$23,050	7.6	$3,033
San Jose	$25,598	8.2	$3,122
ToledoS	$23,273	7.3	$3,188
PittsburghS	$22,024	6.9	$3,192
PortlandS	$23,004	7.2	$3,195
PhiladelphiaS	$23,722	7.1	$3,341
CincinnatiS	$22,888	6.8	$3,366
Kansas CityS	$23,507	6.8	$3,457
Dallas—FortWorthS	$23,633	6.7	$3,527
OmahaS	$22,273	6.3	$3,535
BostonS	$24,300	6.8	$3,574
San Francisco—OaklS	$26,347	7.3	$3,609
BuffaloS	$22,255	6.1	$3,648
ColumbusS	$22,898	6.2	$3,693
AkronS	$23,340	6.3	$3,705
ClevelandS	$25,409	6.8	$3,737
HoustonS	$26,749	7.1	$3,767
WichitaS	$22,815	6.0	$3,803
IndianapolisS	$23,228	6.1	$3,808
NewarkS	$26,640	6.4	$4,163
SeattleS	$25,693	6.1	$4,213

continued

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APPENDIX (continued)

City or Suburban Ring *S = suburban ring*	*Median Family income*	*Percent Population in Poverty*	*Median Income per Percent of Poverty*
BaltimoreS	$24,804	5.6	$4,429
San JoseS	$27,898	6.1	$4,573
DetroitS	$26,888	5.7	$4,717
New YorkS	$27,443	5.6	$4,901
Washington,DC,S	$29,563	5.5	$5,375
ChicagoS	$27,762	4.7	$5,907
Minneapoilis—St.PaulS	$26,093	4.4	$5,930
MilwaukeeS	$26,596	3.4	$7,822

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The Procedural Presidency of George Bush

KERRY MULLINS
AARON WILDAVSKY

Where it was easy to observe that President Jimmy Carter was more interested in management than in politics, and President Ronald Reagan was more interested in politics than in administration, it is not so easy to get a fix on President George Bush. What is one to think of a president who, after some thirty-odd years in politics, has few apparent policy preferences? Why, during one of the greatest revolutionary periods in world history, when the American values of democracy and capitalism have received the most remarkable validation by other peoples, has the president of the United States virtually nothing to say except to raise fears of instability? Where is the evidence of what the best vitae in American public life has brought George Bush in terms of applied wisdom to guide his behavior as president? What kind of leadership is it that refers more to world events over which human beings have little control than to the president himself? What is one to make of a leader who regards "the vision thing"—charting a path and then moving people in that direction, as his predecessor had done—as if it were a disease?

Here we attempt to make explicit the values and beliefs that would make sense out of George Bush's presidential style. Using the resources of cultural theory,[1]

[1] Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

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which relate shared values to the patterns of social relationships they justify, we shall try to recreate the cultural context out of which President George Bush works. Cultural analysis posits several ways of life, each operating from a different set of premises. Given different views of how the world works, different behaviors are rational. Which ones in relation to what objects, we ask, fit George Bush?

Intertwining Hierarchy and Individualism

His is, above all, a cultural context of inclusive hierarchy whose object is to integrate all elements of the American polity (classes, races, regions, interests, even political opponents) into a cohesive whole in which leaders serve followers and, in return, followers, seeing the leaders sacrifice for the whole, grant them the authority due their positions. This is not the exclusive hierarchy in which those who do not obey the letter of the law are expelled; in George Bush's encompassing hierarchy, there is always room at the inn. Because inclusive hierarchies are so accommodating, however, theirs is not a hierarchy of command but of persuasion, in which authorities have the right to say what ought to be done, but citizens need not comply unless they are persuaded.

George Bush is also partly individualistic. He likes competition and capitalism. Individuals, especially those born to advantage, need the opportunity to prove themselves against their equals. Economies grow best when they allow room for entrepreneurs to innovate so as to better serve their fellow citizens. Yet competition, important as it is, must not be allowed to destabilize the accommodations among groups of diverse Americans that hold this potentially explosive people together. American vitality, Bush believes, is best expressed through individualism. But American unity is best preserved through the sense of a caring collective conveyed by leaders whose main purpose is not, as conservative theorist Michael Oakeshott expressed it, to steer the ship of state in a particular direction but rather to keep it on an even keel while nurturing the gentle arts of civility. In this moderating and civilizing task, Bush believes, none are better qualified than those who have devoted their lives to public service, to becoming part of a government that includes ever-larger sections of the population in an expanding consensus.

Bush's individualist sympathies are particularly evident in the economic realm. Rather than taking a paternalistic attitude toward social welfare issues, he appears to prefer market solutions and freedom of choice. Free-enterprise zones are offered as a remedy for economically distressed areas of the country. He took a strong stance against a large increase in the minimum wage, emphasizing employer choice over worker protection. And despite his strong defense of the family, he has resisted limiting employer discretion by mandating three months leave for workers to take care of family responsibilities. But the most obvious example was his "no new taxes" pledge. By emphasizing the private market as

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the source of growth, he legitimates individual profit over extension of central government.

As long as he maintained his "no new taxes" pledge, Bush could not perform as a hierarchical leader. Hierarchical governments require extensive tax revenue to demonstrate concern for the less well off and to build impressive displays. Bush cannot use the highway and airport trust funds, which stand idle, because their presence reduces the deficit. He cannot take the lead against homelessness or fight the drug wars. He cannot tell foreign nations to sacrifice (that is, Japan and/or Korea on diminishing protection of home industry), if he, the president of the United States, does not go first. How can Bush bail out Russia to maintain international stability without the wherewithal to do so? Where individualist Ronald Reagan needed money mainly for defense, so a decline in danger would be met by lowering taxes; Bush, as a hierarchical leader, wishes to do so even more. In addition, a hierarch's devotion to balance is much greater than the individualist who sees opportunity in instability. For all these reasons, we expected Bush to raise revenues. And, following the hierarchical belief in sacrificing for the collective, Bush's higher taxes, insofar as possible, will be placed on consumption.

Governmental intervention in individual and corporate decision making is necessary to the hierarch, abhorrent to the individualist. Bush spent eight years in an administration well known for its dislike of most forms of governmental regulation, playing a central role as head of the task force on deregulation. His actions as president, however, have distressed some strong opponents of regulation.[2] His administration's policies in areas such as the environment, occupational health, and gun control reflect at minimum a shift in emphasis from the strong antiregulation flavor of the Reagan administration.

In his attitude toward AIDS, Bush demonstrates a blend of individual and collective responsibility. His strong preference for traditional family structures would indicate a suspicion of homosexual activity. Yet he also believes that the system must take care of its members, and he appears unwilling to define gay men as external to his hierarchy. He has thus defined nontraditional sexual activity as wrong, as behavior for which the individual must bear some responsibility. But it remains incumbent on society to work toward alleviating the damage done. "We don't spurn the accident victim who didn't wear a seat belt. We don't reject the cancer patient who didn't quit smoking cigarettes. We try to love them and care for them and comfort them. We do not fire them. We don't evict them. We don't cancel their insurance."[3] Thus the president has continued but not expanded funding on research to fight the disease.

Elements of individualistic values in Bush's world view certainly exist but have perhaps weakened over the years. On at least two occasions, both during his

[2] Albert Karr and Michel McQueen, "Adjusting Course," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 November 1989.

[3] Bush, quoted in Phillip J. Hilts, "Bush, in First Address on AIDS, Backs a Bill to Protect Its Victims," *New York Times*, 30 March 1990.

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twenties, he deviated from the traditional path. Against the wishes of his family and older friends, he delayed his entrance to Yale by joining the navy in 1942, becoming the youngest naval aviator. Then, after graduating from Yale, he turned down a safe position in his father's financial firm for a job in the Texas oil fields. In both instances he chose competition and danger over safety and security. Moving to an alien region (although not without family friends supporting him) stands as the most dramatic break from tradition. It is remarkable precisely because it is an unusual event in Bush's life. Having tried and tested himself, his governmental career is largely the story of deference to hierarchical values.

Perhaps it takes one politician to know another. "The Americans," the leader of the opposition in Britain, Neil Kinnock, said, "are no longer wedded to the magic of the market place." That notion was reinforced by Dennis Healy, a former deputy leader of the Labour party, who told the BBC that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Bush did not get on because "Bush . . . represents the sort of upper-class wet she most dislikes in Britain" (In Thatcher terminology, 'wets' are members of her party who cry too much about poor people.) As for a president who believes in the rules of the democratic game, including an honorable place for opposition, he opened his door to all such leaders because "that's the way it ought to be."[4]

Bush was raised to value competition, but competition among equals guided by shared rules. Recognition of one's worth must come from others rather than from oneself. Thus a win is only a win when judged as such by the society. And a game fairly played is not to be regretted or resented if lost. A similar mixture of hierarchic and individualistic attributes, with the balance favoring hierarchy, can be seen in his personal style. Most attention has been devoted to characteristics consistent with hierarchy: conciliation, cooperation, and personal warmth. There is, however, a different side of Bush that can emerge under conditions of adversity. Most recently, Bush has gone on the offensive in his 1992 reelection campaign referring to the Democratic opposition as "carping little liberals."[5]

On several occasions, Bush has evidenced a carefully controlled combative streak. He described his debate with Geraldine Ferraro by saying he "kicked some ass." His celebrated "debate" with Dan Rather, in which Bush was deliberately combative, was viewed by many as improving his image. Negative campaign tactics led to confusion on the part of political forecasters, who could not describe whether that tone, or Bush's more general tendency toward conciliation, would dominate the administration's relations with Congress.

During the campaign, Bush absorbed continual charges of inability to lead. As president, his foreign policy had been repeatedly attacked as indecisive and reactive. Panama, especially, had been a sore point for several months. Sustained

[4] *The Independent* (London), 18 April 1990.

[5] Heard on radio as part of George Bush's stump speech in New Hampshire, 22 January 1992.

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criticism alluding to personal weakness seems to spur Bush to more aggressive behavior. Such assertiveness strikes a shrill note, however, when contrasted with his general preference for coalitions over confrontations. Perhaps he feels the need, or the justification, to strike back only when criticism has exceeded what he considers the boundaries of fair play.

Bush says he had developed a fairly high tolerance for criticism. He prides himself on not letting it get "under his skin." "I've gotten immune to criticism. It used to bother me but now I think all you can do is be what you are, get back to real values and do your best."[6] He almost seems to be saying that he has moved from an individualistic (substantive, bottom line) to a hierarchical (procedural) mode of response. He often refers to his experience with an ulcer as the event that changed his attitude toward handling stressful situations.[7] "That's why I had ulcers 20 years ago, because . . . I kept it all inside, but I've learned now to get out there, do your best, get the best information you can, have confidence in good people. And those fundamental principles are guiding me now."[8] It is possible that his mellow attitude does not come naturally, that it is something he has had to learn at some personal cost. Bush connects not worrying about negative comments with reliance on values. But he does not usually say what these values consist of. He knows, of course, but we surmise they are no less important for being platitudinous—hard work, fair play, faith, friendship. As Bush put it in his inaugural address, "The old ideas are new again because they are not old, they are timeless: duty, sacrifice, commitment, and a patriotism that finds its expression in taking part and pitching in."[9]

Analysis of some of President Bush's vetoes reveals a striking hierarchical pattern. Three stem from his early anti-abortion stand, one is a technicality, another is opposition to a too-high minimum wage, and the other seven are in defense of presidential prerogatives. Thus Bush vetoed a foreign aid bill because "it interfered with my constitutional authority to conduct" foreign relations. He vetoed a bill that would have made it a crime for governmental officials to use what were termed "indirect means" in support of foreign policy objectives prohibited by law, on the grounds that it would "impermissibily constrict" the president. Other vetoes involved dealing with China and Japan his way and restricting the ability of Congress to make partisan appointments and to regulate railroads outside the executive branch.[10] With this much data and a little political understanding—as Republicans win the presidency and Democrats gain majorities in Congress, each party tends to identify with the branch of government in which it is strongest—these vetoes begin to make sense. At one and the same

[6] Quoted in Maureen Dowd, "Aides Fret, but Bush Has to 'Be Me,' " *New York Times*, 8 August 1988.

[7] George Bush, *Looking Forward* (New York: Doubleday, 1987).

[8] Bush, press conference, 8 November 1989.

[9] Bush, inaugural address, 9 February 1989.

[10] *Albuquerque Journal*, 15 July 1990.

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time, Bush is defending his party and his powers. Moral boundaries (such as abortion) and institutional boundaries (the separation of powers) are joined, as we would expect from a person with hierarchical beliefs.

INSIDERS VERSUS OUTSIDERS

Bush's response to situations of adversity may be explained by reference to insiders and outsiders. He is willing to tolerate a great deal from those he considers part of the system. As an inclusive hierarch, his tendency is to define people and institutions as part of the system. If they are not, he tries to make them—Russians, Chinese, whoever—part of his extended family. Yet once the invisible line is crossed, the rules are changed and friendly competition becomes serious adversity. Despite Bush's assertion that he never holds grudges, several former allies seem to have had a different experience. Bush's refusal to bury the hatchet with columnist George Will is well known. Conservative activist Paul Weyrich, who was responsible for some of the allegations against John Tower, has found himself excluded from policy circles, as have several other associates.[11]

Moving from outside to insider is also possible. The evolution of Bush's position on the Soviet Union can be seen as one example. He was initially very skeptical of Soviet conversion and much more reluctant than was Reagan, foe of the "evil empire," to trust Gorbachev. In an international context, America was the relevant hierarchy, and the Soviet Union most definitely external. Trusting the Soviet Union meant reordering his concept of who was included and who was excluded in his definition of the system. Redefinition on this scale may account for some of his hesitancy in reacting to changes in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As William K. Muir suggested to us, Bush's service in the United Nations may have disposed him to see the Soviets as more human.

China, on the other hand, has been a part of Bush's world for a long time. He developed personal bonds and an identification with the people of China during his tenure as chief of the U.S. Liaison Offices in the mid-1970s.[12] His treatment of the Chinese leadership as part of his hierarchy is reflected in his policy toward them in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. Bush felt strongly enough about his relationship with China to defy congressional and public opinion. He risked a near defeat on his veto of a popular bill to protect Chinese students. He has continued China's status as a "most favored nation" enjoying the lowest tariffs on imports. Rather than confrontation through formal channels, he chose personal negotiation and moral pressure. These are the tactics appropriate between parties within the same system. Whether China actually fits the status Bush would like

[11] Michel McQueen, "When Bush Fishes for Advice or Information, He Casts His Net into a Wide Sea of Contacts," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 1989.

[12] Bush, *Looking Forward*.

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it to have is another matter. The fact that China supported United Nations sanctions against Iraq has made Bush's overture seem more desirable than it did on its own.

Bush's definition of insiders and outsiders affects his view of domestic problems, particularly the drug issue. His discussion of drug use contains some of the strongest rhetoric he has used as president. "Perhaps the greatest challenge of our times . . . the continuing struggle to keep drugs out of our high schools . . . a form of pollution, a poisoning of the mind, a corruption of the very soul of young America."[13] Drug use is defined as far beyond anything acceptable to his system. By labeling drug providers, and to a lesser degree, drug users, as enemies, certain policies are suggested. "The tolerance . . . of casual users or the exclusion of one echelon of society for using drugs and then going after another is unacceptable . . . The day of tolerance for those who break the law in using drugs is over, and should be over.[14] Drug use, for Bush, casts one completely outside of society. No longer can this be mediated by class status or extenuating circumstance. No distinction is made between various kinds of illegal drugs; all are external—and thus a threat—to the system. Although his individualism as well as pressure from his party led Bush to reject provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, he eventually signed the law because he wanted racial inclusion. His statements that the law did not mandate positive discrimination no doubt reflect his hope that individualism and hierarchy may be reconciled.

Bush's emphasis is on interdiction and on punishment of deviants. The military and the police play the largest role in a war against the drug scourge. Although treatment is not excluded from the agenda, its secondary role is an attempt to resocialize deviants back into the system. Given the seriousness of the threat to order, lesser values such as the right to privacy may have to be sacrificed.

Working from a perspective of hierarchial exclusion and inclusion, Bush's puzzling treatment of minorities gains some degree of coherency. From his first involvement in politics, he has emphasized improving the Republican image among blacks and Hispanics. He worked hard as a county chair in Texas to include minorities. As president, he has attempted to demonstrate a sensitivity to issues of minority rights. At the same time, however, his individualist inclinations suggest taking opportunity, not welfare, is the right route to go.

Some say his rhetoric does not always square with his actions. Bush has been criticized for failing to pursue policies aimed at substantial improvement for minorities. According to Congressman Don Edwards (D-CA), "In civil rights, Mr. Bush has not been kinder and gentler."[15] Assuming Bush is simply mouthing empty rhetoric for political reasons fails to explain the consistency of his focus

[13] Bush, remarks at the Boy Scout National Jamboree in Bowling Green, Virginia, 7 August 1989.
[14] Bush, press conference, 15 August 1989.
[15] Maralee Schwartz, "Liberal ADA Gives President Failing Marks," *Washington Post*, 18 January 1990.

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on inclusion of blacks and Hispanics. His predecessor felt no need to address the issue at all.

Bush's desire for inclusion makes the issue of minority exclusion a serious problem, a contradiction in his coherent system. An individualist will see, perhaps, the need to improve the condition of competition. Bush sees the need to make everyone feel welcome, to be invited in to take part in discussions, to be given the chance to contribute for the good of the whole. To entertain the idea that the system itself might require fundamental change to integrate the historically excluded threatens the stability Bush holds so dear.

Bush's urge is to pull everybody into one cooperative whole. Family, faith, and country are the principles needed for a system of mutual support in an unpredictable world. The crucial position of the traditional family structure in maintaining stability intertwines both moral and institutional values. The family is the most basic hierarchy on which all others depend. "As I look at the fabric of society, and then look at the instability of family relationships, I see a real threat to our future."[16] He believes that "so many of the problems out there are because of this new trend towards single parent families."[17] Any orderly structure has to be complete.

To Bush, "family and faith represent the moral compass of the Nation."[18] His most passionate rhetoric centers around hierarchical concerns. "The underpinning of society . . . comes from the family. And I do not want to see one piece of legislation passed that diminishes the family choice or that weakens the family in any way, whether it's welfare legislation, child care legislation, or whatever legislation."[19]

The strength of his moral values, particularly religious ones, may present problems with the separation of church and state—an issue he claims to have thought about when shot down in the Pacific during World War II.[20] Hard as it is to believe that such thoughts occupied a young soldier expecting capture by the enemy, perhaps it was then that he formed his compromise on the dilemma. By conceptualizing faith as morality instead of religion, the problem evaporates. He avers, "We believe in the separation of church and state, but not in the separation of morality or moral values and state."[21]

Despite the attempt to eliminate the issue, moral/religious questions remain central to some of the most divisive political debates: prayer in schools and abortion. What is particularly interesting is that he has altered his position on

[16] Bush, remarks at a luncheon hosted by the Forum Club, 16 March 1989.

[17] Bush, remarks at a White House briefing for the State Legislators' Working Group, 20 March 1989.

[18] Bush, address before a joint session of Congress, 9 February 1989.

[19] Bush, remarks at a White House briefing for the American Legislature Exchange Council, 28 April 1989.

[20] Bush, *Looking Forward*.

[21] Bush, remarks at a breakfast meeting with religious leaders, 4 May 1989.

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both of these issues in recent years. Even his attitude toward the family has undergone a certain shift in emphasis; once a strong supporter of family planning, he now vetoes birth control legislation. By reversing his stand on the Equal Rights Amendment, he throws his support behind a traditional family structure and stronger hierarchical order. As the strength of social conservatism has grown within the Republican party, Bush has moved along with it.

His preferences concerning appropriate child care legislation also support a strong family structure. Rather than emphasizing direct provision, his program is one of tax exemptions. Parental choice is thus protected. Here, the goals of hierarchy mesh with those of individualism—parental authority and freedom from government dictates are both served equally well.

The Hand of Fate

The sense of the value of order and the consequent fear of disorder that come from an inclusive hierarchical conception of the good society, leavened by a sense of the adventure of enterprise, would not, by themselves, cause the aversion to vision that George Bush shares with such preservationist conservatives as Edmund Burke. Bush need not have read them to share their sense of the fragility of institutions, the importance of manners in governing consent, and the desirability of limiting change so as not to rend the social fabric. Yet there is something more to Bush's "follow the events" leadership style.

Bush does not quite believe that society operates in random ways, so there is no way of intervening in it with good effect. Nor, evidently, does he believe that human nature is treacherous, so that no one outside the family can be trusted. These hallmarks of fatalism, whose adherents believe they can do nothing positive to affect their fate, obviously do not apply to a man who has done a great deal to elevate himself to the presidency. Nevertheless, Bush reveals a fatalistic streak, albeit in a milder manner. He acts as if he sees the world if not exactly as random then at least as highly uncertain, with large, perhaps dominant, unpredictable elements. If one believes that each new set of events is different from any that preceded it, no general theory of public policy will serve. Nor would the holder of such views expect to push events in a predetermined direction. The best one might do is avoid going too fast, latching on to events in order to nudge them slightly in one direction or another. The path of vision is fraught with danger to a hierarch tinged with fatalism, because it unleashes passions that threaten disorder without the hope that any abstract vision can be realized or, lacking sufficient social complexity, that if realized, is likely to be found good.

The policy-political groupies (ourselves included) who are likely to write about presidents think so much in terms of leadership as proposing substantive programs that they are puzzled when they do not find what they expect—Carter's lack of politics, Reagan's lack of administration, Bush's lack of policy. Where Carter thought primarily of effective implementation, and Reagan of new direc-

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tions (especially because he did not believe they were impossible), Bush sees people of all kinds, shapes, and varieties who must be persuaded to consent.

That sums up the differences and the difficulties we-the-observers have in understanding Bush-the-president. Given good people who are loyal and competent (in that order), as demonstrated by experience and who relate to one another in protective ways, good things can happen, if not always, then sometimes. For if the world is a precarious place, often out of joint, held together barely by the one enduring factor—personal relationships—expecting losses as well as gains is the beginning of wisdom. Pinning hopes on any one action is unwise. A good batting average, taking advantage of situations in which the previously unknowable becomes manifest, is the best a good leader can do.

The Persian Gulf war raised Bush's already high approval ratings[22] to the unprecedentedly higher level of near 90 percent. Bush became the only recent president to show increasing support from the other party.[23] As his second year began, Bush's 80 percent approval was second highest only to John F. Kennedy's after the Bay of Pigs,[24] an irony soon to be realized. As the economy worsened in the latter half of 1991 and unemployment rose, the president's popularity began to decline until it dropped below the 50 percent mark as 1992 began. Bush was not helped as the contradictions pointed out in the following sections of this article were manifested in frequent policy reversals. He was not, to say the least, the darling of the media. Economic adversity, combined with the inadequacies of his procedural approach to leadership already discernible when he was thought unbeatable, combined to make his presidency more problematic.

The Presidential Network, or Government by the Friends (and the Friends of the Friends) of George Bush

Avoiding sharp edges and angularities, Bush seeks the smooth integration of disparate parts. People are resources to be molded into networks of advisers, each part contributing to the whole like a well-oiled machine. Bush's approach to those he selects to be around him is characterized by an emphasis on cooperation and a strong desire to maintain close relations.

Consistent with the logic of inclusive hierarchies, Bush wishes to bring those around him under the umbrella of his personal organization. Once there, ties remain and are rarely eroded by time or political distance.

Our portrait of Bush as a networker par excellence resonates well with the image of the eastern patrician milieux in which he was raised. Ties between families often span generations, friendships nurtured in exclusive schools and

[22] Rhodes Cook, "Approval of Bush Is High, but Ratings Are Slippery," *Congressional Quarterly* (November 1989): 3097.

[23] The American Enterprise Public Opinion Report, March/April 1990, 98-99.

[24] Graham Hueber, "Bush Rates Second Highest in Poll's History," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 January 1990.

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clubs mature into valuable contacts in adult life. One of Bush's earlier political successes—appointment to the influential Ways and Means Committee as a freshman representative from Texas—was seen as a favor to his father, a former senator. Bush's membership in Yale's secret Skull and Bones Society is perhaps the most widely recognized example of strong bonds forged early in his life, bonds that continue to provide a source of support.[25] His presidential campaigns included top fund-raisers who were high school friends.[26] Several influential members in Bush's administration trace their original connection through family ties. White House counsel C. Boyden Gray, for instance, is the son of a man close to Bush's father, and Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady was a close friend of Jonathan Bush, the president's brother. Friends of Bush's children have also found their place in the Bush White House.[27]

Bush has expanded the practice of making and keeping personal contacts far beyond family and school. Rather than importing a discrete set of advisers from a specific region or period in his life, as did both of his immediate predecessors, Bush tapped associates from nearly every phase of his career. According to Shirley M. Green, a special assistant to the president, he assembled his advisers by "dropp[ing] back to a lot of his former lives," and he "never loses track" of people he's known.[28] He has drawn upon friendships from his early days in Texas (Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher, White House personnel director Chase Untermeyer, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, among others), associates in the Ford administration from his tenure as director of the CIA (National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills), contacts through the Reagan administration (Agriculture Secretary Clayton K. Yeutter, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater), and connections he made working with the United Negro College Fund (Secretary of Health Louis Sullivan). At least ten people in his sixteen-member cabinet have known him for at least ten years.[29] In his first nine months in office, he placed a higher proportion of friends and supporters (forty-eight out of eighty-seven of his selections have previous personal or political connections) in ambassadorial posts than either Reagan or Carter.

It is not only by rewarding loyal supporters that Bush builds his network. His style of operating revolves around making connections with individuals and

[25] Bush, *Looking Forward.*

[26] Cynthia Ward, "A Conversation, with George Bush About the Election," *Conservative Digest* (August 1988): 7.

[27] Burt Solomon, "A Tangle of Old Relationships . . . Binds Cabinet, White House Aides," *National Journal*, 30 September 1989, 2418–19.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Burt Solomon, "When the Bush Cabinet Convenes . . . It's a Gathering of Presidential Pals," *National Journal*, 1 July 1989, 1704. Compare with Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977) for evidence of the lack of personal relationships in earlier administrations.

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pulling them into his coalitions. He has been known as a tireless and committed party operative since chairing the Harris County Republican Committee in the early 1960s. He is given some share of the credit for the current Republican majority among voters under thirty in Texas.[30] The experience served him well in 1973, when, as Republican National chair, he had the unenviable duty to be in charge of damage control during Nixon's Watergate problems. He "responded to the crisis by traveling around the country almost nonstop to bolster sagging morale."[31] Eddie Mahe, Jr., who worked as Republican National Committee (RNC) political director during Bush's stint as chair, claims that Bush "not just intuitively understands the party, he is the party" and he "thinks in party terms."[32] When he sought the presidency in 1980, his campaign was notable for its organization more than its wide support. In 1981, as vice-president, Bush spoke at thirty-five Republican fund-raisers, earning about $3 million for the national party candidates, and signed letters for state candidates that his staff claimed raised an additional $5 million.

Coalitions are Bush's preferred method of problem resolution. He emphasizes the involvement of all parties, including those who disagree, particularly when encountering difficult issues. His approach to educational reform calls for "all of the players—administrators, school boards, local business leaders, parents, teachers' unions—around the table working together."[33] His policies on the environment, drug use, and the transportation system, all problems defying easy resolution, also call for widespread involvement on all levels. Indeed, they were not "his" policies until they emerged out of this consensus-raising process. Much of this consultation can be attributed to his desire for the widest possible inclusion. But it also serves as a substitute for strong ideological commitment and a vision for how these problems might be solved.

These facts, we argue, are best viewed as emerging from a coherent set of values. The intertwined ethics of loyalty, trust, and personal graciousness surface again and again in Bush's life. Building coalitions and rewarding the faithful are not merely utilitarian matters of trading favors and stacking up political debts, but a reflection of deeply held adherence to spreading ideals of family and friendship into politics. His career consistently demonstrates a belief in politics as a very personal process. Asked to characterize where he has left his mark in life and politics, he replied, "Friendships with people."[34] He lays claim to having "probably more friends than anybody in public life."[35]

[30] Burt Solomon, "Bush's Zeal for Partisan Duties. . ." *National Journal*, 28 October 1989, 2650.

[31] John W. Mashek, "Bush's Theme: Time for an Insider in the White House," *U.S. News & World Report*, 22 October 1979.

[32] Solomon, "Bush's Zeal," 2650.

[33] Bush, remarks at a White House briefing for members of the American Business Conference, 4 April 1989.

[34] Quoted in Carole Horner, "George Bush," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 28 February 1988.

[35] Quoted in Dowd, "Aides Fret, but Bush Has to 'Be Me.' "

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His reputation for personal politics spans his career. As the new ambassador to the United Nations in 1971, he was described as "excell[ing] at the game of meeting 300 strangers at one cocktail party" and "greet[ing] each as if he had just met a new brother-in-law."[36] His long-standing habit of writing personal notes has been widely reported. As president, he has made it a point to know all the senators and half the members of Congress on a first-name basis, to appear on the Hill for a game of racquetball or a chat in the dining room, to invite members of Congress over for Friday night movies, and to offer personal tours of the White House to members of Congress and their families. Every member of the Congressional Black Caucus was invited to the White House in mid-March, and the dozen who came were treated to a complete White House tour.[37]

In the words of one commentator, "If personal friendships were crucial to a successful foreign policy, George Bush should soon be winning a Nobel Prize."[38] Bush engages in what Gerald Seib calls "a little Dialing for Diplomacy" – he writes and phones various political figures, adversaries as well as allies, seeking advice and cooperation.[39] The pace of his personal diplomacy efforts far exceeds those of his predecessors; Bush participated in 190 phone conversations and 135 meetings with world leaders during his first year in office.[40]

In addition to his constant use of the phone, the president habitually sends notes and cards to world leaders. He sent a handwritten note to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss the Malta Summit.[41] He also personally authorized diplomatic notes to Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to find a way to free American hostages in the Middle East.[42]

He has worked hard to establish personal relationships with world leaders. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak has become a key ally in Bush's Middle East strategy, their relationship apparently solidified over a Baltimore Orioles baseball game. Inviting François Mitterand to the Bush's Maine retreat provided an opportunity to generate a closer relationship with the notoriously frosty French leader.[43] World leaders are frequently treated to such typical Bush entertainment as fishing trips and speedboating. These are casual settings, designed to increase personal understanding.

A preference for personal relationships, however, can sometimes be misleading. When the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, misled Bush's confidants, President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, the president was also

[36] Nadine Brozan, "George Bush, New Ambassador to the U.N. Eases into His Post Genially," *New York Times,* 4 March 1971.

[37] Fred Barnes, "Playing Ball," *New Republic*, 9 April 1990, 9.

[38] David Gergen, "Bush's Very Own Ford Foundation," *Washington Post,* 2 April 1987.

[39] Gerald F. Seib, "Personal Touch," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 November 1989.

[40] David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer, "Bush Makes Personal Contact Hallmark of His Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, 13 April 1990.

[41] Seib, "Personal Touch."

[42] Michael Duffy, "Mr. Consensus," *Time*, 21 August 1989, 16.

[43] Seib, "Personal Touch."

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temporarily misled. Perhaps a severe warning early on would have deterred the invasion of Kuwait. By the same token, the president was able to orchestrate an impressive global response, including China, the Soviet Union, and Egypt against the Iraqi onslaught through established personal relationships.[44]

Bush's personal touch in foreign policy raises some questions concerning his balance between the exclusivity of intimacy and the inclusiveness of cooperation. His preference for direct communication with world leaders exemplifies a cooperative approach to decision making, yet at the same time excludes many in his own policy team from negotiations. He has been sharply criticized for his "abiding penchant for secrecy,"[45] staff members often complaining they were not informed of key decisions.

Bush decisions have frequently come as a surprise to staff members and even close advisers. His staff had so little advance warning on Brent Scowcroft's appointment as national security adviser that they were barely able to notify the nominee in time for him to make it to the announcement.[46] Bush's decision on a raise for federal employees sent staff members scurrying to rewrite a press release composed in anticipation of a slightly different decision.[47] Neither Secretary of Defense Cheney nor Director of the CIA Webster knew of Bush's plans for the Malta summit until they were made public.[48] Selecting Dan Quayle for the vice-presidential spot was an early example of decisions made without consultation.

We have, on one hand, a portrait of a man emphasizing a consultive style of decision making. Advisers in both the cabinet and within the White House staff were chosen for their loyalty and their competence, and Bush appears to rely on these traits, allowing a freer reign to his cabinet than had his predecessor. Former Chief of Staff John Sununu (who absorbed punishment intended for the president and was driven from office) did not act as a strong gatekeeper; access to the president is fairly open.[49] Bush also reaches beyond official channels to lower levels in the bureaucracy and to individuals outside the formal decision-making process. Yet sudden, independent decisions repeatedly surface, providing a confusing, if minor, counterpoint to the main theme of consultative decisions.

The explanation may lie in Bush's desire to assert leadership capabilities in the face of public criticisms of weakness. Kicking over the traces is Bush's way of reminding himself, and therefore others, that he has the final voice. The occa-

[44] Michel McQueen, "Bush Is Handling Crisis Through Personal Ties with Foreign Leaders and Advice of Close Aides," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 August 1990.

[45] David Hoffman, "Zip My Lips: Bush's Secret Conduct of U.S. Policy" *Washington Post*, 7 January 1990.

[46] Gerald F. Seib, "Capital Insider," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 December 1988.

[47] Michael Duffy, "Mr. Consensus."

[48] Maureen Dowd, "Basking in Power's Glow: Bush's Year as President," *New York Times*, 31 December 1989.

[49] James P. Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," *Public Administration Review* (January/February 1990): 66.

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sional independent decision reflects a commitment to secrecy as necessary for some types of decision, combined with a strong belief in role distinction. As president, his job is to make certain decisions, and he wants to remind people of who is in charge.

A reputation for secrecy contradicts our image of President Bush as open, warm, and inclusive. Yet it emerges from the same set of values and understandings about the world, albeit directed toward another sphere of life. Although a remarkably inclusive one, George Bush is at heart a hierarch. While he may wish to bring people into the system, he maintains strong feelings about their roles once in that system.

> My starting point has been a respect for American institutions—for Congress, for the dedicated civil servants in the executive branch, for State and local governments, for the concept of public service—and a firm belief in the constitutional powers of the Presidency. Each has its role; each can be enlisted in the work at hand. The emphasis is on cooperation, not confrontation as the surest route to progress. . . . When I took office, I told the Congress that the American people hadn't sent us to Washington to bicker. They sent us to govern, to work together to solve the urgent problems that confront us.[50]

The view that authority ought to go with position is hierarchical.

Bush straightforwardly defended what he believed to be his prerogative to make foreign policy. "I have an obligation as president to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I see fit."[51] The trouble is that the American political system of separation of powers contradicts that rule. The implicit assertion that only presidents, and not Congresses, have such powers is contrary to fact.

According to one former Reagan aide, "Bush thinks there are a lot of things people would like to have in the end—but you could never get them done if you had to debate them."[52] Bush used a similar defense when criticized for sending secret envoys to China. "I point back to the original relationship with China, and I don't believe you'd ever have one if there hadn't been some secret diplomacy."[53] Even reading the sentence over a few times, however, reveals no similarity between the situation Nixon and Kissinger found themselves in and Bush's position after the massacre at Tiananmen. When Bush acted, the United States had an ambassador in China.

Those who are in a position to make decisions and formulate foreign policy, Bush believes, must be trusted to do so. The office must be respected. Hence, those who serve them must maintain their confidences. Put another way, friendship implies partiality and mutual trust.

[50] Bush, remarks at the Associated Press business luncheon, 28 April 1989.
[51] Quoted in Hoffman, "Zip My Lips."
[52] Ibid.
[53] Bush, press conference, 25 January 1990.

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Splitting the Difference

Bush began his presidency with a call to conciliation, and his relations with Congress frequently reflect that commitment. After the divisive vote on protection for Chinese students, he commented, "I will pledge right here to work with the Congress. I love the way their debate ended with both Senator Mitchell and Dole saluting each other for the way in which the matter was discussed. And I think that's a good signal for the political fights that . . . that may lie ahead."[54] According to one pundit, "Bush is a brick layer. He's split the difference on practically every issue he's confronted, except taxes and abortion."[55]

Bush's conciliatory style can be seen in his compromise over supplying aid to Nicaragua. The Reagan administration was unsuccessful in maintaining its commitment to the Nicaraguan contras; in the end, Congress refused to authorize military aid. In an attempt to lessen the bitterness typical of Central American policy, Bush cut a deal with Congress. Nonmilitary aid was approved for the contras through November, with further aid necessitating a letter of approval from four congressional committees. Despite the loss of prerogative this agreement entailed, the administration cooled down the controversy sufficiently to see the Sandinistas defeated in the elections.

In an effort to facilitate clean air legislation without imposing heavy costs on the economy, the administration once again compromised with the Senate on a complex package of auto pollution controls. The administration agreed to the committee's standards, which were considerably more stringent than those originally proposed by the administration. In return, the implementation of the program was slowed down.[56]

At this point, two features of the political context are so obvious there is some danger they will be neglected. The first is President Bush's partisan disadvantage; he faces overwhelming Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and a small majority in the Senate. There is little chance, therefore, that a program acceptable to him, let alone to strong conservatives, could pass. Some of his vetoes have been sustained by only a few votes. They have to be chosen carefully lest he lose so often that the threat of veto loses its punch. The second feature is that while Bush is not a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, neither is he a flaming liberal. His conciliation, therefore, begins from moderate premises.

If we think of ideology as coherent and connected policy positions, Bush is not very ideological. But if ideology is about how people ought to live together, about the process of decision making, then he is ideological. Compromise and conciliation are made much easier in the absence of strong ideological policy commitments. At the same time, a preference for negotiation and broadly based

[54] Ibid.

[55] Fred Barnes, "Mr. Popularity," *New Republic*, 8 and 15 January 1990.

[56] Michael Weisskopf, "Senate, White House Negotiators Compromise on Auto Pollution Controls," *Washington Post*, 1 March 1990.

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coalitions make a rigid policy ideology difficult to sustain. Bush rejects ideological policy labels; he does not "think people are in quest of ideological conformity."[57] Yet he appears to have trouble connecting his disdain for policy ideology to his problem with "the vision thing." From his perspective, shifts are necessary to respond to changing circumstances. He thinks of himself as pragmatic rather than ideological. As a result, a Bush loyalist could say, "I don't know what George stands for. I think of George Bush and get certain impressions—loyalty, hard work. But tell me what he stands for."[58] We shall try.

Belief in inclusive hierarchy is a world view that could properly be called an ideology. It tells adherents about what constitutes better and worse kinds of social relationships. If it appears "pragmatic," that is because its ideology (recall that it is not only hierarchical but also inclusive) calls for bringing within its ambit as many groups as possible, which requires much accommodation, which in turn blurs policy differences.

The Process Is the Purpose

George Bush stands for the system, and to Bush, the political and economic system is expressed as process. Perhaps he stated this view most succinctly when he said, "I believe in the integrity of the process. I believe our institutions can still cope."[59] Joining the two, he might have added that coping is possible only when the guardians of the institutions that relate each part to the whole are respected.

The logic of hierarchy implies a set of approaches to the world, and particular expectations about its behavior. Individual differences are valuable when performing the role for which they are best suited, and dangerous when not contributing to the system. Hierarchy assumes the necessity of role differentiation. Individual needs must be subordinated to the needs of the group. Vesting authority in position ensures group cohesion.

It is through rules and processes that variations in individual abilities are channeled toward the maintenance of order—everyone and everything in its place. The system and the processes it requires for the individual parts to mesh with the social whole thus become crucial reference points for the hierarch.

The nature of a system lies in its rules, in its rights and obligations. This concentration on form as substance has been a source of confusion to observers seeking to isolate Bush's central political beliefs. By examining Bush's relationship to process, a more coherent explanation emerges.

Enhancing the process is President Bush's purpose. The need to reaffirm the basic rightness of the system that produced him, the emphasis on widely shared values, and the celebration of progress within a framework of stability can be

[57] Quoted in Elizabeth Drew, *Portrait of an Election* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), 101.

[58] Quoted in Francis X. Clines, "George Bush-Loyalty to the Cause," *New York Times*, 7 October 1984.

[59] Drew, *Portrait of an Election*, 90.

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said to provide the organizing rationale behind Bush's actions. Within this world view, proper execution of duty earns one the right to claim rewards from the system, while deviance upsets the balance. By the same token, those who have been advantaged have a disproportionate responsibility to put something back into the system. Here we see at work the hierarchical norm of the sacrifice of the parts for the whole.

Within a hierarchical world view, the health of the system always takes precedence over the needs of individual parts. Bush is aware of the advantages from which he has benefitted, together with the obligations this implies. References to public service as a sacred duty abound in his rhetoric. He is also aware that many people have not had the same opportunities. "I do feel an awkwardness in terms of having been able to take care of my kids when they were sick or raise them properly. . . . I feel a certain privilege."[60] Along with his position in society, Bush inherited the norm of noblesse oblige, a tradition that justifies inequality largely in terms of returning value to the system. Bush's ideals of duty and obligation are consistent with a belief in the primary importance of the system as a whole. "Those who go to fine private schools . . . have a disproportionate obligation to put something back into the system."[61]

For the individualist, pursuit of self-interest produces well-being through market competition. For the hierarch, self-restraint and denial are necessary to a viable system. His comments on the savings and loan crisis can be read as a more general statement that "nothing is without pain when you come to solve a problem of this magnitude."[62]

Bush does have an enduring faith that the process will indeed produce the answer. "I am an idealist about this country," he states; "I am a total believer that we in the United States can solve any problem we want to solve."[63] More recently he quoted Winston Churchill, saying "Give us the tools, and we will do the job."[64] Perhaps this emphasis on tools helps to explain why science and technology have been favored items in his budget.[65] If the system is fundamentally sound, and its politicians sacrifice part of their views in the national interest, there should be a value-free, logical way to reach this harmonious goal.

Bush's preference for agreed-upon rather than ideological solutions has been noted by political insiders. A Republican source stated that Bush "separates

[60] Bush, press conference, 27 January 1989.

[61] Quoted in James M. Perry, "To George Bush, Seeking Presidency Seems Almost a Duty," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 July 1979.

[62] Bush, question and answer session with reporters, 6 February 1989.

[63] American Enterprise Institute, "A Conversation with George Bush about the Election," 19 October 1979.

[64] Bush, address before a joint session of Congress, 9 February 1989. The occasion was the anniversary of Winston Churchill's radio address in 1941 in which he used the phrase.

[65] William Booth, "Science and Technology Fare Well in Bush's Budget," *Washington Post*, 2 February 1990.

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politics from government the way Jimmy Carter did."[66] A former Reagan administration official called Bush "a neutral political functionary" who would "come to a lot of Cabinet Council meetings, listen for a while, raise a few points and say 'why can't we overcome this problem?' . . . He had this sense that there was a disembodied solution out there that involved no political or ideological position."[67]

The observation, we think, is correct, but the inferences drawn from it are not. Bush is searching for a policy that will command widespread agreement. That is his (though not everyone's) understanding of the politician's art. He understands perfectly well that no technical formula can create consensus. He seeks, instead, a partisan agreement so that the technicians can get on with their jobs.

Relations with Congress early in his administration reflect Bush's faith in the process of government for problem resolution. Rather than charging into the presidency with a policy agenda, Bush stressed cooperation and a division of duties. He has repeatedly expressed faith in the congressional process. Responding to public rejection of the Catastrophic Health Care plan, he said, "We are letting the congressional process hash this out."[68] When questioned about his decision to keep negotiations with China secret, he responded, "You have the checks and balances of the Congress . . . I feel encouraged that the process worked out this way."[69]

Throwing up a problem to the mercies of the process may be a way of avoiding responsibility, or it may be an observation born of experience; either way, there is a belief that the pulling and hauling in Congress may result in a more creative outcome than anyone could otherwise envisage.

There have been times, however, when the process has not worked. Failure to make use of the attempted coup in Panama in early October 1989, a less costly way of deposing the Panamanian dictator Manual Noriega, earned Bush some of his strongest criticism. Much of this criticism focused precisely on procedure. Bush responded that "in terms of procedures . . . I don't see any serious disconnects at all . . . if we can fine-tune our crisis management systems, so much the better . . . but the fact that I say that should not indicate that I think there was something fatally wrong here.[70] The remarkable aspect of Bush's remark is that he did not defend his decision, only the process out of which it emerged. It is as if he ought not be expected to succeed, only to put in place a proper procedure. But is not success the test of procedure? In the academy, the question has been debated long and inconclusively.

[66] Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, "Why Do Conservatives Hate Bush?" *The Washingtonian,* April 1982.

[67] Randall Rothenberg, "In Search of George Bush," *New York Times,* 6 March 1988.

[68] Bush, press conference, 14 October 1989.

[69] Bush, "Excerpts from the President's News Conference on China and Other Matters," *New York Times,* 26 January 1990.

[70] Bush, press conference, 13 October 1989.

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The internal discord that surfaced during this episode seemed to bother Bush a great deal. Reacting to a spate of negative comments in the media, attributed to his own staff, he apparently laid down the law in no uncertain terms. Aides were instructed to adhere to the administration line. According to reports, he indicated that internal criticism could be a "firing offense."[71]

Such an uncharacteristically strong response suggests Bush saw a fundamental issue at stake. The ordering of subordinate and superior was threatened by staff dissention. By airing dirty laundry in public, outsiders were invited to intervene in a process best left to those who know best. The system depends on adherence to discrete, defined, and distinct roles populated by people directly or indirectly responsible to the public. It requires building a solid staff of experts, a feat Bush believes he has accomplished in his presidency. In one exchange with reporters, he referred three sequential questions on three separate matters to three administration experts.[72] He believes a structure is only as solid as its foundation, and a president can only be as good as his staff: "My commitment to this Cabinet council structure reflects my conviction that effective decision making depends on the President receiving the best information available from his senior advisers."[73]

Emphasis is on change at the margin, never on fundamental change. Bush's approach is guided by the advice he offers: "Don't look for shortcuts and don't try to circumvent the process. Most important of all, follow the rules."[74]

What can such a wispy-wimpy phrase signify? If rules of good conduct are broken, no one is safe. The strong Bush reaction to the invasion of Kuwait is not only a matter of oil, but of establishing an international security regime.

A preference for certainty leads to hesitancy when faced with the unknown. Some of the most frequent criticisms about Bush concern his "wimp" image. He has been forced to defend himself against the charge on numerous occasions. "Democrats on Capitol Hill have been calling me 'timid.' I have other, better words, like 'cautious,' 'diplomatic,' 'prudent.' We have a good team, well seasoned. We're unified."[75] Let us translate. Loyalty, unity, and caution are the best guides to policy.

Bad Bush

George Bush's understated style, his lack of big, new proposals, the absence of calls to follow him on this or that crusade (except for hard drugs) had led to a

[71] Anne Devroy, "Bush to Aides: Stop Second-Guessing" *Washington Post*, 11 October 1989.

[72] Bush, remarks and a question-and-answer session at a luncheon with regional press, 31 March 1989. The questions referred to drug policy (William Bennett), the Savannah River Plant (Energy Secretary Watkins), and the Chicago mayor's race (Lee Atwater).

[73] Bush, statement on the roles of the economic and domestic policy councils, 8 February 1989.

[74] Bush, *Looking Forward.*

[75] Quoted in R.W. Apple, Jr., "Possibility of a Reunited Germany Is No Cause for Alarm, Bush Says," *New York Times,* 25 October 1989.

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cacophony of criticism. So confused are the critics that they vacillate between characterizing Bush as a wimp and wondering whether there must not be some method to this mindlessness.

A good collection of presidential characterization comes from columnist Clarence Page's article, "George Bush's Dynamic Inaction." Not exactly terms of endearment, these descriptors include "political paralysis," "governmental gridlock," a "paralyzed presidency," and "White House passivity." President Bush himself is termed not as Reagan was, a "Teflon President" but a "Revlon President—all cosmetics."[76]

"Prudent" or "passive," R.W. Apple wonders. Could George Will be correct in terming George Bush's an "unserious presidency," whose symbol "should be a wetted finger held up to the breeze"? Representative David McCurdy commented that Bush "makes Jimmy Carter look like a man of resolve." Is this behavior prudent or merely timid?[77]

A reporter known for her saltiness, Helen Thomas put it on the line and got one of Bush's best quips:

> Question: President Carter says you've really been slow on the uptake on one of the most transforming political events of our times. You have failed to show the leadership. You've failed to put the U.S. ahead of the curve on these things that are happening. And you are going to the summit without any initiatives at all. I mean this is boasted about. Why don't you have some new ideas of what to talk. . . .
>
> Answer: Now Helen, that is not a kinder and gentler way to phrase your question. We have done plenty. And the fact that some critics are out there equating my progress with spending more money doesn't bother me in the least. Look at the dynamic changes that are taking place around the world . . . well, I'd like to hear some specific suggestions other than triple the spending on every initiative. We are working closely with our allies. We are trying to facilitate the change. . . . We've got a seasoned team that are . . . that's evaluating the change. I will have a wonderful opportunity to discuss the change with Mr. Gorbachev. But I can't be all concerned when . . . when people jump up and say the answer is to spend more money.[78]

Can George Bush, or any president, renounce the role of inspirational leader by saying, "I'm just not an emotional kind of guy"?[79] Nor do we think this is an accurate self-portrait. Bush may not be passionate about policy but, as we have seen, he does have strong convictions about process. This conviction is so strong that the president may actually believe he ought to follow it himself. Bush may not wish to appeal directly to the citizenry because he views that as rejecting the process by (as the usual phrase goes) "appealing over the heads of Congress."

[76] Clarence Page, "George Bush's Dynamic Inaction," *Chicago Tribune,* 22 October 1989.

[77] R.W. Apple, Jr., "Prudent Meets Timid," *New York Times National,* 15 October 1989.

[78] Bush, press conference, 8 November 1989.

[79] Walter S. Mossberg and Robert S. Greenberger, "Policy Void. Upheaval in Europe Tests Bush's Capacity for Leadership of West," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 November 1989.

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And he does talk a lot to the media, which he views as the proper institutional conduit to the public.

Having provided an explication of President Bush's cultural context, it remains to examine his mode of operation in the light of its substantive validity: How well does George Bush work? How effective has he been as a policy maker?

The reason we dwell on failings is to offer a comparison between a procedural and a policy presidency. And to do this we have to get at potential flaws in a procedural presidency. Fundamental principles are almost by definition unchanging. Rather than an elaborate and often contradictory set of ideological beliefs, reliance on a handful of procedures makes the world a familiar place. It is these that can guarantee a level of stability in an uncertain world. As Bush stated in reference to changes in Eastern Europe, "The enemy is unpredictability, the enemy is instability."[80]

The President as Administrator

Because we have a president who operates "as if policy itself were a mistake," most likely, as Elliot Abrams put it, "to get in the way of the flexibility needed to conduct foreign relations,"[81] it is especially important to look at how foreign policy is made. When we do, we will see a pattern familiar at the State Department, Office of Management and Budget, Housing and Urban Development, and elsewhere. The pattern is so consistent as to suggest that it reflects beliefs about the political context in which decisions are made.

We have seen that the Bush administration by and large does not attempt hands-on government. It is content, instead, to leave political administration to the departments while attempting to reserve policy for itself. Thus a new presidential level of decision making has been created in full view of the public but with hardly a comment. The National Security Council remains as it was, though smaller, this time part of, rather than challenging, the secretaries of State and Defense. Its small size is a special advantage because it can fit more easily into the tiny size of the State Department's staff, from five to seven top professionals and the secretary. On any given issue, these seven, plus the NSC director, Brent Scowcroft, the NSC staff man, and the president (including the chief of staff, if interested) make whatever decisions are to be made.

Of course, advisers may and do differ about what is good for the president and who is closest to him. When hard times hit the presidency and the president looks bad in responding to them, a typical response is to sacrifice a chief-of-staff in his stead. There is good reason to believe that President Bush and Chief-of-Staff Sununu played "bad cop-good cop" by design. Nevertheless, Sununu had to leave.

[80] Bush, "Excerpts from the News Conference Held by Bush and Kohl," *New York Times*, 26 February 1990.

[81] Elliot Abrams, "Bush's Unrealpolitik," *New York Times*, 30 April 1990.

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And there's the rub. The kind of people George Bush has assembled, and the people his people have chosen to work for them, are the kind who respond well to their leader's policy initiatives. Secretary Baker, for instance, is a superb deal maker. But who will guide him in what deals to make? And who will provide indispensable guidance to the friends of Bush's friends, if his friends have his friendship but not his guidance? Bush has built an advisory and management apparatus that would respond wonderfully to the policy guidance he believes it would be unwise for him to provide.

It is strange that in this instance alone, the president appears to be departing from the hierarchical way by not using the existing administration process. The surface view may be mistaken, however, in that the president may believe he is actually reinvigorating the administrative process by more clearly separating it from the political level. Where most suggestions for reform either drive political appointees further down into the executive branch or, conversely, raise the civil service higher up the chain of command, the Bush administration does neither. Instead, it reduces the size of the plainly political apparatus while keeping it closer to the White House. This is only of the many ways in which Bush administration is different from other governments.

What Does Bush Learn from Experience?

Let us begin this critique of George Bush's performance as president by attacking the one claim he makes that has so far been unassailed, though, as the reader will see, it is not unassailable. We refer to his claim to gain from experience. On close inspection, it is not easy to see exactly what this experience consists of (aside from knowing who to call for advice) when observed in the coin of action.

One might think experience would advise some such adage as don't promise (at least not in public) what no reasonable person believes you can fulfill. Bush has been taken to task for not putting resources behind promises. But this may be due to conflicting promises vis-à-vis not raising taxes versus higher spending. We refer to promises like that of the "education summit" with the nation's governors in which Bush promised, among other things, that American students would lead the world in scientific performance by the end of this century. No way. That would require motivating large numbers of students to enter science in the first place, to say nothing of greatly improving their performance in mathematics as well as science. One does not have to go far out on a limb to acknowledge that this is not going to happen, and that we know now that it is not going to happen. Former Drug Czar William Bennett was slapped down for saying this was nonsense, but he was right.

Emerging from his "drug summit" with the presidents of a number of nations in Latin America, President Bush let loose what can only be called his pique at accompanying reporters. Through the days and weeks that followed, the president had been accused of withholding information from the American people by

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sending advisers on secret missions to China. This time Bush was especially angry because he had tried to be open with reporters, so that when asked whether he expected an agreement among Western allies about the unification of Germany, he said he did not. Circumstances changed so quickly that an agreement was forthcoming the next day and, to his chagrin, Bush was accused of misleading the media. The press inferred that Bush had deliberately lied about a possible conference of world leaders, while knowing all the while that such an agreement would be discussed the next day. They believed he was withholding information, while Bush believed he was acting in good faith. He was so outraged at the insinuation that he repeatedly answered "No comment" to questions concerning Germany, China, and his trip to Colombia. He threatened to reduce the media's access (he gives incessant conferences as opposed to former President Reagan's infrequent ones) and refused to answer except in jest. When asked if Colombian President Virgilio Barco had called him the previous night, Bush told reporters that he was aware they knew the phone rang, but he would not comment on the caller's identity.[82] Observers of the national political scene must wonder where Bush has been. Has he not observed reporters trying to get at presidents since LBJ's time? How could he imagine it would be different for him than for all his predecessors?

The danger signal for President Bush is that he could fall into the same trap as Jimmy Carter and, indeed, John Adams and John Quincy Adams before him. They were presidents of a hierarchical disposition who had the misfortune to believe that the political system within which they worked was one in which authority inhered in position. Therefore, all they had to do was figure out the correct policy position and others would fall in line. This does not happen in a separation of powers system combined with a federal structure. The confrontations with the media are not personal but institutional. By their role as critics of established authority, and by their political ideology (far more liberal than conservative), the media are not any president's friends. Academics who vary between exceptionally and extremely thin-skinned are not the ones to cast stones at anyone in this regard. Here, however, the thin skin suggests an inattention to what has been happening over a long period of time. An alternative explanation is that Bush has a well-worked-out strategy for handling the media—subdue them with attention, submerge them in data, make them conscious of their responsibility as semiofficial conveyers of information from the president to the people. Perhaps his tendency to use existing processes is reinforced by his lack of capacity for self-dramatization. President Bush's reliance on reporters to get his message across is more likely due to his belief that his task is to reinvigorate by actually using the ordinary processes of government.

[82] David Hoffman, "Bush to News Media: Mum's Going to Be the Word," *Washington Post*, 16 February 1990.

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Bush's Learning Curve

Near the beginning of his term, George Bush was confronted with what appeared to be a new variant of the hostage crisis. Rumors began circulating that, given the appropriate responses from Washington, the hostages held in Lebanon might soon be released. President Bush was out on a speaking tour. He could presumably have taken a hard-line stance in which the United States held Iran accountable until the Iranians found a way to deliver the hostages. But this would not have commanded widespread support. Or, based on what had been learned from the two previous crises, the president might have ignored these informal overtures in order to avoid the syndrome in which hopes are raised only to be dashed amidst contempt from the captors and their supporters. But Bush did neither. He rushed back, began seeking contacts, issued hopeful statements, only to see once more the mixture of ridicule and disappointment that had greeted his previous efforts. This leaves open the question of what Bush learned during the previous hostage crises.

Policy aficionados gain experience at a distance by imagining that they are part of the decision-making apparatus, asking themselves what they would do under this or that contingency, including the possibility that there is nothing useful to be done. In this and in other episodes, Bush does not appear to have asked or answered such questions. Whatever he learned, it was not about what to do. Had he had a strong idea of what to do, he would have behaved differently and not rushed back to determine what it was he ought to be doing. Long after this episode was forgotten, President Bush performed at his best in initiating and orchestrating (though not in concluding) the Persian Gulf war. All of us in his generation were taught the same lesson: get dangerous dictators early. Knowing what he should do, Bush did it well. But the lesson did not include when to end the war or whether to leave the dictator in office. In our understanding of foreign policy, it is unwise to speak ill of an opponent personally as President Bush did repeatedly in regard to Saddam Hussein. Having done so, however, anyone with experience should know that such personal disparagement signals a determination to remove that person from office. For the president to claim that he did not intend his actions to be so interpreted is worse than misleading. It verges on amateurishness.

The literature on President Bush as director of the CIA or of the Republican National Committee or as ambassador to the UN or to China or as vice-president is remarkably sparse on what he did. He brought in some new people or tried to improve procedures. When things went badly (right after President Nixon's resignation) he traveled widely to shore up morale; otherwise the trail is cold. In the Reagan administration Bush headed up the effort on deregulation, which did further that particular cause. Conversations with those who served with him are revealing. Bush appeared interested, always making those who worked with him feel they were being listened to attentively. But did he pay attention to what they told him or what he told them? Maybe yes, maybe no. Several participants

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reported that if the same or similar subject came up soon after, the vice-president would still be attentive and interested, but there did not appear to be any carryover in understanding (perhaps they meant agreement) from the first to the second or even the third time.

Here a comparison with Presidents Carter and Reagan may prove instructive. Jimmy Carter would have remembered everything, but because the details were new and he believed it important to master them, he would likely have asked specific questions, at least in writing, about the circumstances. Ronald Reagan led with his conservative values out front. His "priors" were few but powerful. He wanted deregulation, but he also wanted agreement within his administration. Upon being assured of that agreement, he would say yes without wanting to know the details. Bush had few priors on policy. He might, in a general way, have been in favor of deregulation, but he was also in favor of regulation where warranted, so that he lacked a context in which to put what he was hearing. All of it was a collection of facts that he could master, but facts did not tell him what he ought to favor the next time around. He also tended to believe that each case was different. Because he thought of government as a potential source of good not only in the defense and justice areas (in which Ronald Reagan believed it ought to stay), he was ready to hear arguments on that side, unencumbered by free-market principles.

Early in his term, President Bush stated repeatedly that he would not be stampeded into precipitous foreign policy decisions but would take his time to go at them in a systematic and orderly way. Responding to a question during a press conference concerning the contradiction between his campaign image as closely involved in foreign policy decisions and his need for a six-month policy review prior to action, he justified his actions by repeatedly referring to prudence and the rapidity of change.[83] From Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter, who had no formal foreign policy experience and did not pretend to know all there was to know, this might be expected. For George Bush, however, whose career had largely been occupied with foreign policy assignments, we regard this as extraordinary. Of all possible potential presidents, Bush should have been the one most ready to go. Of course, he might not agree with everything the Reagan administration had done, but one would think he would be aware of his disagreements even if he did not, out of loyalty or caution, verbalize them in public. How might this be explained?

If Bush believed that there were regularities in foreign policy that could be learned, presumably he had had an awfully long time to learn them. Only if he thought that each set of events was discrete would he have to learn again what, ostensibly, he already knew. Yet Bush does not appear convinced that knowledge is cumulative. In his confirmation hearings as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he dodged a question concerning whether the United States has the right

[83] Bush, press conference, 7 March 1989.

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to interfere financially and militarily in a dispute in another country, by saying, "I think each case has to be looked at on its own merits."[84] His comments frequently indicate his strong belief in the limits of knowledge and prediction. Referring to the Cheney-Webster disagreements over arms reductions, he stated, "Nobody is smart enough. None of us sitting in this room predicted the changes that have taken place so far, so why would we now be insisting one or the other is correct when we don't know?"[85] Further, "I don't think any of us think we can see with clairvoyance what's going to happen the day after tomorrow."[86]

It is possible that Bush wanted to get his new team committed to whatever policy would emerge. Aside from the secretary of state, however, all his top appointees were experienced people who knew each other, and who knew defense and foreign policy. Nor is there any reason to believe that Bush had preconceived notions.

The foreign policy review came up empty, which was entirely predictable. Experienced people, one might think, would already know that there are good arguments on behalf of many different foreign policies. In order for a study group of subordinates to come up with something valuable, there has to be a sense of direction imparted by the president. Otherwise, the review is likely to regurgitate the standard arguments of the past, leading to no further resolution than had hitherto been achieved. What happened was that as an important NATO meeting approached, the president hurriedly worked out with his advisers some minor adjustments in the American posture that, for the moment, suited the Europeans. Where was the experience there?

Just to show that the outcome of the foreign policy study group was not a fluke, the same thing happened for the same reason when Bush convened an interagency study group on antipoverty measures. The group came up with a dozen or so major alternatives, similar, we presume, to those known by most specialists. Lacking presidential guidance, however, the Domestic Policy Council decided that all the recommendations were either too expensive or too controversial. The comment made by a staff member on what had emerged—"Keep playing with the same toys. But let's paint them a little shinier"[87]—does not reflect well on the administration's policy apparatus. It also shows that Bush has not succeeded any more than his predecessors in stopping staff from shooting off their mouths. The episode does show that Bush is different in that his three predecessors (Reagan, Carter, and Nixon) announced their welfare programs within a few months of taking office.

Experience, for George Bush, appears to consist of believing what everybody else believes until it is contradicted by events. Not a bad rule, though not a rule

[84] Confirmation hearing.

[85] "The Bush Message," *Washington Post,* 18 March 1990.

[86] Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, "Bush Seems Out of Touch with World Affairs," *National Journal,* 17 February 1990, 409.

[87] Robert Pear, "Anti-Poverty Proposals Rejected," *San Francisco Chronicle,* 6 July 1990.

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a DeGaulle or a Nixon or anyone who had ideas of his own on foreign policy would adopt. Since events change rapidly (especially since the beginning of the Bush administration) the president often finds himself climbing down a hill on which he started to climb up. The number of policy reversals is much greater than commonly recognized.

If our interpretation of President Bush's behavior has merit, it should explain his flip-flop on taxes. Although we expected Bush to go off of his antitax pledge in order to serve his perception of the national interest in budget balance, we were surprised by the offhand manner in which he did so. This indicated how little we had learned about his style of leadership, which we were trying to teach by writing this article. Bush wants to work through the system. We heard him on the radio saying that the budget process must be made to work. By going directly to the people, Bush may have felt he would be doing what previous presidents have been criticized for, namely, going over the heads of Congress. Here, however, he did not follow his usual practice of viewing the media as the proper institutional channel for reaching the people.

No double Bush preferred to wait until a bipartisan deal had been made so that he could endorse the outcome as a validation of the system. As a strategic move, however, announcing his turnaround before a deal was set put the president at a disadvantage. He lost all he had to lose. This put pressure on him to agree even if the agreement was undesirable. No doubt he was told the Democrats would not move until he made his announcement. But presidents do not have to believe everything they are told.

We think Bush did not sufficiently consider the fury of the opposition presidents often face. Perhaps the brutality of the attacks on him via his son, Neil Bush, for his involvement in the savings and loan debacle, will cause the president to think again. In any event, we expect President Bush to be subject to increasing attack not only for changing his position but for immorality. "Read my lips—I lied," as the *New York Post* had it, is only a foretaste.[88] Or "I told the truth [about tax increases], and I paid the price," Michael Dukakis declared. "Mr. Bush did not tell the truth, and now we must all pay the price."[89] The president has to hope that Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas was wrong when he commented, "Now he's saying 'unread my lips.' . . . This has contributed, along with the saving-and-loan crisis, to eroding confidence in government. The American people liked President Bush and trusted him, and now that he's changing his tune he's hurting all politicians."[90] The meaning of being part of an antileadership political system is that others are out to get whomever is in authority.

It is easy to lose track of the numerous times President Bush has changed his mind on public policy and/or the reasons for it. In explaining himself, Bush

[88] Quoted in George Will's column, *Oakland Tribune*, 1 July 1990.
[89] *New York Times*, 27 June 1990.
[90] *Wall Street Journal*, 30 July 1990.

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reveals his conception of a world always in flux. Sometimes he manages wry humor:

> Question: Mr. President, you said when you originally picked your Cabinet that you didn't want to pick anybody from the House or Senate because you didn't want to deplete the ranks of Republicans in Congress. Now you've picked Mr. Cheney. What happened to that rule?
>
> Answer: That is the exception that proves the rule.
>
> Question: You said that Senator Tower was the best qualified for his job. Where does Congressman Cheney stand in this priority assessment?
>
> Answer: I said that on December whatever it was. And now we're in March whatever it is, and as of today, Dick Cheney is the best and the proper choice.[91]

Planned Parenthood is another case in point, for George Bush has a family connection to that issue. In a foreword to a book on population control, he related how his father, Prescott Bush, had possibly lost his bid for reelection when columnist Drew Pearson revealed that the senator supported Planned Parenthood. As for the younger Bush, this is what he said way back then:

> As we amended and updated the Social Security Act in 1967 I was impressed by the sensible approach of Alan Guttmacher, the obstetrician who served as president of Planned Parenthood. It was ridiculous, he told the committee, to blame mothers on welfare for having too many children when the clinics and hospitals they used were absolutely prohibited from saying a word about birth control. So we took the lead in Congress in providing money and urging—in fact, even requiring—that in the United States family planning services be available for every woman, not just the private patient with her own gynecologist.[92]

As the headline put it in the first month of Bush's presidency, however, "Bush Backs Away from Birth-Control Program." The congressman who worked with Bush to pass the Family Planning Service Act, James Scheuer (D-NY), commented that "it's bizarre that twenty years later he's acting the way he is."[93]

Often Bush changes without necessarily being aware he is doing so, perhaps again, because he thinks general rules cannot cover specific circumstances. Here follows a typical colloquy, this time on Panama.

> Question: You . . . said only a month ago that you didn't think it would be prudent to launch a large-scale military operation. What changed your mind, and particularly why did you opt for the maximum use of force in this situation?
>
> Answer: I think what changed my mind was . . . the death of the marine, the brutalizing, really obscene torture of the navy lieutenant, and the threat of sexual abuse and the

[91] Bush, press conference, 10 March 1989.

[92] George Bush, Foreword to *World Population Crisis* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

[93] Kenneth H. Bacon, "Bush Backs Away from Birth-Control Program . . ." *Wall Street Journal*, 2 February 1990.

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> terror inflicted on that navy lieutenant's wife, the declaration of war by Noriega, the fact that our people down there felt that they didn't know where this was going and they weren't sure what all that meant and whether that meant we could guarantee the safety of Americans there.
>
> And so I made a decision to move and to move with enough force—this was the recommendation of the Pentagon—to be sure that we minimized the loss of life on both sides and that we took out the PDF, which we did, took it out promptly. And so I would like to think that what I said sometime ago still stands.[94]

The president does exactly the opposite of what he previously said was wise, yet he does not see that. What were these momentous events? A killing and a beating and a threat, all vile but not exactly what one would call the stuff of war. And the larger context—how important was Panama compared to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe or other momentous events that might arise? Did the president want to give some other country the excuse to intervene at will? Could Noriega not have fallen of his own ineptitude or been brought down anytime the situation got much worse?—was left out. Perhaps the Panama invasion was an effort to restore an image of vigor after the fumbling response to the earlier failed coup attempt against Noriega.

If there is to be a policy of cultivating good relations with foreign officials, giving them the benefit of the doubt in difficult situations, it should also be acceptable to crack down when the rules of reciprocity have broken down. Bush may have come to believe that the former Panamanian strong man was one such lesson. And Bush may view Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, as another. That, coupled with the industrialized world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil, may explain the Bush administration's massive deployment of armed forces to Saudi Arabia.

We have a president in George Bush who knows what he wants—to make process of mutual accommodation work at every level, from the family to the family of nations—but not how to explain what he wants. He is "ill at ease in any bout with self-analysis."[95] Nor is he sure he ought to explain. Processes, he feels, belong to those who operate them. What is owed the public is good outcomes, though not every time. Hence the difficulty others have in understanding him and his difficulty (sometimes) in explaining to others his concerns. For they are as different as policy and process.

Looking back from the end of his third year, we hear four questions being asked by the president's critics: Why did President Bush go back on his "no new taxes" pledge? Why did he sign the civil rights bill he previously vetoed? Why did he stop the war with Iraq before destroying its Red Guard armed forces? And why did the president keep seeking a centralized regime in the former USSR and in Yugoslavia? The answers to these questions lie in George Bush's cultural

[94] Bush, press conference, 22 December 1989.
[95] Michael Duffy, *Time*, 12 March 1990, 67.

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identity as an inclusive hierarch whose self-understood task is to unify the nation and, after that, the western world. From a partisan Republican standpoint, a president campaigning against new taxes would have a healthier economy and a lower deficit than one who sacrificed his popularity and his party by violating his pledge. But President Bush saw it as national over parochial interests. Fighting the 1992 presidential and congressional election against affirmative action seems to conservative Republicans like combining principle with voting majorities. To President Bush, however, fighting an election on a racially divisive issue was against both conscience and country. As for stopping the war prematurely in Iraq, the president's critics forget he was being bombarded by accusations of lying to the people in stating that the war was conducted to liberate Kuwait. The president stopped the war to maximize support at home and in his carefully wrought and fragile United Nations coalition. His lack of vision prevented him from seeing that Saddam Hussein's survival would be taken as a sign of failure. Maneuvering the work of nations toward a new order of collective security, to use the term of the 1920s and 1930s, is the president's aim. As for failing to recognize the severity of the economic downturn, Bush relied on his economic advisers who were the experts. And these advisers—Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, Budget Director Richard Darman, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Michael Boskin—were especially anxious not to overdramatize the situation so as to avoid large tax cuts and spending increases that would worsen the deficit. The president chose the long-term national interest. He may have been mistaken, but he was trying to favor the whole over the warring parts. This is the consistency that unifies the inconsistencies of President George Bush.

In regard to policy, Bush expects differences. In regard to process, however, he expects support. Previously, we have suggested that Bush responds combatively to public criticism. If he figures out how to use conflict creatively, that is fine; if this sensitivity suggests that he is less secure and comfortable in a leadership role than he appears, that is not so good. If he is suited only for easy times, when he can get everyone to like him by spreading consensus, the hard blows that undoubtedly lie in wait for him—those that are due to life and afflict any president, as well as those that come from the antileadership elements among political elites—might make him defensive.

George Bush may find the international arena more accommodating than the domestic. At home, ideological differences between Democratic and Republican activists continue to widen, the Democrats becoming more egalitarian and the Republicans more individualistic and more hierarchical.[96] Congressional differences on the deficit, for instance, parallel these ideological splits. In the midst of growing dissensus among the politically active comes George Bush, a believer in integrative hierarchy, not quite what the social conservatives in his party had in

[96] This literature is summarized in Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 7th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 127–42.

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mind. The usual fate of those who intercede in fierce family quarrels is to get beaten by the opposing forces. Bush believes he can form a middle American way based on agreement on process and procedure. To do that, however, he must do by demonstration what he cannot explain in theory. Now that America has a president who believes in its procedures, it does not know what to do with him, and he does not know how to tell his fellow citizens that by helping make the process work, they help themselves as well as him.

The buffeting President Bush has received should put to rest the ancient canard to the effect that the best politicians are those with the fewest policy preferences, because they can be most flexible in catering to public opinion. The vision thing matters, we now see more clearly, if for no other reason than that without a sense of direction would-be helmsmen are too easily blown about by the contradictory puffs of political winds.*

* This article is adapted and updated from *The Beleaguered Presidency* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992).

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Blacks and the Republican Party: The 20 Percent Solution

LOUIS BOLCE
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"Why Blacks Love Bush" headlined the *New Republic* in May 1990. A month earlier the *New York Times* reported that George Bush's approval rating among blacks—56 percent—was the highest for a Republican president since Dwight Eisenhower three decades earlier. Tom Wicker wondered "Why is he so popular?"[1]

Bush's standing with blacks eighteen months into his administration led Republican pollster Robert Teeter to suggest that Bush "might double his share of the black vote in 1992" to about 20 percent.[2] Twenty percent appears to be the threshold that Republican strategists believe will establish GOP dominance in America politics—not only in presidential elections, which has been the pattern since 1968, but in congressional contests as well. The inability of Republicans to achieve this modest target prompted then Republican National Chairman Lee Atwater to urge a "command focus" by his party to increase its share of the black electorate to 20 percent, "if we want to become a majority party." Atwater contended that had Republicans won 20 percent of the black vote in the 1986 midterm elections, they would not have lost control of the Senate.[3]

[1] Fred Barnes, "Black Backing," *The New Republic*, 28 May 1990, 11-13; Tom Wicker, "Bush and the Blacks," *New York Times*, 16 April 1990; Jessica Lee, "GOP Under Bush Attracts New Look from Black Voters," *USA Today*, 18 June 1990.

[2] Barnes, "Black Backing," 11.

[3] See Allen D. Hertzke, "Populist Mobilization and Strategic Party Assimilation: The Lessons of

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Before the upsurge in Bush's ratings among blacks, leading Republican politicians and strategists were bemoaning the GOP's abysmal record in attracting black voters—the most loyal component of the Democratic coalition.[4] In 1988, George Bush won 10 percent of the black vote against a Democratic opponent who had limited personal appeal to blacks.[5] But this showing was no less pathetic than that of other Republican presidential candidates since 1964. Over the past six presidential elections, the Republican black vote has averaged 10 percent; for whites it has varied from 47 to 68 percent, averaging 58 percent.

The Democratic stranglehold on the black vote has tightened at a time when its grip on other key Democratic constituencies has loosened.[6] Catholics, blue collar workers, and white southerners—all core elements of the New Deal coalition—averaged respectively 78, 66, and 54 percent Democratic in the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections. From 1968 onward, however, the Catholic vote has oscillated between 40 and 59 percent Democratic and has averaged 49 percent Republican. Blue collar workers evenly split their votes between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates over these same twenty years (ranging from 58 to 43 percent Democratic). And the southern anchor of the Democratic party, white southerners, have become the most faithful supporters of Republican presidential candidates. In short, black voters have become more loyal to the Democratic party during a time when Republicans have made significant inroads into core Democratic groups.

The almost total absorption of the black vote within the Democratic fold is a relatively recent phenomenon. The black political realignment which began in the 1930s with the New Deal policies of FDR, when heavily Republican blacks in the North switched allegiance to the Democratic party, was not effectively consolidated until the 1960s. Barry Goldwater's advocacy of the dismantling of the New Deal state and the repeal of the 1964 Civil Rights Act among other things knocked loose the Republican moorings from most remaining black Republicans.

Jackson and Robertson" (Unpublished ms., University of Oklahoma, Spring 1989); Fred Barnes, "Party of Lincoln," *The New Republic*, 20 March 1989, 10-12.

[4] Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972): 11-20; Alexander P. Lamis, "The Realignment of Southern Politics, 1964-1988," (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 31 August-3 September 1989).

[5] Michael Oreskes, "New Generation of Blacks Drawn Less to Democrats," *New York Times*, 27 October 1988.

[6] Robert Axelrod, "Presidential Election Coalitions in 1984," *American Political Science Review* 80 (March 1986): 281-284; Harold W. Stanley, William T. Bianco, and Richard G. Niemi, "Partisanship and Group Support Over Time: A Multivariate Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986): 969-976; John R. Petrocik, "Issues and Agendas: Electoral Coalitions in the 1988 Election" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 31 August-3 September 1989).

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With Richard Nixon's Southern Strategy of winning the white South in 1968, the defection of blacks to the Democratic party became almost complete.[7]

The political significance of this transformation of black partisan loyalties was not lost on Republican strategists. In the late 1970s, Republicans under the leadership of national party chairman Bill Brock began to make overtures to black voters. Indeed, some black spokespersons seemed receptive to the GOP's efforts to refashion blacks' perspective of their place in national electoral politics. Jesse Jackson, in addressing the Republican National Committee in 1978, urged blacks to avoid overidentification with one party: "We must pursue a strategy that prohibits one party from taking us for granted and another party from writing us off."[8]

In the late 1970s, academic studies began to explore the extent to which there existed ideological, policy, or class cleavages among blacks that could form the bases for increased black bipartisanship. Louis Bolce and Susan Gray found evidence of considerable diversity in policy preferences of blacks, which they attributed to the growing social and economic heterogeneity among blacks.[9] Richard Seltzer and Robert Smith detected a "substantial conservative constituency" on issues like "abortion on demand, stricter law enforcement, prayer in school, and homosexual rights."[10] Similarly, Michael Combs and Susan Welch found blacks to hold more conservative opinions than whites on abortion, but Bolce showed that the issue had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of anti-abortion blacks.[11]

Other research has focused on the relationships between class and political conservatism. The results are inconclusive. Wayne Parent and Paul Stekler found that middle-class blacks are less supportive than lower-status blacks of government programs to raise the living standard of the poor.[12] Similarly, Susan Welch and Lorn Foster, using Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS) data, reported

[7] Pearl Robinson, "Whither the Future of Blacks in the Republican Party?" *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Summer 1982): 208–214; Hanes Walton, Jr., *Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 141–147; for a discussion of the impact of the 1964 presidential election on racial voting patterns and the evolution of race as the dominant issue in American politics, see Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), chap. 2.

[8] Quoted in Robinson, "Whither the Future of Blacks," 220.

[9] Louis Bolce and Susan Gray, "Blacks, Whites, and Race Politics," *The Public Interest* 53 (Winter 1979): 61–75.

[10] Richard Seltzer and Robert C. Smith, "Race and Ideology: A Research Note Measuring Liberalism and Conservatism in Black America," *Phylon* 46 (Summer 1985): 105.

[11] Michael Combs and Susan Welch, "Blacks, Whites and Attitudes Toward Abortion," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46 (Winter 1982): 510–520; Louis Bolce, "Abortion and Presidential Elections: The Impact of Party and Candidate Positions," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18 (Fall 1988): 815–829.

[12] Wayne Parent and Paul Stekler, "The Political Implications of Economic Stratification in the Black Community," *Western Political Quarterly* 38 (December 1985): 531–532.

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policies. Welch and Combs's earlier analysis, which relied on General Social Survey (GSS) data, also found higher-status blacks to be more conservative on welfare spending but found these blacks more liberal on health and education spending.[13]

In contrast, I. A. Lewis and William Schneider unearthed no evidence that middle-class blacks were inclined toward political conservatism (and Republican party support).[14] Indeed, Franklin Gilliam argued that middle-class blacks are more approving than lower-class blacks of social welfare spending and more liberal on social issues such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and school prayer.[15]

The dearth of consistent and cumulative findings on the political outlook and behavior of black Americans and the virtual absence of analysis on higher-status blacks result from the lack of data. As Welch and Foster explain:

> . . . national survey data contain relatively small numbers of blacks. Even if blacks are not undersampled, a random sample of 1,500 Americans yields only about 180 blacks. While such a number is sufficient to say something about black attitudes in general, it is hardly enough to make detailed analyses of differences based on income, education, and other indices of class.[16]

The JCPS black oversample utilized by Welch and Foster contained "only a handful of respondents who made more than $50,000" a year (only forty earned more than $30,000). In light of this, Welch and Foster caution that the "attitudes of the upper-middle and upper-class black might indeed be more conservative than what we have found."[17]

This study seeks to answer the question that Welch and Foster and previous studies have not been able to address: To what extent have the political orientations of higher SES black subgroups diverged from lower-status blacks? Specifically, are self-employed, high-income, and college-educated blacks more conservative and Republican than blacks who are less economically successful and schooled? Comparisons are also made with whites sharing similar SES characteristics. In sum, this study attempts to ascertain whether the Democratic hold on segments of the black community has begun to loosen and, if so, whether this will produce political opportunities for Republicans to attain their "20 percent solution."

[13] Susan Welch and Lorn Foster, "Class and Conservatism in the Black Community," *American Politics Quarterly* 15 (October 1987): 445–470; Susan Welch and Michael Combs, "Intra-racial Differences and Attitudes of Blacks: Class Cleavages or Consensus?" *Phylon* 46 (Summer 1985): 91–97.

[14] I. A. Lewis and William Schneider, "Black Voting, Bloc Voting, and the Democrats," *Public Opinion* 6 (October/November 1983): 15.

[15] Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., "Black America: Divided by Class?" *Public Opinion* 9 (February/March 1986): 53–57.

[16] Welch and Foster, "Class and Conservatism," 449.

[17] Ibid., 452, 466.

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The Data

The 1984 and 1988 ABC News presidential election and congressional exit polls offer some answers to these questions. The advantage of exit polls lies in their large sample sizes and the immediacy of the poll to the event. Eight hundred forty-five black respondents were included in the 1984 ABC exit poll, and over eighteen hundred blacks were queried in the 1988 survey. Thus, the number of respondents in both samples is approximately three to nine times larger than the black subsamples in the Center for Political Studies (CPS) biennial National Election Surveys and the annual GSS. The 1988 exit poll had roughly twice the number of blacks as the typical multiyear pooled GSS and CPS samples.

The ABC exit poll permits extensive subgroup analyses and reliable inferences about segments of the black community that standard data sets and pooled samples do not allow. The 1988 ABC exit poll data enables us to assess, for example, the political orientations and behavior of relatively unexamined groups such as black Republicans, blacks earning incomes of $50,000 or more annually, blacks voting for Bush, and college-educated blacks. The number of respondents of these respective groups in the ABC survey are 112, 233, 174, and 521; the comparable figures in the 1988 CPS survey were 17, 11, 10, and 26.

Party Identification, Ideology, and Vote

The ABC data suggest that doubling the Republican share of the black vote to 20 percent through appeals to targeted subgroups faces formidable obstacles. In 1988, only 6 percent of black voters identified themselves as Republican (the same as in 1984); 83 percent called themselves Democrats (up six percentage points over the same period). Nine percent classified themselves as Independents. A plurality of whites in 1988 (41 percent) identified themselves as Republican, up 5 percent from 1984. (See Table 1.)

Over the last generation, the Republican party has become more conservative. Blacks have become more liberal. In 1984, self-described black liberals outnumbered black conservatives by only seven percentage points (30 to 23 percent); in 1988, blacks were 22 percentage points more likely to subscribe to the liberal label (40 to 18 percent). A near majority of whites in 1988 (46 percent) identified themselves as conservative—twice the percentage who called themselves liberal. (See Table 2.) Only 29 percent of black conservatives voted for Bush, while 85 percent of white conservatives did. (See Table 3.) It is only among older and higher-income conservative blacks (less than 2 percent of all blacks) that Bush got a majority of votes. He beat Dukakis 66 to 34 percent among black conservatives making $50,000 or more a year and 56 to 44 among those over age 60.

Even the voting patterns of black Republicans do not give GOP strategists much solace: only 74 percent of the 6 percent of blacks who identified themselves

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TABLE 1

*Partisanship Among Blacks and Whites by Various Social Indicators, 1988 (in Percent)**

	Party Identification					
	Republican		Independent		Democratic	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Total	6%	41%	9%	20%	83%	37%
Income						
<$5,000	4	32	5	13	91	51
$5–9,999	6	33	8	15	86	49
$10–19,999	5	38	8	18	84	41
$20–29,999	6	39	12	20	80	39
$30–39,999	6	41	12	21	81	36
$40–49,999	9	45	10	20	80	33
>$50,000	11	47	8	22	80	29
Education						
<High School	4	31	6	12	89	55
High School	5	38	6	17	87	43
Some College	6	43	11	21	80	34
College	7	48	10	21	82	29
Post Grads	8	39	12	23	79	37
Employment Status						
Hourly	5	34	8	21	85	42
Salaried	8	45	11	21	80	32
Self-employed	15	45	9	22	75	31
Unemployed	2	31	9	15	85	51
Ideology						
Liberal	2	11	7	19	89	68
Moderate	5	30	11	25	83	42
Conservative	20	64	12	17	67	17

Source: 1988 ABC News exit polls. The group Ns for blacks range from 1,503 to 1,729; for whites the range is 17,950 to 19,435.

* Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding and deletion of minor party preferences and those who refused to respond.

as Republicans voted for Bush (Reagan got 70 percent in 1984). Black Republicans were three times more likely than white Republicans to support Michael Dukakis. White defections in contrast came disproportionately from the Democratic side. White Democrats were thrice as likely to vote against their party's candidate as were Republicans. (See Table 3.)

Black Independents (9 percent of black voters), like their Democratic counterparts, overwhelmingly supported Dukakis in 1988 (72 to 23 percent) and Mondale in 1984 (83 to 16 percent), while white Independents supported the Republican presidential candidates by landslide margins. Any hope of reaching a 20 percent

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TABLE 2

*Political Ideology of Blacks and Whites by Various Social Indicators, 1988 (in Percent)**

	Liberal		*Moderate*		*Conservative*	
	Blacks	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Whites*
Total	40%	24%	41%	30%	18%	46%
Income						
<$5,000	37	29	45	38	15	32
$5–9,999	36	29	44	38	19	33
$10–19,999	39	25	44	33	17	42
$20–29,999	42	24	41	32	17	44
$30–39,999	39	23	40	31	21	46
$40–49,999	41	21	39	28	21	51
>$50,000	48	23	36	25	16	52
Education						
<High School	42	22	44	42	14	36
High School	35	20	46	38	18	42
Some College	37	22	40	31	24	47
College	41	23	39	24	19	52
Post Grad	58	34	32	21	10	45
Employment Status						
Hourly	36	25	45	37	19	38
Salaried	46	25	38	26	16	50
Self-employed	40	22	40	28	21	50
Unemployed	39	28	41	39	20	32

Source: 1988 ABC News exit polls. The group Ns for blacks range from 1,474 to 1,492; for whites the range is 17,646 to 17,880.

* Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding and deletion of those who refused to respond.

solution must elicit substantially greater support from black Independents, black conservatives, and black Republicans—three presumably receptive (though numerically small) subgroups within the black electorate.

If there is any segment of the black electorate with whom a Republican strategy has a chance of success, conventional wisdom suggests that it is with higher socioeconomic status blacks. High-status blacks, the argument goes, should be substantially more likely than low-status blacks to identify themselves as conservative and Republican and to support Republican candidates, because the GOP tends to favor economic policies consistent with the class interests of more affluent and conservative voters.

The reality appears to be otherwise. Higher-income blacks, unlike similar whites, are more likely to call themselves liberals than those at lower-income levels. Of those earning between $10,000 and $20,000 in 1988, 39 percent chose the liberal designation, while 48 percent of blacks earning $50,000 or more called

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TABLE 3

*1988 Presidential Vote among Blacks and Whites by Various Social Indicators (in Percent)**

	Bush		Dukakis		Other	
	Black	*White*	*Black*	*White*	*Black*	*White*
Total	10%	58%	88%	41%	2%	1%
Income						
<$5,000	4	42	93	56	2	2
$5–9,999	8	46	91	53	1	1
$10–19,999	8	55	91	44	1	1
$20–29,999	8	56	89	43	3	1
$30–39,999	9	60	90	39	1	1
$40–49,999	14	63	84	33	2	1
>$50,000	15	64	84	35	1	1
Education						
<High School	6	48	93	52	2	1
High School	7	56	93	43	–	1
Some College	10	62	87	37	2	1
College	12	63	87	36	1	1
Post Grad	11	52	86	47	3	1
Employment Status						
Hourly	6	53	92	46	2	1
Salaried	12	62	87	37	1	1
Self-employed	15	64	83	34	1	1
Unemployed	3	42	93	56	4	2
Ideology						
Liberal	3	18	95	81	2	1
Moderate	8	50	90	49	2	1
Conservative	29	85	69	14	1	1
Party ID						
Republican	74	92	25	7	1	1
Independent	23	57	72	40	6	2
Democratic	4	21	95	78	1	1

Source: 1988 ABC News exit polls. The group N for blacks is 1,829; the group Ns for blacks ranged from 1,511 to 1,778. The total N for whites was 19,725; the group Ns ranged from 18,012 to 19,509.

* Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding and deletion of refusals.

themselves liberal—more than twice the level of whites at comparable incomes. There was virtually no difference among higher-income blacks in Democratic party identification from blacks in general (80 versus 83 percent). Among whites there was an inverse relationship between income and identification with the Democratic party. A plurality (47 percent) of higher-income whites identified with the Republican party, whereas 51 percent of whites with the lowest incomes (under $5,000) viewed themselves as Democrats.

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In 1988, Bush won a mere 15 percent of the votes from blacks earning $50,000 or more. In 1984, 16 percent of blacks making more than $50,000 voted for Reagan, who was supported by 7 percent of the black poor. In contrast, among white voters there was a strong positive relationship between financial status and support for Bush. Roughly six of ten poor whites supported Dukakis; more than six of ten in the highest income group voted for Bush. (See Table 3.) Thus, while income is clearly a factor in the voting behavior of whites, it appears to have virtually no influence in the vote choices of blacks.

A similar narrow opening for Republicans can be seen among well educated blacks. In 1988, Bush got one of nine votes from black college graduates and postgraduates, six percentage points more than blacks who had not graduated from high school. The 1988 levels and proportions of blacks voting for Bush, regardless of their educational attainment, were virtually the same as for Reagan in 1984. Among whites the relationship between education and vote in 1988 was curvilinear, with Bush getting fewer votes from whites with the least and most education; still, Bush carried majorities from whites in every education category except among those not finishing high school.

The dilemma confronting Republican strategists can be graphically, if somewhat hyperbolically, stated: if all blacks who voted in the 1988 presidential elections earned $50,000 or more and cast their votes like those blacks who actually earned these incomes, Bush would have increased his share of the black vote from 10 to 15 percent. Similarly, if the entire black electorate in 1988 had graduated from college, Bush's portion of the black vote would have increased only two percentage points. These increases are so small that they could simply reflect statistical margins of error.

Another favorite target of the Atwater strategy is entrepreneurial (self-employed) blacks—a group who could be expected to be amenable to the Republican "opportunity society" message. However, self-employed blacks are twice as likely to call themselves liberals as conservatives (40 to 21 percent), and they are also decidedly Democratic (75 percent) with only 15 percent identifying with the Republican party, the same percentage that supported Bush in 1988. Neither the age nor the income of self-employed blacks predisposed them to vote for Bush; for example, self-employed blacks earning over $50,000 a year voted nearly three to one for Dukakis (71 to 25 percent). In general, there is very little to distinguish politically self-employed blacks from blacks in other occupational categories. In contrast, a plurality (45 percent) of self-employed whites identified with the Republican party as compared to the 31 percent and 22 percent who respectively viewed themselves as Democrats and Independents. They were twice as likely (50 versus 22 percent) to call themselves conservatives rather than liberals. These whites also gave over six of ten of their votes to Bush. Hence, an entrepreneurial orientation does not seem to bridge the political and ideological chasms between blacks and whites. Self-employed blacks, in fact, were considerably less likely to support Bush than unemployed whites (15 versus 42 percent).

While Bush garnered majorities among some black groups—the tiny fractions

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who were either self-identified Republicans or those who were both politically conservative and wealthy or elderly—and received 29 percent support among black conservatives, no other meaningful social category of blacks gave Bush 20 percent of its vote. Other black voters supportive of Bush were Catholics (17 percent); blacks residing in the West and veterans (16 percent); the self-employed and those earning $50,000 or more a year (15 percent); older voters (13 percent); and college graduates, black suburbanites, and those living in rural areas (12 percent). The voting behavior of young upwardly mobile black professionals and born-again Christians was virtually indistinguishable from black voters in general (11 and 13 percent respectively vs. 10 percent). In contrast, over three-fifths of white yuppies and eight of ten white born-again Christians supported Bush.

Perceptions of Economic Progress, Party Identification, and Vote

Political scientists have devoted considerable attention to retrospective voting, which assesses the presidential vote choice in terms of the voters' evaluation of the past performance of the party controlling the White House. In 1988, ABC asked respondents whether they thought that they were "better or worse off financially than eight years ago." Retrospective vote analysis would hold that those who claimed to have benefited from Reagan economic policies would be more prone to support Bush and the GOP than those who thought that they were worse off after Reaganomics.[18]

This expectation is borne out for white voters, but only marginally supported by the voting patterns of blacks. A near-majority of whites (46 percent) felt that their financial status had improved during the previous eight years, and four-fifths of them supported Bush. Seventeen percent of whites thought their financial situation had deteriorated under Reagan, and they gave over 80 percent of their votes to Dukakis. The 37 percent of whites who saw no change in the family's income during the Reagan administration split their votes evenly between Bush and Dukakis. Fifty-nine percent of whites who felt that their financial status had improved identified with the Republican party, while those who felt that their family income had declined over the previous eight years felt closer to the Democrats. Among white voters, then, there was a direct linkage between perceived financial trend, vote choice, and partisanship.

The relationships between perceived financial status and partisanship and vote choice among blacks were much weaker. Even the 17 percent who thought their financial situation had improved during the Reagan years overwhelmingly identified with the Democratic party (63 percent) and supported Dukakis (81 percent).

[18] Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

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Issue Salience

The gulf that separates white and black voters is manifested not only in their partisanship and voting behavior but in the types of issues that concern them. This is especially notable among higher SES blacks. The most salient issues to black voters according to ABC's three category "most important issues" summary measure were those related to domestic social and welfare concerns such as health care and the "problems of the poor." Forty-nine percent of blacks chose this issue domain. In contrast, whites were most concerned with the national economy (41 percent) and defense and foreign policy (24 percent). Only 6 percent of blacks cited defense and foreign policy as their chief concern.

The single most important voting issue for blacks was problems of the poor, the modal response of blacks at all income and education levels. Forty percent of blacks with family incomes below $5,000 and 26 percent of blacks with family incomes above $50,000 chose this item as "the most liked stand of the presidential candidate [they] voted for." Health care ranked second for low- and high-income blacks (14 and 16 percent, respectively) as it did for black voters at all education levels. (The figures for blacks and whites in the highest and lowest income and education categories are displayed in Table 4.)

Problems of the poor (21 percent) and health care (14 percent) were the most cited issues for whites with family incomes below $5,000. The most favored candidate stands for whites with incomes above $50,000 dealt with the national economy (20 percent) and national defense (18 percent). Health care and problems of the poor were the foremost concerns of only a handful of the high income whites (6 and 7 percent respectively).

Thus, while distinct class differences are found in the policy preferences and the voting behavior of low- and high-income whites, similar class differences were not found among blacks. The differences in issue orientations, party identification, and political ideology among higher SES whites and blacks and similarity in the political outlooks of low- and high-status blacks would seem to foreshadow dim prospects for inclusion of large numbers of upwardly mobile blacks in future Republican presidential coalitions. Whatever economic cleavages may exist between the black poor and the black upper-middle class, these class differences were not reflected in their issue concerns, political ideology, and voting behavior. Paradoxically, the political differences (that is, partisanship, voting, ideology, and policy concerns) between blacks and whites widen as their income and employment status increase. The result is that the political orientations of high-status blacks are much more akin to those of lower-class whites than they are to upper-status whites.

The 20 Percent Solution in Congressional Contests

While the possibility that President Bush's popularity with black voters will translate into votes in 1992 might dismay partisan Democrats, the fact remains that

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TABLE 4

Most Liked Candidate Stand of Black and White Voters within Highest and Lowest Income and Education Categories (in Percent)

	Income			
	Less than $5,000		*More than $50,000*	
	Blacks	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Whites*
Taxes	13%	11%	7%	13%
Health Care	14	14	16	6
Defense	3	11	4	18
Budget Deficit	2	6	9	9
Problems of Poor	40	21	26	7
Foreign Affairs	0	5	2	7
National Economy	5	12	12	20
Crime	4	4	5	3
None of Above	19	16	19	17
N =	701	231	231	4,029
	Education			
	Less than HS		*College Grads and Above*	
	Blacks	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Whites*
Taxes	13%	13%	8%	10%
Health Care	20	17	13	8
Defense	4	12	4	17
Budget Deficit	3	7	8	9
Problems of Poor	37	15	29	9
Foreign Affairs	1	3	1	7
National Economy	6	13	13	19
Crime	4	5	3	3
None of the Above	12	15	21	18
N =	198	1,067	527	6,937

Source: 1988 ABC News presidential exit poll.

Republicans have been able to win five of the last six presidential contests with only 10 percent of the black vote. The 20 percent solution hoped for by Republican strategists has to work itself out in House and Senate contests.

Yet, as a generation of voting studies attest, the forces of incumbency and party salience, which are more enduring in congressional contests than in presidential races, have resulted in a split-level realignment, that is, a Republican controlled presidency and a Democratic Congress.[19] However, even if the incum-

[19] Michael Nelson, "Constitutional Aspects of Elections" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Elections of 1988* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989); and Everett C. Ladd, "Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics," *Polity* 22 (Spring 1990): 511-525.

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bency effects were significantly diminished, the substantial increase in black turnout and the heavily Democratic black population in one-third of the states in which blacks comprise 10 percent or more of the electorate have erected electoral stumbling blocks that few Republican congressional candidates have successfully hurdled.

Republican Trent Lott's successful 1988 bid for the U.S. Senate seat in Mississippi exemplifies this point in the extreme. To win just a bare majority of the votes in the Senate race, Lott had to convince at least 70 percent of white Mississippians to vote against Democrat Wayne Dowdy, the popular representative from the fourth congressional district, merely to negate the votes of the 31 percent of the electorate who were black and who were certain to vote ten-to-one against him. In Alabama and Georgia in 1986, small shifts in the black vote could have reversed the electoral fortunes of both GOP candidates. If Republican incumbents Jeremiah Denton of Alabama and Mack Mattingly of Georgia won merely 20 percent of newly black registered since 1980 and *all* other votes remained cast as they were, Denton would have been reelected by 24,800 votes instead of losing by 7,000, and Mattingly's loss by 22,000 votes to Wyche Fowler would have resulted in a victory of 3,200 votes.[20]

The impact of the black vote was no less striking in the House races in 1988. Democrats won 54 precent of the national congressional vote and captured 59 percent of the House seats but carried over 70 percent of congressional districts where blacks comprise 10 percent or more of the population. Forty-two percent of the total House seats held by Democrats were from districts that had a black population of 10 percent or more; in contrast, 82 percent of Republican-held seats came from districts in which blacks constituted less than 10 percent of the population.[21]

While whites evenly split their votes between Republican and Democratic congressional candidates, blacks favored the Democrats by nine-to-one. Blacks voted overwhelmingly Democratic irrespective of their demographic, social, or economic backgrounds. Not one of the groups presumably most susceptible to Republican party overtures—high income, born again Christians, the self-employed, young professionals, conservatives, and those whose financial situation improved under the Reagan presidency—gave even a quarter of their votes to Republican congressional candidates. Only black conservatives and those financially better off gave more than 20 percent of their votes to Republicans.

[20] Computations are based on figures contained in Allen D. Hertzke, "Jackson, Robertson and the Politics of Community: Religious Mobilization and the 1988 Campaign" (Paper presented at the XIV Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1 September 1988); and Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, eds., *The Almanac of American Politics 1988* (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1987).

[21] Computed from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, eds., *The Almanac of American Politics 1990* (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1989).

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Racial Concentration, Polarization, and Bloc Voting

While SES, political ideology, and domestic and foreign policy concerns appear to be unrelated to black partisanship and voting behavior, are there any factors associated with political differences among blacks? One factor that seems to matter is the proportion of blacks in a state's electorate. According to 1988 ABC statewide exit poll data, Republican candidates were much more likely to garner black votes in states where there are low concentrations of blacks. Conversely, in states with the highest concentration of blacks, Republicans receive the smallest share of the black vote.

Bush obtained 20 percent or more of the black vote in seventeen of the twenty-three states where blacks comprised less than 5 percent of the electorate; he won 30 percent or more in eleven of these states. Bush did not reach the 20 percent threshold in any of the twelve states where blacks comprised 10 percent or more of the electorate. Indeed, in ten of these states, blacks gave Bush less than 10 percent of their votes. These concentration and diffusion effects held in Senate races between 1984 and 1988. In two-thirds (twenty-one) of the Senate races in states where blacks constituted 5 percent or less of the population, Republican candidates won 20 percent or more of the black vote. However, in 60 percent of the races in states where blacks comprised 10 percent or more of the electorate, Republicans won less than 10 percent of the black vote; in only one race did a Republican win 20 percent or more.

Another way of looking at the political effect of black voters in a state is whether racially polarized voting patterns are greatest where the proportion of blacks is highest. The ABC exit poll data show that this is indeed the case. For example, in the states where blacks comprised 10 percent or more of the electorate, the mean difference in the percentage of whites and blacks who supported Bush was 56 percent. It was 45 precent where blacks constituted 6 to 9 percent of the electorate, but only 27 percent where they made up 5 percent or less of the voting public. The mean differences for the Senate races that ABC polled between 1984 and 1988 were 42, 39, and 25 percent, respectively.

Thus, ironically, in states where the black vote counts less toward the election outcome (that is, in states where there are the fewest blacks) Republican candidates have the best chance of picking up black support. The black vote tends to be monolithically Democratic in states where they are concentrated the most. Republican candidates fare worse in precisely those states where blacks could potentially help them the most.

This contextual impact may be explained by the presence or absence of inducements to bloc voting. In states where the proportion of blacks is large, factors like residential concentration and the existence of black political, civic, and cultural structures including elected officials, activist churches, civic associations, newspapers, and radio stations enhance the racial salience of issues and provide racial cues and incentives for bloc voting. In states where blacks make up a tiny fraction of the population, these factors are limited, and black voters are more likely to

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be influenced by nonracial considerations, such as the local and state partisan climate, economic circumstances, and so on.

Conclusion

The stated desire of Lee Atwater and other Republicans to make the GOP more inclusionary is salutary to the extent that it reduces divisive race politics. Yet there is nothing in the ABC exit poll data that points to any segment of the black community that can be successfully mined for Republican votes.

The academic literature and conventional wisdom point to three segments of the black community as potentially fertile ground for Republican inroads: higher income blacks, those who are politically and culturally conservative, and the self-employed. But the ideological and partisan affinities of these blacks for liberalism and the Democratic party intensified.

Why the rejection of the Republican option among middle-class black voters? One answer lies in the 1988 ABC exit poll data. The policy concerns of high-status blacks are virtually indistinguishable from blacks at the lowest income levels. Social welfare issues such as health care and problems of the poor were cited by blacks at every income level as the most important issues affecting their vote choice. In contrast, higher-status whites were most concerned about the economy and defense, issues which hardly registered among black voters. The traditional Republican antagonism to an expanding public sector coupled with the New Deal-Great Society liberalism of the Democratic party tends to reinforce the existing political loyalties of high- and low-status blacks.

The heightened racial consciousness of black voters as well as changes in the structure of the Democratic party apparatus also present formidable obstacles to Republican strategists. Since the New Deal, the Democratic party has been especially solicitous in providing representation to identifiable constituent groups. This orientation toward group representation is best exemplified by the McGovern-Fraser commission's (1969–1972) guidelines "to encourage representation on the national convention delegation of minority groups, women, and young people in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the states."[22] While subsequent Democratic party commissions have modified the McGovern-Fraser standards, the Democratic party remains far more committed than the Republican party to the proportional representation of groups. In the absence of politically meaningful class or ideological differences within the black electorate, it is rational for blacks to support a party that is inclined toward group representation.

[22] Quoted in Austin Ranney, "Changing the Rules of the Presidential Nominating Game: Party Reform in America" in Jeff Fishel, ed., *Parties and Elections in an Anti-Party Age* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 222.

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Thus, any Republican strategy to garner more black votes in the hope of establishing GOP dominance in electoral politics runs up against the fact that "the Democratic party has become [now both in its policy objectives and the public mind] the home of racial liberalism."[23] Race defines the major parties.

George Bush has enjoyed unparalleled popularity among blacks as a Republican president. Will this translate into unprecedented support in the 1992 presidential election? The most recent national poll available, a 24–29 October 1991 ABC News/*Washington Post* survey found 43 percent of blacks sampled nationally approved Bush's job performance. While this level of support represented a 34 point decline from the heights of Bush's support reported by Gallup in March in the aftermath of the Gulf war, it still is more than double the highest levels achieved by Ronald Reagan.[24]

However, Bush's current relatively high black approval ratings will likely have little effect on the 1992 election. Approval ratings registered a year before a presidential election have been unreliable predictors of voting behavior in the past, and there is no reason to believe that Bush represents a departure. Republican presidential candidates have won five of six elections with negligible support from blacks. It is unlikely that the outcome of the 1992 election will turn on the number of black votes George Bush receives. Should Bush win one in five black voters, there is no reason to believe that such support will be extended to Republican Senate and House candidates and into state executive and legislative races. After all, Republican strategists see a 20 percent share of the black votes as the solution to the problem of GOP's minority party status. Except for Ronald Reagan in 1980, recent presidents have had extremely short coattails.

Another reason for questioning the electoral impact of recent approval ratings for George Bush is that only 10 percent of blacks identified with the Republican party in July 1991 (about the same as in 1981), while his approval level was 49 percent.[25] Party identification was the best predictor of black votes for Reagan in 1984 and Bush in 1988 (when 74 precent of black Republicans voted for Bush) and the most important predictor of vote choice in congressional elections except for incumbency. Given the low and invariant levels of Republican party identification among blacks, it is highly improbable that George Bush, let alone Republican candidates for lower offices, will attain the 20 percent solution.

It is almost inconceivable that the Republicans would attempt to outbid the Democrats for the support of blacks, since the GOP's electoral strategy since

[23] Carmines and Stimson, *Issues Evolution*, 184, 185; see also Lewis and Schneider, "Black Voting," 14–15.

[24] ABC News/*Washington Post* poll of 24–29 October 1991, Jeffrey Alderman, director of polling, personal communication. The Gallup data appears in Everett Carll Ladd, *The Ladd Report*, 4th ed., vol. 1 (New York: Norton, 1991), 13.

[25] "Changes in Party Allegiance," *New York Times*, 14 July 1991; and Ladd, *The Ladd Report*, 13.

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1964 has been to win over racially conservative Independents and Democrats. It would seem that only social and political forces as cataclysmic as that which took place in the 1960s can dislodge the attachment of blacks to the Democratic party. The 20 percent solution may have to await another transformation of American politics and the two-party system.*

* The data used in this analysis are from the ABC News Exit Polls. The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Alderman, director of polling for ABC News, for access to ABC polling materials. They also gratefully acknowledge the released time support of the School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Baruch College.

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Can the United States Promote Democracy?

GRAHAM T. ALLISON, JR.
ROBERT P. BESCHEL, JR.

Is it possible for the United States to promote democracy and pluralism? Are there potential actions, programs, and policies to be undertaken—or avoided—that will encourage the development of an appropriate system of checks and balances, promote the participation of existing and emerging groups in the political life of foreign nations, strengthen the rule of law in such countries, and enhance the protection of minority rights and values? If such initiatives do exist, then what are their chances of success? What factors will encourage or retard their effectiveness?

These questions, formerly addressed only in remote academic circles, have recently moved to the forefront of the American foreign policy debate. The democratic revolutions of 1989, coupled with the retreat of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa, have prompted a resurgence of interest throughout the U.S. government and society at large in promoting democracy. The 1989 Support for East European Democracy (SEED) legislation authorizing U.S. spending for these purposes presupposes that such objectives are obtainable. It reads:

> The President should ensure that the assistance provided to Eastern European countries pursuant to this Act is designed—(1) to contribute to the development of democratic

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institutions and pluralism characterized by: (a) the establishment of fully democratic and representative political systems based on free and fair elections, (b) effective recognition of fundamental liberties and individual freedoms, including freedom of speech, religion, and association, (c) termination of all laws and regulations which impede the operation of a free press and the formation of political parties, (d) creation of an independent judiciary, and (e) establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces.[1]

Such enthusiasm stands in marked contrast to the considered counsel of the most serious students of democracy. The theorists' conventional wisdom sounds a cautionary note. Their prevailing answer to the question of whether the United States can promote democracy and pluralism is mostly "no" or "not much."

The purpose of this article is to engage this argument. Since our analysis leads to a conclusion quite different from the consensus among scholars on this subject, we will state our conclusion bluntly. Not only is it possible for the United States to promote democracy, but we believe that the evidence suggests that in fact the United States has promoted democracy and is promoting democracy. To state the case provocatively, we identify fifty-seven specific initiatives, actions the U.S. government can take or refrain from in order to promote democracy. Moreover, we have no doubt that it would be possible to identify at least fifty-seven more.

To bring this central question into sharper focus, it is necessary to be explicit about the lenses through which we view the evidence, for these lenses play a particularly important role in shaping our conclusions. Operationally the question appears straightforward enough, and the answer obvious. Of course governments can promote democracy. Viewed historically, one observes cycles of enthusiasm and self-confidence about the promotion of democracy. In the upswings, the answer seems clearly yes; on the downsides, certainly not. Through the lens of theory, the most thoughtful students persuade one quickly that the subject "is much more complicated than you thought."

I

When addressing the issue from an operational perspective, it is difficult to see how any informed observer could have serious doubts about the answer to the question. Is it an accident that the nations occupied by U.S. forces after World War II are now democracies? Consider recent events in Nicaragua. It would be difficult to argue that the combination of diplomacy in developing wide-spread support for democratic ground rules (including making future economic assistance contingent upon compliance), direct support for the opposition parties, and international supervision and observation of the elections were not significant

[1] Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, (H.R. 3402), 101st Congress, 1st sess., 17 November 1989.

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factors in producing both Violeta Chamorra's victory and the Ortega brothers' acquiescence to this result. Who doubts America's stance, including various specific actions like the 1990 U.S. air force flyover of Manila, affected the enthusiasm of the Philippine military for a coup to oust a democratically elected president?

Through the historian's lens, one discovers a recurring confidence among advocates in the inevitable progress of democratic expansion. As representative democracy took root and flowered in the United States, both Americans and sympathetic Europeans celebrated this development.[2] Alexis de Tocqueville stated that American democracy was "a providential fact, that it is universal, it is lasting . . . and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress." After a century of slow but steady growth in the number of democratic regimes, Lord Bryce published his classic *Modern Democracies*, in which he concluded that this "trend towards democracy now widely visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress." Unfortunately his book's 1921 publication date coincided with the reversal of this trend.[3]

Eras of optimism have typically been followed by periods of pronounced pessimism regarding the future of democratic institutions and values. Fifty years ago, in the midst of the global clash between fascist, communist, and democratic regimes, doubts about democracy's future were dominant. As recently as fifteen years ago another crisis of confidence was fashionable. In the mid 1970s, Willy Brandt offered the following assessment:

> Western Europe has only 20 or 30 more years of democracy left in it; after that it will slide, engineless and rudderless, under the surrounding sea of dictatorship, and whether the dictation comes from a politburo or a junta will not make much difference.[4]

In 1975, the Trilateral Commission was so concerned about the prospects for democracy's survival in Europe, Japan, and the United States that it commissioned a major study of the subject.[5] Today such pessimism appears odd. Yet current optimism about the spread of democracy may be equally misplaced. The views of pundits on this subject are often driven by fashion as much as fact, and they consequently manifest more pronounced swings than the data itself would warrant.

A number of historical studies identify cycles in the development of democracy. One of the most penetrating students of the subject, Samuel Huntington, has

[2] In 1787 James Madison claimed that one of the great innovations of the American (as compared to the traditional) conception of republicanism is representation. See Madison, *The Federalist*, No. 63 in *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor, 1961), 382–390.

[3] The de Tocqueville and Bryce quotes are cited from Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984): 193–218.

[4] The Brandt quote is cited from Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 229.

[5] Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

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identified several cycles or waves in the emergence of modern democratic regimes: first, 1820–1920, when democracy spread from the United States to northern and western Europe, some British dominions, and a few countries in Latin America; second, 1920–1942, when "democratic trends were snuffed out in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic states, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan"; third, 1945–1962, when democracy expanded as a consequence of the U.S. imposition of democracy on West Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, combined with decolonization during which many independent countries adopted the political forms of the imperial powers; fourth, a second reverse wave (1962–1975), in which military coups and revolutionary triumphs reduced the number of democracies from thirty-six to thirty; and finally, the period from 1975 to the present, which Huntington characterizes as the "third wave" of democratic expansion.[6]

Between 1974 and 1990, at least thirty countries made transitions to democracy, almost doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. Yet in spite of these fluctuations, Huntington notes a remarkable constancy in the percentage of the world's population living in free states (as classified by Freedom House). This proportion stood at 32 percent in 1973, after which—except for India's two years of emergency rule—it never rose above 37 percent and never fell below 35 percent. Huntington's reading of these cycles contributes to his 1984 conclusion that, in the absence of major discontinuities in current trends, "a significant increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely."[7]

Even after the democratic revolutions of 1989, the majority of the world's population still lives in the more than one hundred regimes that are either partly or wholly nondemocratic. According to Freedom House's latest publication, *Freedom in the World: 1989–1990*, the percentage of the world's population living under democratic rule stood at 38 percent in January 1990. If the newly democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe are included, this total would rise to 41 percent.[8] If the Soviet Union were counted, one almost reaches majority—49.7 percent.

Such figures may understate the degree to which democratic values and institutions have increased during the past decade. Examined on a regional basis, democracy has made marked advances in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. This expansion has taken place primarily among the wealthier nations. Today, of the countries the World Bank classifies as "High Income Economies," 74 percent are democracies. Conversely, 71 percent of the worlds poorest nations have authoritarian or totalitarian forms of government.

[6] Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 196–197. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Spring 1991): 12–34.

[7] Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 218.

[8] See R. Bruce McColm, et al., *Freedom in the World: 1989–1990* (New York: Freedom House, 1990), 3–7.

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II

Few subjects have received more attention from political scientists than democracy. Debate goes back to the first half of the fifth century B.C., when the idea of direct self-rule emerged in the Athenian city state. Most of the dialogue since replays strands of the original debate, with the exception of a major eighteenth-century development that married the concept of democracy with that of representation.[9]

In the twentieth century, many scholars have turned away from the more philosophical task of establishing the normative basis for democracy to the more practical task of understanding the factors and preconditions that make democratic regimes more likely. Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, and scores of other distinguished academicians have sought to enrich our theoretical understanding of the conditions under which democratic regimes develop and the factors contributing to their ultimate success or failure.

Several impressions emerge from these studies. In an effort to be provocatively conclusive, we would characterize this theoretical literature (that is, the portion of it which we have reviewed) as both extensive and impressive; complex, indeed, tending toward even greater complexity than the phenomena it seeks to analyze; suggestive about possible causes, correlates, and conditions that contribute to the emergence and sustenance of democracy; but curiously unsatisfying, at least for someone who comes with the action-oriented question posed at the outset of this article.

When one turns to the concluding sections or chapters of major studies, no point is more often repeated (quite frequently in virtually the same words) than that any conclusions must be "modest." The literature provides little advice for would-be promoters of democracy other than cautions about how little can be done.

We state this impression starkly, recognizing that it is open to the charge of being unfair. Indeed, we hope that it will inspire or provoke others to refute it. But to pursue this dominant impression, consider the following quotations from the conclusions of a number of these scholars.

[9] Robert Dahl points out, "from classical Greece to the seventeenth century, the possibility that a legislature might properly consist not of the entire body of citizens but of their elected representatives remained mainly outside the theory and practice of democracy or republican government." In *Social Contract*, Jean Jacques Rousseau rejected representation as inconsistent with the idea of democracy. Yet other thinkers such as Montesquieu and John Locke had already begun to join the democratic notion of rule by the people to the practice of representation. John Stuart Mill cemented this relationship in the nineteenth century. Again to quote Dahl, "in his considerations on representative government, John Stuart Mill, stating in a single sentence what to him and his readers could be taken as a self-evident truth, dismissed the conventional wisdom of over two thousand years by rejecting the assumption that self-government necessarily required a unit small enough for the whole body of citizens to assemble." See Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

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Robert Dahl sums up his masterful and inspiring inquiry of decades in a 1989 publication, *Democracy and its Critics*. On what must certainly count as a downer for democratic activists, he concludes: "That no more than a third of the countries in the world are governed by polyarchy [constitutional democracies] should not be surprising. It would be surprising, on the other hand, if the proportion were to change greatly over the next 20 years." To V. I. Lenin's question, *What Is to Be Done?*, Dahl answers: "When I reflect on the conditions favoring polyarchy, I am driven to the conclusion that the capacity of democratic countries to transform non-democratic regimes into stable polyarchies is very limited in the short run." Nonetheless, ending on a more positive note, he states: "Yet democratic countries could make a difference in the long run, I think, if they steadily pursued a policy of supporting changes in the direction of democracy and discouraging changes away from it. . . . Democratic countries could aid in the democratization of non-democratic countries by steadily pursuing policies over many years that focus on changes in the underlying conditions that support stable polyarchy."[10] Thus, to the question of this article, Dahl offers a qualified "yes." But the book ends without any enumeration of what such actions might be.

Democracy has been a subject of study for Samuel Huntington for over more than three decades. His oft-quoted 1984 article, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" not only asks that question but several others including: "What policies should governments, private institutions, and individuals espouse to encourage the spread of democracy?" Huntington's answer to the first question is that "the prospects for the extension of democracy to other societies are not great." To Lenin's question, he first insists that only "modest conclusions . . . emerge from this review." He then answers: "the ability of the United States to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited." Nonetheless, he does identify several ways in which the United States could contribute to democratic development: assisting economic development of poor countries; encouraging developing countries to foster market economies and development of rigorous bourgeois classes; refurbishing the United States own economic, military, and political power so as to exercise greater influence than it has in world affairs; and developing "a concerted program designed to encourage and to help the elites of countries entering the 'transition zone' to lead their countries in a more democratic direction."[11] As to the final recommendation, his article contains no specific suggestions about what such a "concerted program" might include.

Following the classic *Civic Culture* by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 1965, there has been a steady growth of systematic, comparative studies of democracy.[12] Among the most thorough is *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, a 1986 publication by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe

[10] Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, 316, 317.

[11] Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 218.

[12] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989).

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Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Their central conclusion relevant to our inquiry merits quotation at length. They seek to

> capture the extraordinary uncertainty of the transition, with its numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas. . . . If we ever have the temerity to formulate theory of such processes, it would have to be a chapter in a much larger inquiry into the problem of 'underdetermined' social change, of larger-scale transformations which occur when there are insufficient structural or behavioral parameters to guide and predict the outcome. Such a theory would include elements of accident and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequate information, of actors facing irreconcilable ethical dilemmas and ideological confusions, of dramatic turning points reached and passed without an understanding of their future significance. In it the unexpected and the possible are as important as the usual and the probable.[13]

The most extensive comparative study, supervised by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, examines twenty-six developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The overview of this study's findings appears in a 1990 publication, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*.[14] Three decades earlier, Lipset's *Political Man* had pursued the search for necessary and, if possible, sufficient conditions for democracy, emphasizing the link between economic development and the likelihood that a society is democratic. In one of the more famous propositions from this discussion, Lipset asserts: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that will it sustain democracy."[15] The most recent study abandons the concept of "pre-conditions" and shifts instead to what the authors label "facilitating and obstructing factors" in democratic development. It discusses such factors under ten headings, one of which is "international factors." While the authors "attribute the course of political development and regime change primarily to internal structures and actions," they recognize that internal structures have been "shaped historically by a variety of international factors." On the one hand, they caution that "the potential for democratic influence from the United States or other external actors should not be underestimated." In support of the claim they cite four examples, one positive, one negative, and two mixed. The Kennedy administration's bet on democracy in Venezuela was "an important supporting factor"; the Carter administration's human rights pressure on Argentina failed to force the withdrawal of the military, but nonetheless "saved many victims of indiscriminate repression in the late 1970s and was a factor in the international isolation of the military regime"; in Chile and South Korea, the U.S. role was mixed. On the other hand, they conclude that "at the current time, however, and no doubt in many previous decades, the most important international influences

[13] Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3–4.

[14] Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989).

[15] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 31.

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on the prospects for democracy in developing countries appear to be economic ones." The democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe will depend significantly on the "flexibility and vision" of the industrialized countries in dealing with "the critical issues of developing countries' debt and trade."[16]

These scholarly studies force one to recognize the inescapable complexity that surrounds the simple question with which we began. They complicate our inquiry by identifying more than a score of fundamental issues, many of which are controversial. What do we mean by "democracy"? Is democracy best understood as a phenomenon or as an intellectual construct? Are there unambiguous criteria for distinguishing democracies from other forms of government? For which kinds of associations among individuals, if not all, is democracy the best (or the least worst) solution? For the world? For national groups, nation states, business firms, or universities? And if for some of these associations and not others, why?

Similar questions surround the role of the United States in promoting democracy. Why should Washington be interested in advancing the spread of democratic values and institutions? Is our principal objective national self-determination, freedom for individuals, or the promotion of regimes that are likely to be friendly to American interests? Are there significant international implications associated with the spread of democracy (for example, Immanuel Kant's assertion that democracies are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states)?

Finally, another set of fundamental questions surrounds the prerequisites for the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes. Are there pre-conditions for democratic development? Is a market economy a necessary condition for sustainable democracy? Is a bourgeois class a necessary precondition for democracy, or a widespread belief in the legitimacy of democratic institutions? When countries develop economically, do they enter what Huntington calls "a zone of transition or choice" about democracy that was previously unavailable to them?[17] Is the high correlation between levels of economic development and democracy just a coincidence? How does the process of democratization relate to the probability of a stable democracy? Is blood required, as Barrington Moore theorizes? Or is Dahl closer to the mark when he argues that stable democracies "are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies."[18] Finally, is political democracy a natural condition of mankind in that it is more consistent with fundamental human needs, aspirations, and inclinations than other forms of government?

Interesting essays have been written and remain to be written in response to each of these questions. Moreover, thoughtful answers to each query would be

[16] Diamond, Linz and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 1-37.

[17] See Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 199-203.

[18] Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, 260-262; Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 211; Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

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germane to our current inquiry. But given the space available, we return to the operational question: is it possible for the United States government and society to promote democracy?

We believe that the answer to this question is a clear and resounding "yes." Under a particular condition C, the transition to and consolidation of democracy in specific target countries is more probable; if the United States takes a specific initiative, then condition C is more probable; thus by taking that initiative, the United States can promote democracy. According to this argument, the initiative by the U.S. government and others that produced the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Agreement (which establishes democratic elections as the criterion for legitimate governments) promotes democracy. Conversely, if failed U.S. policies contribute to a worldwide recession and protectionist sentiment seals off western markets to newly-democratic countries, their overall economic performance would decline sharply and with it their prospects for sustaining democracies.

III

We expected that we would find an agenda of actions for promoting democracy in the literature. We are still looking. Perhaps others will have articles or books to suggest. But since we have been unable to find someone else's list, yet remain unwilling to cease and desist without offering a more specific, positive answer to the question we began with, we will continue where qualified students of the subject have hesitated to tread.

In an earlier volume on avoiding nuclear war, *Hawks, Doves and Owls*, we developed a simplistic format for stating an agenda of action in the form of specific do's and don'ts for reducing the risks of nuclear war.[19] Thus, for example, one of ten "principles for avoiding nuclear war" states "obtain a credible conventional deterrent." Under it, there follow a number of actions to take and to avoid: "*DO* strengthen NATO and the Rapid Deployment Force to levels in which it would not be necessary to threaten escalation to nuclear use to deter Soviet aggression"; and "*DON'T* pretend that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war"—a fiction that was gaining currency in the early 1980s when the book was written. Shorn of qualifications and footnotes, this agenda was better received by politicians and officials than by academic colleagues. But in retrospect, for all its limitations, we judge it useful.

Here we attempt to formulate the first draft of an agenda of actions for a government and society determined to promote democracy. Assuming the U.S. government were to give high priority to promoting democracy, what could it

[19] Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls* (New York: Norton, 1985), 223–246. (Emphasis added.)

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do? Each "do" or "don't" assumes, of course, an unspecified *ceteris paribus* clause. As is true in any policy arena, specific initiatives may conflict with each other and with other national objectives. Trade-offs and hard choices are therefore necessary. These principles and injunctions identify guidelines for action. They provide starting presumptions or inclinations that must at the moment of choice be balanced against other objectives.

We have organized initiatives for promoting democracy under ten principles. Each principle identifies a cluster of factors that U.S. policy (governmental and societal) could promote, the presence of which makes sustainable democracies more probable, the absence of which makes them less so. Such factors cover the spectrum from macro considerations that may appear so obvious as not to arise in general discussion, to micro considerations so particular that they have generally been dismissed.

The first two principles identify initiatives that create an external environment favoring democracy. The second five focus on what might be called building the infrastructure of democracy within states. A final three target strategies for democratizing individual nations. Under each principle we group illustrative measures that government or other actors in the society might take or avoid. A given action like the transfer of the technological infrastructure of democracy might enhance the prospects for democracy while simultaneously increasing the prospects of chaos that could lead to an authoritarian resurgence. Whether a given action should be taken or avoided in a specific instance depends on situational assessment of the net effect on the prospects of democracy, as well as the trade-offs between promoting democracy and other objectives.

This agenda could be expanded with additional measures at the same level of generality. Greater specificity under each do or don't could lengthen the list still further. And, of course, each of these principles clearly deserves discussion at far greater length than it will receive here. Nevertheless, this agenda serves a useful task in demonstrating there are a host of actions that the United States can take to promote democracy abroad.

IV

Demonstrate and communicate democratic society's superior performance.

• DO make American democracy a "shining city on a hill." Western democracies must never forget that in the final analysis it is the vitality of their values, institutions, and societies that will be the strongest argument for democracy. In this context, the United States has a special role to play, since America has been the exemplar and promoter of modern democracy for the last two hundred years.

Almost as important as the success of American society for the prospect of democracies elsewhere is the demonstration effect of America's allies in the commonwealth of industrial democracies, specifically Europe and Japan. The suc-

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cessful reconstruction of defeated authoritarian regimes and the rebuilding of Western Europe as part of a commonwealth of industrial democracies, who together exhibit the features of the most dynamic and successful societies in the world, reinforce confidence and success. This community of shared values, institutions, and practices thus becomes a model for other societies.

- DO act in confidence that "it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or ill." As John Maynard Keynes explained:

> The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believed themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.[20]

- DO encourage analyses by scholars and governmental officials in democratic and nondemocratic countries of objective indicators of society's performance: per capita GNP, health status including mortality and morbidity, education, housing, food, telephones, automobiles, televisions, etc.
- DO broadcast the facts of life through publications, radio, television, and audio and video cassettes to the populations of nondemocratic countries in their languages and in terms and comparisons meaningful to them. Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Television Marti, the BBC World Service, CNN, and international comparative statistics produced by various organizations provide facts that undermine nondemocratic fictions.
- DON'T neglect the failures of American society. The United States is first among developed countries in consumption of drugs (50 percent of the world's cocaine), crime, infant mortality (higher in the nation's capital than in Jamaica), adult illiteracy, international debt, low savings rate, pornography, and growth of an underclass. As George Will recently observed, "Nothing in Bangladesh should be as interesting to Americans as the fact that a boy born in Harlem today has a lower life expectancy than the boy born in Bangladesh."[21] These concerns are not irrelevant to the standing of American democracy, and thus to the prospects of democracy worldwide.
- DON'T agree with arguments about the moral or practical equivalence of political systems. Democratic states have a proven track record at providing their citizenry with both unprecedented political freedoms and the highest level of prosperity found on this planet.

[20] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: MacMillan, 1957), 383–84.

[21] George F. Will, cited in Paul Kennedy, "Fin-de-Siecle America," *New York Review of Books*, 28 June 1990.

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Build an international security, economic, and political order favorable to democracy.

- DO build upon the alliance of industrial democracies in fashioning a strategy for security in the aftermath of the cold war. Substantial revisions in basic alliance relations, such as NATO, the U.S.–Japanese treaty, and others will be necessary. But the process should begin with the recognition that these alliances have provided a longer peace, more sustained economic growth, and greater freedom than any of the parties enjoyed under any earlier arrangement. Alliances such as NATO always had positive goals beyond defending against the Soviet threat. Those goals should be explained and extended. The U.S. government should project a vision of a peaceful international order starting with the foundation of the alliance of industrial democracies and extending, as Kant originally explained, in successive stages to a widening pacific union among the democracies of the world.
- DO organize institutional arrangements to provide for the security of the newly independent nations in Eastern and Central Europe. War and the eminent threat of war pose a danger to democracies, young and old. Responses to security threats require the centralization of power and encourage authoritarian tendencies while simultaneously raising the visibility and influence of the military in society. Weak as it is, the CSCE framework may offer a useful framework for protecting current borders while providing a process for adjudicating peaceful changes. CSCE can also help to institutionalize the notion of open societies and support a full spectrum of confidence and security building measures (CSMBs) to minimize paranoia.
- DO discreetly capitalize on victory in the cold war to build specific cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. Address specific regional security issues and global issues like the proliferation of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and missiles in ways that contribute to a more secure environment for democracies.
- DO continue to build upon, extend, and strengthen the international economic order that has emerged over the past four decades. The global economic depression of the 1930s brought severe and in some cases fatal pressure upon democratic regimes. America's postwar strategy wisely aimed to create an international economic system that would provide stable monetary relations, stimulate investment and trade, reward market-oriented economies, and promote expansion of the United States and world economy. The performance record of this international economic system is impressive, and it has permitted the most rapid and sustained expansion of the world economy in history. Since 1950, world product has quintupled to more than $20 trillion; the American standard of living has tripled. In addition, economic growth and thickening interactions with the industrial democracies continue to create pressures for democratization, as in the case of Korea. While the successful economic performance of a society does not guarantee democracy, failing economic performance almost certainly guarantees a failure of democracy.

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• DO welcome new democratic market economies into appropriate status in the major international economic organizations as they meet required prerequisites. Assist them in making the transitions required for Most Favored Nation (MFN), membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) and participation in other institutions.

• DO nurture the free trading system, resist backsliding, and press for the expansion of its realm in the GATT Uruguay round. Provide open markets for exports from newly established democratic countries, especially in the realm of steel, agriculture, and textile products.

• DO seek to organize a strategy for major western financial assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and to hold out a carrot for equivalent Soviet transitions. Future SEED legislation will be necessary.

• DO establish democracy, human rights, and individual freedom as norms of civilized societies. The political strand of America's cold war strategy emphasized promoting democratic institutions and values, not just by example but by actively building democratic societies elsewhere. The bedrock of these political institutions are values that the Declaration of Independence asserts are universal, including the freedom of individual citizens to order their political, economic, and cultural life and the need for governments that derive their powers from the consent of the governed, secured by regular competitive free elections. From the UN Charter and Declaration on Human Rights to the Helsinki Accords, the insistence upon the rights and freedom of individuals represents more than a preference. It is the essential ingredient in a commonwealth of industrial democracies that promises peace as well as freedom.

• DO insist on the performance of societies in meeting these standards. Multiple monitoring and reporting mechanisms, including independent monitors like Amnesty International and Freedom House, as well as official multinational organizations, magnify the message.

• DO encourage advocates of victims whose rights are violated. Emphasize processes most appropriate to the specific society, such as using the legal framework and independent judiciary in South Africa.

• DO establish and encourage both regional and international associations of democratic societies. The European Community has played a critical role in facilitating the transition to democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. It is also doing so in Turkey and the newly independent nations of Central Europe.

• DO reward good behavior and penalize violators. The interruption of international loans to China after Tiananmen Square spoke more credibly than any words of condemnation.

• DON'T imagine or allow leaders of newly democratic countries to imagine that any viable third way exists. It is a powerful and profound fact of history that *all* viable democracies have market economies. This is no accident.

• DON'T insist on any single model of a market economy. The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden are successful examples of market economies.

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• DON'T impose a foolish political consistency that would be a hobgoblin of little minds. For example, don't expect that the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf will make a rapid transition to democracy. And don't insist upon any single model of democratic governance.

• DON'T imagine an "end of history." There is a large element of fashion in the current democratic revolutions; and fashions change.

V

Promote pluralization of societies and the development of civil society.

• DO recognize that private property, private ownership of farms, housing, goods, and enterprises are among the most solid guarantees of pluralization. People with economic power have power.

• DO aid and abet independent groups, voluntary associations, and civil society: independent trade unions, businesses, professional organizations, churches, political parties, etc.

• DO encourage western groups to interact and stand in solidarity with their counterparts in newly democratic and nondemocratic societies.

• DO allow and promote an independent media, enabling free dialogue and pluralism on a national scale.

• DO speed the transfer of the technological infrastructure of pluralism to newly democratic and nondemocratic societies: printing presses, photocopiers, personal computers, fax machines, satellite dishes, and modern telecommunications systems. (Don't hesitate to revise lists of the Coordinating Committees for Multilateral Export Controls and procedures to free the transfer of most items, limiting only narrowly defined, militarily critical technologies.)

Encourage the evolution of a democratic political culture.

• DO encourage the international culture that has emerged with modern telecommunications and travel, and include those from political cultures hostile to democracy within that international culture.

• DO provide leaders of nondemocratic countries with direct experience with the facts of life in democratic societies. Words are an important form of communication, but direct experience is even more persuasive. Boris Yeltsin illustrates this point vividly in his autobiography when he recounts his "shattering" visit to an American supermarket: "When I saw those shelves crammed with hundreds, thousands of cans, cartons and goods of every possible sort, for the first time I felt quite frankly sick with despair for the Soviet people.[22]

[22] Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain*, Michael Glenny, trans. (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 255.

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- DO support professional and citizen exchange efforts with nondemocratic countries.
- DON'T be insensitive to or imperialistic about other cultures; but don't accept the notion of a moral equivalence between authoritarianism and democracy.

Strengthen democratic institutions.

- DO provide information about and analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of various alternative models of democracy regarding constitutions, legislatures, executive branches, civil services and public administration, relations between politicians and bureaucrats, civil-military relations, independent judiciaries, etc.
- DO provide assistance in conducting and monitoring free elections.
- DO provide assistance for newly emerging independent political parties, but don't teach them the bad habits and tricks of American political consultants.
- DO support the establishment of independent, functioning parliaments in new democracies.
- DO support the formation of independent judiciary systems.
- DO promote the development of democracy at the regional and local level.
- DO channel such assistance through nongovernmental organizations, like the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as private foundations. This will limit the U.S. government's vulnerability to charges of imperialism.

Assist the development of market economies.

- DO help develop the pillars of a market economy: private property, legal protection of property and enforcement of contracts, financial markets, a fiscal system, a banking system and a central bank, macroeconomic stabilization policies, antimonopoly regulations, privatization, etc.
- DO work to assure access to world markets for the goods and services of newly-democratized market economies, including the extension of GSP (general system of preferences) treatment to agricultural products, OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) eligibility, export-import bank credits, bilateral investment treaties, special tax credits, etc.
- DO encourage private sector development through devices like the Enterprise Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, regional development banks, etc.
- DO encourage foreign investment and joint ventures. Demonstration projects like McDonald's in Moscow provide models of firms whose imported cattle and seeds for lettuce and tomatoes are several times more productive than their Soviet equivalents and whose methods for delivering services mesmerize Muscovites.
- DO work actively with newly democratic market economies to establish a

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framework that will attract the type of international investments that transfer technology and know-how and thus encourage production.

- DO provide concrete economic assistance for decisions and policies that will promote economic growth. The IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, and analogous international banks are the preferred instruments for such conditional assistance.

Socialize the military and the security forces to respect democratic norms and values.

- DO train the emerging military leadership with American and other western military forces.
- DO make socialization to respect the norms and values of democracy an explicit part of such extended training programs.
- DO encourage the development of independent, civilian analysis of military issues throughout newly democratic and democratizing countries.
- DO support military-to-military exchanges between democratic and newly democratic and nondemocratic countries, including high level contacts and visits to military training academies.

VI

Nurture and support leaders who are building democracy.

- DO recognize that key individuals and their choices make a substantial difference in the transition to and maintenance of democracies. Contrary to prevailing social science theories, social transformation is not all a matter of impersonal forces. Support those individuals who strongly favor democratic change.
- DO use carrots and sticks in a calculated manner to the advantage of leaders who are building democracy and to the disadvantage of their opponents. Penalize societies whose leadership is moving in the opposite direction.

Provide sustained advice and assistance about critical choices in the transition to democracy, market economies, and cooperative international relations.

- DO encourage relationships between expert groups in democratic societies and those in democratizing or nondemocratic societies (with special attention to those in positions of political responsibility) for sustained advice and assistance about the lessons of western experience in democracy, market economies, and international relations.
- DO seek to stimulate sustained, personal cooperation sector by sector between leaders of newly emerging democracies and established democracies—parliaments, judiciaries, civil servants, military, law, press, accountants, bankers—in order to more effectively transfer the lessons of western experience and support key individuals in building democracies in their own societies.

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• DO provide education and training, especially short courses, on the best practices in various areas of experience in political and economic democracies.

• DO encourage the development of independent universities and research institutions to assume the responsibility of educating the next generation in a timely fashion.

Be sure to differentiate between various regions and countries.

• DO realize the inherent limitations in any one-size-fits-all approach to promoting democracy. Regions and countries differ in their history, culture, traditions, internal politics, values, belief systems, etc. These differences are likely to exert an important influence over the likelihood that they will become democratic. Many of the major gains and setbacks in recent years occurred by region. Between 1973 and 1989, Europe, Latin America, and Asia witnessed a considerable expansion in the number of democratic regimes, whereas Africa lost ground. A better understanding of these geographical differences, including the factors that shape them, should provide useful clues regarding how democratic norms and institutions can best be promoted and transferred within a particular region or culture.

• DO watch for specific windows of opportunity in which, due to an unusual intersection of political and historical factors, a given country or region is uniquely open to democratic change. Southern Europe entered such a period in the mid-1970s after the deaths of Francisco Franco in Spain and Antonio Salazar in Portugal. Latin America and Eastern Europe are in such a period in 1992. Under these circumstances, external assistance—if conducted in a timely, sensitive, and appropriate fashion—can prove particularly effective. Resulting success stories may then serve as inspiration for other countries in the region.

VII

Is it possible to identify initiatives the U.S. government could take to establish conditions necessary for the establishment of democracy in a particular country or sufficient to guarantee democracy in that country? On the evidence available, while certain conditions are highly correlated with democracy, none appears strictly necessary. No set of conditions appears sufficient to guarantee democracy. The best candidate for a necessary condition would appear to be a market economy. While market economies exist with nondemocratic governments, there are no societies with democratic governments and nonmarket economies.

If the United States and other democratic allies were to adopt a coherent program that included many of the items in our agenda, would the consolidation of democracy in the newly-democratic countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America and transition to democracy elsewhere be assured? Certainly not. Transitions to democracy are uncertain in every case. Consolidation is never assured. On the historical record, there is no reason to believe that the transition to or

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consolidation of democracy is easy, quick, or ever assured. What the record does suggest is that some initiatives are more conducive to the success of democratic government.

Finally, why are so many scholars, pundits, and practitioners skeptical about the ability of the United States to promote democracy? Our reflections identify several possibilities. First, prescription has not been the focus of most social scientists studying democracy. Their goal was to define, analyze, and where possible to identify correlations of causal significance—not to prescribe.

Second, respect for democratic values appears to reinforce reserve about external manipulation and the desire to avoid undue interference in the internal affairs of other states. This basic respect for the rights and self-government of others leads to reserve about championing initiatives that promote democracy. But since most of the individuals living in nondemocratic societies have not had the opportunity to choose between democracy and their current political system, is this reservation well founded?

Third, one senses some hangover from unfortunate experiences in the past, whether from enthusiasm for the Alliance for Progress, or for Woodrow Wilson's aspirations, or perhaps even Vietnam. Observers coming fresh to the literature sense almost a bad conscience or feeling of guilt about the American record. Perhaps many agree with Hans Morgenthau's remarkable proposition:

> With unfailing consistency, we [the United States] have since the end of the Second World War intervened on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against revolutionary and radical reform. In an age when societies are in a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary stage, we have become the foremost counterrevolutionary status quo power on earth. Such a policy can only lead to moral and political disaster.[23]

We find Morgenthau's statement to be both inaccurate and dated.

A final factor contributing to scholarly reticence about prescription could be an appreciation for the fact that no identifiable set of conditions is sufficient to guarantee a sustainable democracy. In a world in which many nations are fraught with ethnic, racial, regional, religious, and historical conflicts and in which various subcultures and belief systems exist that are hostile to democratic values, hubris about our ability to export or impose democracy is certain to produce disappointing failures. Yet, for those less captured by the search for sufficiency, initiatives that increase the probability that regimes will become democratic are sufficient to justify the continued effort to promote democracy.*

[23] Hans Morgenthau, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 247.

* The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Cimbalo, Lawrence Diamond, Michael Doyle, Samuel Huntington, Marc Lindenberg, Gary Mueller, Adam Posen, Tony Smith, and Dennis Thompson for their helpful and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy

ATHAN THEOHARIS

Drawing upon his department's miscellaneous expense funds, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte on 26 July 1908 created a twenty-four agent investigative division within the Department of Justice—the Bureau of Investigation (formally renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935) with the limited responsibility to investigate violations of federal interstate commerce and antitrust laws. Created at a time of the expansion of the federal government's responsibilities to regulate business activities and to supplement local and state law enforcement, the bureau's role further expanded with the enactment of a series of laws defining new interstate crimes—the Mann Act of 1910, Dyer Act of 1919, and making kidnapping, bank robbery, and extortion federal crimes between 1932 and 1934. The number of agents increased to approximately 300 in 1917, 441 in 1924, and 609 in 1936.

The year 1936 marked a new phase in the bureau's history. Its role and influence expanded thereafter at an unprecedented rate—documented by the increase in FBI agents from 898 in 1940, to 1,596 in 1941, 4,886 in 1944, 7,029 in 1952. More importantly, the enactment of new federal laws had not triggered this expansion. After 1936, executive directives authorizing FBI investigations of "subversive activities" proved to be the major catalyst to the bureau's remarkable growth, whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt's oral directive of August 1936 or President Harry S. Truman's executive order of March 1947 establishing the Federal Employee Loyalty Program. No longer confined to seeking evidence justifying protection, FBI investigations increasingly sought intelligence about the plans,

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membership, and supporters of organizations or causes deemed to be subversive by FBI officials. In addition, FBI officials exploited the vagueness of the various executive directives and public concerns about internal security threats to cultivate a more positive image, undercutting the antipathy toward a federal police role based on states rights or civil libertarian values. In the process, they circumvented Congress's and the court's oversight roles. Furthermore, while executive directives triggered the bureau's expansion and although presidents relied on the bureau's resources to further their own policy and political interests, the FBI did not evolve into a presidential agency. Instead, by the 1950s the bureau became an autonomous agency, independent both of the president and of the attorney general.[1]

This bureaucratic development was not the inevitable byproduct of U.S. involvement in World War II and the cold war. The crises of cold and hot wars indeed provided the political context. Nonetheless, the methods presidents employed to conduct internal security policy effectively determined the FBI's increased powers and autonomy—particularly their preference for executive directives instead of laws to authorize FBI activities and their interest in secrecy to minimize discovery either of their authorization or of the kind of information they received or solicited from the FBI.

A review of FBI wiretapping policy and uses highlights this process. For one, under existing law and court rulings, between 1934 and 1968 wiretapping was illegal. Until enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, administration efforts dating from Roosevelt's presidency in 1941 to amend the Federal Communication Act's ban on wiretapping proved unsuccessful. Recognizing this lack of legal authority, when devising the "June mail" procedure in 1949, FBI officials privately conceded that wiretaps (as well as bugs and mail opening) were "sources illegal in nature." Although presidents lobbied the Congress to enact legislation to lift the ban against wiretapping, they did not release the text of Roosevelt's 1940 directive as providing the legal authority to conduct wiretapping. Moreover, when Justice Department and FBI officials sought to quell the furor created by revelations of FBI wiretapping during the Judith Coplon trial by defending FBI wiretapping practices as authorized by an earlier Roosevelt directive, liberal critics (for example, the *Washington Post*) disputed this claim. At the time President Truman did not honor a Justice Department recommendation to publicize Roosevelt's 1940 directive. The informed public

[1] On the history of the FBI, see Vern Countryman, "The History of the FBI: Development of a Secret Police" in Pat Watters and Stephen Gillers, eds., *Investigating the FBI* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973), 33–62; Sanford Ungar, *FBI* (Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1975); Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance* (New York: Knopf, 1980); Richard Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York: Free Press, 1987); and Athan Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

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and members of Congress might have been aware of FBI wiretapping; this awareness did not constitute acceptance of its legality.[2]

Second, President Roosevelt's secret directive of 1940 authorizing wiretapping stipulated that the attorney general should ensure that specified guidelines were to govern FBI wiretapping. Nonetheless, FBI officials successfully circumvented these proposed oversight requirements. Third, the inherently intrusive nature of wiretapping permitted FBI officials to acquire massive amounts of noncriminal information and then use this information to consolidate their own and the bureau's power.

These conclusions are documented by certain extant FBI records, which only hint at the scope and purpose of FBI wiretapping. These records suggest that FBI wiretapping practices were far more extensive than presently known and that FBI officials used the acquired information to advance their own bureaucratic and political objectives. Because these highly sensitive records, which constitute the research base for this article, were created on the premise that they would never be publicly discovered and were to be maintained separately from official FBI records to ensure that they could be safely destroyed, they are not a complete record of FBI wiretapping activities. Awareness of certain FBI wiretapping activities during the 1940s derives from the happenstance continued existence of records filed in two secret office files, one maintained by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and the second by his key aide, FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols.

These two office files are not a complete record of all FBI wiretapping activities; at best, they provide insights into the targets of FBI wiretaps and then only for the 1940s. Summaries of four sensitive wiretaps (on John Monroe, Henry Grunewald, Edward Prichard, and Thomas Corcoran) are extant in Hoover's so-called Official and Confidential File. The FBI director, however, maintained a second secret office file, his so-called Personal and Confidential File. This second file was destroyed by Hoover's administrative assistant, Helen Gandy, immediately after his death in May 1972 and pursuant to his earlier order. Conceivably, other equally sensitive wiretap records had been maintained in this destroyed file. In addition, during 1949–1953, Hoover refined FBI records procedures and thereby ensured the undiscoverable destruction of any similar wiretap records created during the 1950s and thereafter. On the one hand, in March 1953, the FBI director ordered the destruction every six months of all office files maintained by FBI assistant directors, minimizing the chance that particularly sensitive records (such as those filed in the FBI director's office) would remain extant. On the other hand, in June 1949 and refined over the next year, Hoover authorized the so-called June mail procedure to permit the undiscoverable submission to FBI headquarters of information obtained from "highly confidential" sources (wiretaps, bugs, break-ins, mail opening) or "most secretive" sources

[2] On the Coplon case, see Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), 103–104. On FBI efforts to preclude discovery of the scope and targets of FBI wiretaps and admission that wiretaps were "illegal in nature," see Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss*, 256–260.

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("such as Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitudes"). Whenever reporting information from these sources, SACs (the heads of FBI field offices) were to caption these reports JUNE. Such captioned reports were not filed in the FBI's main case files but in the Special File Room, a "separate confidential file maintained under lock and key."[3]

FBI Wiretapping Authority

In 1934, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting wiretapping. As part of this legislation creating the Federal Communications Commission, Congress forbade any person to "intercept any [wire or radio] communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."[4] The enactment of this law did not end FBI wiretapping, for Justice Department officials concluded that this ban did not apply to federal agents. The Supreme Court, however, in companion rulings in *Nardone v. U.S.* rejected this reasoning and held in 1937 that federal agents were not exempted and then in 1939 that whenever information had been obtained through an illegal wiretap this tainted and thereby necessitated the dismissal of the case.

The *Nardone* rulings did not lead senior Justice Department officials to abandon wiretapping. Claiming that the act prohibited only the interception and divulgence of information obtained through wiretapping, Justice Department officials in 1937–1939 privately maintained that wiretapping was permissible when used for intelligence purposes. Under this interpretation, wiretaps could be installed so long as the intercepted information was not disseminated outside the department to another person as would be required to prosecute. But this interpretation required presidential concurrence were it to become policy. And Roosevelt granted necessary authorization within the year.

Disturbed over German and Soviet involvement "in the organization of propaganda or so-called 'fifth columns' . . . and in the preparation for sabotage, as well as in actual sabotage" in Spain, France, and the western hemisphere, on 21 May 1940, Roosevelt secretly authorized FBI wiretapping. The Supreme Court "never

[3] On the destruction of Hoover's Personal and Confidential File, see U.S. House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, *Hearings on Inquiry into the Destruction of Former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's Files and FBI Record Keeping*, 94th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 2–126, 139–140, 174–177, 203–205. On regular destruction of office files, see Memo, FBI Executives' Conference to Tolson, March 10, 1953, FBI 66-2095-100; Memo, Hoover to Tolson et al., March 19, 1953, FBI 66-2095-100. On June mail policy, see SAC Letter no. 69, ser. 1949, June 29, 1949, FBI 66-1372-1; Memo, Tolson to Hoover, December 7, 1949, FBI 66-8160-1579; No Number SAC Letter, December 22, 1949, FBI 66-1372; Memo, Hoover to Ladd et al., December 28, 1949, FBI 66-1372-2; Memo, Branigan to Belmont, May 28, 1954, FBI 66-1372-11; Memo, SAC New York to Hoover, August 3, 1954, FBI 62-10026A.

[4] Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss*, 169–170.

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intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided [*Nardone*] to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the nation," Roosevelt wrote. Accordingly, he "authorized and directed" the attorney general to permit FBI wiretapping "in such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each case" of those persons "suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies." Roosevelt further specified that when employed, wiretaps were to be limited "to a minimum" and "insofar as possible to aliens."[5]

Whether or not presidents have such national security powers, Roosevelt's secret directive imposed limits on FBI wiretapping. The Court's prohibition applied to criminal investigations, Roosevelt conceded, but wiretaps could be used during counterintelligence investigations to anticipate (and thus avert) any subversive activities by the nation's foreign enemies and their domestic agents. To maintain this distinction, Roosevelt required the attorney general's approval of each national defense wiretap after investigation of the need in each case.

Roosevelt's oversight requirements were almost concurrently abandoned. Desirous of minimizing the possible discovery of this secret decision to circumvent an explicit legislative restriction, Roosevelt's attorney general, Robert Jackson, willingly ceded considerable latitude to his subordinate Hoover, fully expecting the FBI director to act as his and the president's servant. Thus, when discussing the president's directive with Hoover on 28 May, Jackson announced that he would not keep a "detailed record . . . concerning the cases in which wiretapping would be utilized. It was agreeable . . . that I [Hoover] would maintain a memorandum book in my immediate office, listing the time, places, and cases in which this procedure is to be utilized."[6]

In effect, Jackson's decision created a situation ripe both for political use and bureaucratic independence. Having minimized the risk of discovery, the White House could and did request FBI wiretaps of the president's political opponents. The FBI director curried favor when servicing such requests and this in turn compromised the ability of the president and the attorney general to monitor the FBI. In addition, FBI officials could at the time or later use for their own purposes whatever derogatory information had inadvertently been obtained through wiretapping. More important, because Hoover alone maintained the records of authorized wiretaps, only if he briefed subsequent attorneys general could they learn of ongoing FBI wiretaps. In effect, Jackson's decision not to maintain written records of approved wiretaps or require a written justification whenever the FBI director sought approval to wiretap effectively negated the intended restrictions of Roosevelt's directive: that such uses be exceptional and limited to

[5] Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*, 96–99; Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss*, 169–171.

[6] Memo, Hoover for Confidential File, May 28, 1940, Folder #163, Wiretapping, Presidential Authority folder, Official and Confidential File of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (henceforth Hoover O&C).

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aliens and that the attorney general authorize each wiretap after first assessing each request of the FBI director.

A genius at bureaucratic politics, Hoover readily exploited this opportunity. To safeguard himself and the bureau from any adverse consequences should the FBI's wiretapping be discovered, Hoover maintained in his office a "memorandum book" recording all wiretaps authorized by the attorney general.[7] Cards for those wiretaps authorized solely by senior FBI officials were not to be maintained in this folder but in the office of a designated assistant director. The number of such unauthorized wiretaps (by the attorney general, that is) cannot be identified definitively. Extant records maintained at first in the office of FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd (who headed the FBI's internal security division during World War II and the early cold war years) until their transfer in 1954 to FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols's office document at least fifteen instances.[8] Hoover's top aide and liaison to Congress and the media, Nichols began in October 1941 to maintain a so-called Official and Confidential File. Hoover had explicitly authorized creation of this Nichols office file to supplement his own "confidential" office file "in which are kept various and sundry items believed inadvisable to be included in the general files of the Bureau."[9] Because the fifteen wiretap authorization cards were transferred to Nichols's office in 1954, they escaped destruction under Hoover's March 1953 order mandating the regular six month destruction of all office files maintained by FBI assistant directors. Why Nichols's office file escaped destruction remains a mystery; it is the only extant office file of an FBI assistant director.

Ladd had been instructed that "no one can look" at these records without Hoover's approval. The authorization cards identify the targets and the dates of installation and termination of fifteen wiretaps and bear the notation "not included in running memo," that is, in the memorandum book of authorized wiretaps maintained in Hoover's office. In the memo recording his receipt of these records, Nichols reported that Ladd had also maintained five other categories of wiretap records: a wiretap on a name withheld individual; wiretaps installed on FBI officials' authority for which the attorney general's approval was subsequently requested and "if approved put in active drawer"; "active" wiretaps identified by their FBI field office; "Disapproved requests + 200 or so never used"; and one "Top Secret" wiretap installed by the Washington field office. Nichols's memo, however, does not recount the disposition of these wiretap records.[10]

[7] Memo, Tolson to Hoover, March 21, 1941, FBI 62-116758.

[8] Seventeen wiretap authorization cards captioned "Personal for LBN [Louis B. Nichols] Only Cards from DML [D. Milton Ladd] 2/1/54," plus nine note cards in Nichols's handwriting, Wiretapping folder, Official and Confidential File of FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols (henceforth Nichols O&C).

[9] *Hearings on the Destruction of Hoover's Files*, 154–155.

[10] Wiretapping folder, Nichols O&C.

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White House Requests

President Roosevelt seemingly wanted FBI wiretapping confined to national defense investigations. Presidents and their attorneys general, however, retained the discretion to define what constituted a national defense case. Extant FBI records document that in at least four cases Roosevelt and Truman requested FBI wiretaps of their political adversaries. The authorization card and a Do Not File memo of 17 May 1941 involving a fifth FBI wiretap on Henry Grunewald—installed on 4 June 1941 and discontinued on 13 September 1941 during an espionage investigation—records FBI Assistant Director Edward Tamm's authorization. Barely discernible handwriting on the photocopy of this card conceivably records Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle's after-the-fact approval. In June 1940, the FBI initiated an investigation of Grunewald at the request of the White House in response to allegations that Grunewald headed a German espionage ring. The FBI investigation uncovered no evidence of such activity. A 1941 report from Military Intelligence based on the same source triggering the 1940 investigation precipitated this wiretap. Because released FBI records are so heavily edited, it cannot be ascertained if this FBI wiretap was authorized or known to the White House or the attorney general.[11] Another card records that Grunewald was tapped again on 22 June 1945 and that this tap was discontinued on 10 September 1946. This card does not identify who authorized this second Grunewald tap.

Grunewald's activities in any event were not without interest to the Roosevelt White House. A self-employed private detective, Grunewald moved to Washington, DC in the mid-1930s and maintained close ties with conservative businessman Henry Marsh, isolationist Republicans (notably Senators Gerald Nye and Styles Bridges) as well as former Roosevelt aide and Washington attorney, Thomas Corcoran. Through the Grunewald tap and other surveillance methods, FBI officials learned among other items about the plans and political tactics of Roosevelt's isolationist critics in the Congress. Hoover shared some of this information with the White House without disclosing how the FBI had obtained it.[12]

The Roosevelt administration might not have authorized the Grunewald tap, but it did approve two other taps involving John G. O'Brien and Mrs. J. Upshur (Lillian) Moorehead. An officer in the Army Reserve, in 1942 O'Brien was activated and assigned to the provost marshal's office in Washington. Prior to en-

[11] Memo, Ladd to Hoover, February 7, 1945, FBI 87-2755-287.

[12] For background on Grunewald, see obituary and other press clippings in FBI 62-9444; FBI Report, Washington field office, September 7–13, 1943, FBI 87-2755-85; Memo, Belmont to Boardman, June 27, 1955, FBI 62-9444-Not Recorded. On the FBI's surveillance and wiretapping of Grunewald, see Folder #80, Henry Grunewald folder and Folder #84, H (Henry Grunewald) Summaries folder, both in Hoover O&C; "H" (Henry Grunewald) Summary, FBI 62-116758. See, specifically, Do Not File Memo, Spear to Foxworth, May 17, 1941; Do Not File Memo, Tamm to Foxworth, June 6, 1941; Do Not File Memo, Fitch to Foxworth, July 25, 1941, FBI 62-116758.

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tering military service, O'Brien since 1923 had served as an aide to Cornelius Vanderbilt IV and had developed close relationships with a number of anti-New Deal conservatives in the military (including Provost Marshal General Allen W. Guillon), Washington socialites (including the independently wealthy Lillian Moorehead), and leaders in the business community. Vanderbilt was the exception to O'Brien's conservative circle of associates. Although the heir of a sizable fortune, Vanderbilt wrote a gossipy column for the Hearst newspaper chain in which he commented on the foibles of the wealthy from a New Deal perspective. Vanderbilt's social and military contacts (he also served in the army reserve and received a wartime assignment in New York) made him a valued recruit for the White House and the FBI. Dating at least from 1941, Vanderbilt willingly "served in a confidential capacity in the Federal Bureau of Investigation by order of the President." As an informer, Vanderbilt "from time to time" briefed FBI Director Hoover on "matters which he believed should be brought to the attention of the President and which he is reluctant for personal or official reasons to forward through official channels in the War Department."[13]

One such report involved O'Brien's relation with General Guillon, Lillian Moorehead, and a number of other individuals whose names the FBI has withheld but including a wealthy businessman allegedly "willing to finance" a conspiracy "centered around" Guillon to overthrow the Roosevelt administration. Guillon allegedly headed a "constantly growing group who contemplate a military dictatorship in the United States and whose objective is 'to put the Jews in their place' and to remove the 'left-wing friends of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt' from public affairs." Described further as "anti-Administration," these conspirators allegedly boasted that "the Army will be in complete control of the Government prior to the next elections, which move is contemplated to save the Government 'from the revolutionary group of Mrs. Roosevelt's friends.'" In March 1942 Hoover briefed Attorney General Biddle on these unsupported allegations and obtained his "oral" approval to wiretap O'Brien. Exploiting information from the O'Brien investigation and wiretap, the next month Hoover requested and Biddle once again orally authorized a wiretap of Lillian Moorehead.[14]

FBI officials considered these wiretaps "an extremely delicate matter" in view of O'Brien's and Moorehead's prominent associates and thus installed them "without the assistance of the telephone company and without the knowledge of any person, in such a way that it could not under any circumstance be traced back to the Bureau." The resulting intensive FBI investigation did not uncover any

[13] Edwin P. Hoyt, *The Vanderbilts and Their Fortunes* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 315–317, 332–339, 350–353, 356–358, 364–369, 379–380, 391–397. Personal and Confidential Letter, Hoover to Hopkins, August 31, 1942, Folder #87, Harry Hopkins folder, Hoover O&C; Log "Y," June 7, 1942, 8:50 AM, FBI 62-116758. See also, Personal and Confidential Letters, Hoover to Hopkins, November 25, 1941, September 14 and 21, 1942, and November 12, 1942, Folder #87, Harry Hopkins folder, Hoover O&C; Summary Memo Re "Y," FBI 62-116758.

[14] Blind Memo, March 11, 1942 and Memo, Hoover to Biddle, March 11, 1942, FBI 100-94623-4 and Do Not File Memo, Ladd to Hoover, September 17, 1942, FBI 62-116758.

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evidence of a "conspiracy to overthrow" the government beyond Moorehead's and O'Brien's critical comments about the Roosevelt administration and the FBI.[15]

The FBI might have failed to uncover information either of value to the Roosevelt administration or about the alleged military conspiracy. Hoover's willingness to conduct this investigation nonetheless enhanced his standing with the administration. Nor was this the sole case where an FBI investigation targeted domestic critics of the Roosevelt administration. A second known case involving Inga Arvad, a columnist for the anti-New Deal *Washington Times-Herald*, however, had the unanticipated byproduct of uncovering information that proved to be of more long-term value to Hoover.

The FBI director's initial interest in Arvad had been kindled by an unsolicited report of November 1940 from a fellow student of Arvad's in a Columbia University journalist class claiming that she was anti-Semitic and pro-German. Hoover at first did not take these charges seriously. Repetition of this rumor and the elaboration that Arvad, by then employed by the *Times-Herald*, had been a publicity agent for Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and was currently a German spy elicited a different response following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite the absence of any newly acquired hard evidence to support these accusations and given her employment with this isolationist anti-New Deal newspaper, the FBI director in late December 1941 ordered a "discreet" investigation of Arvad and that the results be submitted "in the near future."[16]

To obtain information on the activities of prominent Washingtonians, which she then reported in her gossip column, Arvad frequently contacted second-level federal officials. FBI officials uncovered these contacts during their investigation of Arvad and reported to Hoover that she and her associates "may be engaged in any subversive or un-American activity." Hoover shared this suspicion and petitioned Attorney General Biddle for approval to tap Arvad. The FBI's "current investigation of this woman as an espionage suspect," Hoover reported, had "determined that in the short period of time she had been in Washington she has established close personal and professional contacts with persons holding important positions in the Government departments and bureaus vitally concerned with the national defense." These "facts," Hoover continued, "indicate a definite possibility that she may be engaged in a most subtle type of espionage activity against the United States." Accepting this report at face value, in part

[15] Wiretapping folder, Nichols O&C; "Y" (Lillian Moorehead) and "X" (John O'Brien) wiretap summaries, FBI 62-116758. See, specifically, Do Not File Memo, Ladd to Hoover, September 17, 1942; Blind and undated Memo Re "Y"; Memo, Ladd to Tamm, June 5, 1942; Memos, Ladd to Hoover, January 12 and 17, 1942; Do Not File Memo, Ladd to Tamm, March 11, 1942; all in FBI 62-116758.

[16] FBI Report, New York field office, June 7, 1941; Letter, Hoover to name withheld, December 2, 1940; Memo, McKee to Hoover, December 12, 1941; Letter, Hoover to McKee, December 24, 1941; and undated routing slip, Hoover to Tamm and Ladd; all in Folder #7, Mrs. Paul Fejos, nee Inga Arvad folder, Hoover O&C.

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because he suspected the motivation of the administration's critics in the conservative media, Biddle approved the Arvad wiretap.[17]

Almost from its inception the Arvad investigation acquired a further dimension. Thus, when apprising Hoover of the results of the FBI's surveillance and wiretapping of Arvad as well as information provided by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Washington SAC S. K. McKee portrayed the Arvad case as having "more possibilities than anything I have seen in a long time." McKee specifically cited Arvad's sexual affairs with among others then naval Ensign John F. Kennedy. Briefed on this and the other associates of Arvad, Hoover directed the Washington field office to give the Arvad investigation "close supervision" and "be fully cognizant of the potentialities." All other FBI field offices were to forward their investigative findings "not less frequently than weekly."[18]

FBI investigators had learned from ONI that Kennedy, when temporarily assigned to Washington, DC and prior to his transfer to Charleston, South Carolina, had "spent the night with [Arvad] on several occasions." Forewarned from the Arvad tap that she planned to visit Kennedy in Charleston during the weekends of 6–9 and 20–23 February 1942, Hoover directed the Savannah, Georgia SAC to bug her hotel room. Observing that should the FBI's monitoring of the *Times-Herald's* columnist become known that newspaper "would be quick to expose any investigation of the FBI," the FBI director admonished the SAC to exercise great caution. The SAC duly reported that Arvad and Kennedy had "engaged in sexual intercourse on numerous occasions" during these two weekends.[19]

The FBI's surveillance of Arvad, which also included breaking into her Washington residence to photocopy her papers, never uncovered any evidence of her "most subtle type of espionage activity." When Kennedy learned through contacts in naval intelligence that his activities were under surveillance and conveyed this to Arvad, FBI officials learned immediately of this potential problem from the Arvad wiretap. Alerted to the riskiness of continuing this investigation, in April

[17] Letter, McKee to Hoover, January 22, 1942; FBI Reports, Washington field office, January 6, and 22, 1942; Memo, Ladd to Hoover, January 17, 1942; Memo, Hoover to Biddle, January 21, 1942; Personal and Confidential Letter, Hoover to McKee, January 30, 1942; Memo, Mumford to Ladd, January 21, 1942; Memo, Kramer to Ladd, January 28, 1942; all in Folder #7, Fejos-Arvad folder, Hoover O&C.

[18] Memo, Carson to Ladd, January 1, 1942; Memo, Ladd to Kramer, January 29, 1942; Personal and Confidential Letter, Hoover to McKee, January 30, 1942; Letter, Hoover to McKee, February 11, 1942; all in Folder #7, Fejos-Arvad folder, Hoover O&C.

[19] Memo, Burton to Ladd, February 3, 1942; Personal and Confidential Letters, McKee to Hoover, February 5, 10 (two), and 24, and March 5 and 13, 1942; Wiretap Summaries, January 31, February 3, 5, 10, 17, 19, and 20 and March 1, 2, and 7, 1942; Personal and Confidential Letters, Ruggles to Hoover, February 9, 11, and 23, 1942; FBI Report, Savannah Field Office, February 9, 1942; FBI Reports, Washington Field Office, February 12, March 4, and April 8, 1942; Memos, Ladd to Tamm, February 6 and 10, and March 2, 1942; Memo, Fitch to Ladd, February 11, 1942; Letter, McKee to Hoover, February 10, 1942; Memo, Tamm to Hoover, February 3, 1942; Memo, Ladd to Hoover, February 6, 1942; all in Folder #7, Fejos-Arvad folder, Hoover O&C.

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1942 Hoover ordered discontinuance both of the wiretap and investigation of Arvad. Hoover's orders were countermanded within the month as Roosevelt on 4 May requested that Arvad be "specially watched," having found suspicious Hoover's reports on her associations. According to this request, the FBI investigation and wiretap were resumed for another two months.[20]

Roosevelt's request, however, had not been relayed through the attorney general. Because Biddle never inquired about the Arvad tap (as he had not the O'Brien and Moorehead taps) or about whether any evidence of espionage activities had been uncovered, he could monitor neither the conduct of this investigation nor the fruits of its discoveries. Hoover alone retained the discretion to act upon any acquired information.

From its inception the Arvad investigation had been handled differently from other FBI investigations of subversive activities, because the subject was employed as a columnist for the arch-conservative *Washington Times-Herald*. Accordingly, the more sensitive reports on the Arvad-Kennedy affair had been prepared under one of Hoover's special record submission procedures ("Personal and Confidential Letters"). On receipt in Washington, these reports were not incorporated in the FBI's central files but were routed to Nichols's confidential office file. In the 1940s, Hoover intended to preclude any awareness that the FBI was investigating a *Times-Herald* columnist. Kennedy's nomination in 1960 as the Democratic presidential candidate changed Hoover's interest and handling of these dated records. Briefed on 13 July 1960 (the day Kennedy won the nomination) on whatever derogatory personal and political information the FBI had accumulated on the Democratic presidential candidate, Hoover was reminded, among other items of interest, of Kennedy's wartime affair with Arvad. On 14 July the FBI's massive file on the Arvad investigation was transferred to Hoover's office.[21]

Attorney General Biddle's approval of the Arvad wiretap permitted the interception of information of long-term political value to Hoover. The FBI director's willingness in 1945 to service an even more sensitive request of Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, and in the process bypass the attorney general (whose authorization, oral or written, was not sought at the time the tap was originally installed in June) also furthered Hoover's bureaucratic objectives. Elevated to the presidency following Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945, former Vice President Truman inherited Roosevelt's appointees on the White House staff and other executive agencies. The new president depended on these appointees for background information, not having been fully briefed by Roosevelt about policies

[20] Memo, Ladd to Director, May 23, 1942; Personal and Confidential Letters, Hoover to SAC Washington, April 11 and May 6, 1942; Confidential Memo, White House to Hoover, May 4, 1942; all in Folder #7, Fejos-Arvad folder, Hoover O&C.

[21] Memo, Jones to DeLoach, July 13, 1960, Folder #96, Senator John F. Kennedy folder, Hoover O&C. Memo, Bassett to Callahan, February 13, 1975, Folder #13, President John F. Kennedy folder, Hoover O&C.

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and priorities. Truman expected that the Roosevelt appointees would not leak information about his own planned policies and strategy. Compounding the difficulties of this succession, Truman had won the vice presidential nomination in 1944 as a compromise candidate.

Because he had not been part of Roosevelt's administration prior to January 1945, Truman commanded neither the unquestioned authority of his predecessor nor the respect of Roosevelt's liberal appointees. Although committed to continuing Roosevelt's policies and yet to exercising power in his own right, the newly elevated president nonetheless within the next month appointed his own supporters to key White House and cabinet posts. Truman's appointments, given their more conservative political philosophy, further worried many of the Roosevelt holdovers, who in response attempted to ensure that the Roosevelt agenda would not be betrayed. An obviously insecure Truman was infuriated by this personal disloyalty.

Truman was particularly concerned about the age-old Washington practice of carefully timed leaks to the press by officials seeking to influence policy. To curb leaks and assure the loyalty of his advisers, the new president sought Hoover's assistance. In prearranged meetings with Hoover's senior aides, White House aides Edward McKim and James Vardaman outlined Truman's concerns and specifically requested that the FBI "investigate suspected White House aides, wiretap Edward Prichard [an aide to Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion director and Truman's appointee as Treasury Secretary, Fred Vinson] and study the operations of the White House with the objective of offering recommendations to improve its efficiency." The FBI should "secure all information possible on White House employees and . . . intercepts of phone conversations would be of extreme value." Vardaman imposed one condition when relaying this request, however, that should these investigations become known "it would be incumbent upon both the President and him to deny that any such investigation had been ordered." Eager to secure the new president's favor, Hoover launched a top-secret White House Security Survey to "secure all information possible on White House employees."[22]

In a companion action, Truman ordered the FBI to investigate vigorously the so-called *Amerasia* case "as an example to other persons in the Government who may be divulging confidential information." Having broken into on 11 March 1945 the offices of *Amerasia* (a radical journal of Far Eastern affairs), Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents discovered numerous classified OSS, State, and Navy Department documents. The FBI was immediately brought in to attempt to identify the federal employee(s) who provided copies of these documents to the journal's editors for possible criminal prosecution. In their resulting investigation FBI agents monitored and wiretapped the *Amerasia* office and broke into the

[22] Summary Memorandum Re: Philip Jaffe, March 3, 1953, Philip Jaffe folder, Part II, Nichols O&C. Folder #160, White House Security Survey (1945) folder, Hoover O&C. Memo, Ladd to Hoover, June 5, 1950, Philip Jaffe folder, Part IV, Nichols O&C.

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offices and residences of suspected targets. In early June 1945, however, senior Navy and State Department officials counseled against prosecuting the *Amerasia* case suspects, fearing the effect of any adverse publicity on U.S.–Soviet relations. Concerned more about stopping leaks, Truman not only rejected this counsel but advised Myron Gurnea, Hoover's liaison to the White House, that should other federal agencies not cooperate with the FBI's investigation of this case he wanted to be notified directly.[23]

The *Amerasia* and White House Security Survey investigations soon became intertwined, quite independent of Truman's concern about leaks. When initiating the White House Security Survey, the FBI had targeted Prichard, having learned of his expressed doubts about Truman's abilities and appointees to key administration positions. Hoover reported this damaging information to Truman on 23 April 1945. Acknowledging receipt of this FBI report, presidential aide Harry Vaughan advised Hoover that the president had read it "with great interest" and felt that "future communications along that line would be of considerable interest whenever, in your opinion, they are necessary."[24] In response, Hoover approved an FBI wiretap of Prichard on 8 May and this tap in turn precipitated two additional wiretap requests from the Truman White House.

On 29 May, the FBI director forwarded to presidential adviser Edward McKim transcripts of Prichard's telephone conversations with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and syndicated columnist Drew Pearson. (Prichard retained a close friendship with Frankfurter dating from his earlier clerkship with the Supreme Court justice.) The intercepted conversations contained frequent critical comments about the abilities of Truman's appointees as well as inside information about prospective personnel changes and policy decisions of the administration.

Inviting Gurnea to his office on 2 June, McKim extolled "the hell-of-a-swell job" performed by the FBI, asked Gurnea to convey his "personal gratitude" to Hoover, and reported that the president had found Prichard's intercepted comments "treasonable." Advising Gurnea that "we are taking corrective steps," McKim requested to be "currently" advised of "any" similar conversations and emphasized that we "want to keep that tap on." McKim was particularly interested in the Prichard tap's revelations about the activities of syndicated columnist Drew Pearson and of former Roosevelt aide and influential Washington attorney Thomas Corcoran. Desirous of learning about Pearson's and Corcoran's contacts within the administration and their apparent influence, he also asked if the FBI could identify Pearson's "any other sources" in the administration. Pearson's published accounts of the reports that presidential emissary Harry Hopkins had sent to the president on his meetings in Moscow with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin of 26 May through 7 June 1945 had been an additional catalyst to the White House

[23] Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss*, 239–241, 244–246.

[24] Letter, Vaughan to Hoover, April 23, 1945, Truman Papers, OF 10-B, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

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Security Survey. McKim thereupon requested FBI wiretaps of both Pearson and Corcoran.

Briefed on this White House request, Hoover approved a wiretap of Corcoran but not of Pearson. When doing so, however, the FBI director personally accepted the risks attendant to wiretapping the powerful Corcoran, whose extensive contacts in the Washington political and journalistic communities would have ensured wide publicity should this tap have been discovered. Gurnea might have created a written record of this discussion with McKim, but the president had not been a direct party to the wiretap request, providing Truman future deniability. Second, when authorizing the Corcoran tap in June, Hoover did not seek the attorney general's advance approval, thereby contravening the requirement of Roosevelt's 1940 directive. Third, McKim explicitly stated during this 2 June meeting that "nothing was said in any way, shape or form as to the consequences should this [wiretap on Corcoran] ever become known. It was understood that it was highly confidential." White House aide Harry Vaughan more fully spelled out the meaning of this condition, stating that if the Corcoran tap "should ever become known it would be our [the FBI's] baby" as he "would deny any knowledge."[25]

The Prichard and Corcoran taps never uncovered the source of the troublesome leaks. Nonetheless, through Corcoran's extensive Washington contacts, the Corcoran wiretap apprised the Truman White House of the plans of its New Deal critics within the Democratic party, the federal bureaucracy, the Supreme Court, and Congress. It provided the prospective commentary of columnists Drew Pearson, Irving Brant, and Ernest Cuneo. This invaluable political intelligence enhanced Hoover's standing with the White House.

Having their own interest in monitoring the Washington liberal community, FBI officials also found this political intelligence of value. To ensure that Truman would not conclude that the tap was too risky, FBI officials deleted from the daily summaries that were hand-delivered to the White House Corcoran's frequent comments (dating from 1946) that his phone was being tapped and his warnings to his telephone partners to be careful what they said over the phone.[26]

The Corcoran wiretap consolidated Hoover's position, but not simply because he won favor with Truman. The FBI director had accepted full political responsibility when installing this wiretap. Despite having done so, he had gained leverage to threaten to disclose the unanticipated fruits of this wiretap. At least twice, in 1950 and 1953, the powerful FBI director weighed this option. While never

[25] On Gurnea meeting with McKim and request to wiretap Pearson and Corcoran, see Strictly Personal and Confidential Memo, Gurnea to Hoover, June 2, 1945 and Memo, Nichols to Tolson, June 13, 1950, Philip Jaffe folder, Part IV, Nichols O&C. On Prichard wiretap and Frankfurter, see Memo, Ladd to Hoover, May 23, 1945 and attached transcripts of intercepted conversations between Prichard and both Frankfurter and Pearson, May 8, 13, 16, and 17, 1945, Folder #2, Technical Summaries Sent to the White House folder, Hoover O&C.

[26] Folder #2, Technical Summaries Sent to the White House folder, Hoover O&C.

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disclosing this information, Hoover's consideration of doing so on these two occasions underscore that by the 1950s the bureau's relationship with the White House and the Justice Department had evolved to that of a powerful coequal.

Hoover's first known threat to use this information occurred in July 1950. Hoover and his top aides were incensed over critical news stories based on the planned testimony of senior Justice Department officials before the Tydings Committee to the effect that the FBI's illegal conduct during the *Amerasia* investigation had aborted prosecution of the defendants. Angry FBI Assistant Director Louis Nichols thereupon pointedly advised Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford that unless Justice Department officials defended the bureau before the committee the FBI would be forced to release damaging information to the Truman Administration of Corcoran's behind-the-scene contacts in the summer of 1945 with senior Justice Department officials (including then Attorney General Tom Clark and Assistant Attorney General James McGranery). When Ford admitted knowledge of the Corcoran tap and added that "of course, we would never admit this," Nichols responded that "we wouldn't want to admit it, but if we were ever forced into a position the only thing we could do would be to tell the truth and point out we were ordered to do this."[27] Should Corcoran's activities have become known in 1950, the Truman administration would have suffered politically as conservatives in the Congress and the media were at that time seeking to portray the Justice Department's failure to have convicted the *Amerasia* defendants in 1945 as a political cover-up. Unaware of Corcoran's role, these conservatives had until then focused on the plea bargain that government prosecutors had concluded with two of the *Amerasia* defendants in 1945 and claimed that the U.S. attorney prosecuting the case had left government service to accept employment in a law firm in Buffalo, New York, headed by a relative of one of the original *Amerasia* defendants, Kate Mitchell.

FBI officials upped the ante in 1953, following the election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Preparing in November for public testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on the Harry Dexter White appointment, Hoover again seriously considered publicizing Corcoran's 1945 initiatives. Encouraged by the interest of both the Republican senators on the subcommittee

[27] Memos, Hoover to Tolson, Nichols, and Ladd, May 30 and 31 (two), 1950 and Summary Memorandum Re: Philip Jaffe, March 3, 1953, both in Philip Jaffe Folder, Part II, Nichols O&C. See also, Memo, Nichols to Hoover, May 27, 1950, Philip Jaffe folder. Part I, Nichols O&C and Blind Memo, May 29, 1950, Philip Jaffe folder, Part IV, Nichols O&C; Correlation Summary Re: Thomas Corcoran, January 26, 1956, FBI 62-63007-36. Apparently, FBI officials not only threatened to disclose the Corcoran wiretap material but covertly leaked this information to Robert Morris, minority counsel to the Tydings Committee; and the ranking Republican senator on the committee, Henry Cabot Lodge; as well as to conservative radio commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr.; and conservative reporters Willard Williams of the *Washington Times-Herald* and Frederick Woltman of the *Washington Daily News*. Woltman in fact had played a major role in reviving the *Amerasia* case in 1950, and the Scripps-Howard chain had published his long investigative piece suggesting a conspiracy to avert prosecution of the *Amerasia* defendants.

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and the Eisenhower administration in any information that might tarnish the Truman administration and the Democrats, the FBI director nonetheless hesitated to publicize Corcoran's activities unless he could document Truman's knowledge of the Corcoran tap. Hoover could not risk releasing FBI Assistant Director Gordon Nease's and FBI Inspector Myron Gurnea's reports on their meetings in 1945 with McKim, Vardaman, and Vaughan. These reports did not directly establish Truman's approval and if released would have documented Hoover's earlier willingness to act as a political agent of the Truman White House. Accordingly, Hoover directed Nichols to search FBI files for any documents confirming that in 1945 the Truman White House had received reports based on this wiretap. Hoover maintained in his office file copies of all the Corcoran wiretap summaries and his own cover submission letters. The cover letters, however, did not identify the contents of the submitted confidential material and thus provided no documentation that the Truman White House had received any information from the FBI's wiretap of Corcoran.

After a thorough search, Nichols advised Hoover that "there are no such letters which I can recall or find" for the period of 1945. Nichols's failure to uncover the desired documentation alone dissuaded Hoover from disclosing the Corcoran wiretap information during his testimony before the Senate subcommittee later that month.[28]

FBI Wiretaps

Attorney General Jackson's decision not to maintain records of authorized taps emboldened FBI officials to install wiretaps on their own authority. The totality of such unauthorized wiretapping, however, cannot be fully documented. The wiretap authorization cards located in Nichols's secret office file confirm only that at least fifteen taps were installed solely on the authority of FBI officials. Some were authorized by Hoover; others by FBI Assistant Directors Ladd, Tamm, or Clyde Tolson. While six of these taps had been installed during criminal investigations (involving bribery, extortion, stolen property, and treason), seven others were, in bureau terms, installed during "special inquiry" or "SPECIAL surv.[eillance]" investigations.[29] These wiretaps bore no relationship to national defense; some were even installed during the course of a criminal investigation; and none met the specified oversight standards of Roosevelt's directive while directly contravening the Supreme Court's ruling in the *Nardone* cases.

The Corcoran tap was one of these unauthorized wiretaps. Installed in June 1945 at the request of the White House, Hoover first sought Attorney General Tom Clark's approval to tap Corcoran in November 1945. At the time the FBI

[28] Memo, Nichols to Hoover, November 8, 1953; Memo, Ladd to Hoover, June 5, 1950, Philip Jaffe folder, Part IV, Nichols O&C.

[29] Wiretapping folder, Nichols O&C.

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director did not apprise Clark that the FBI was already tapping Corcoran and had intercepted Clark's conversations with Corcoran.

A far more revealing example, of the FBI's independent wiretapping activities involved the tapping of Washington-based businessman and influence peddler John Monroe. In contrast to the other fourteen wiretaps (again excepting that on Corcoran), a sufficient record exists to evaluate the purposes and consequences of this FBI wiretap, for Hoover maintained summaries of the Monroe tap in his confidential office file.

Monroe first came to the attention of FBI officials in 1943 as the result of allegations of a major national scandal, publicized first by the news media and then during a follow-up congressional hearing. This adverse publicity described Monroe as the host of the "big red house on R Street" (reviving images of the Harding era scandals) who through his contacts with federal officials and members of Congress was able to obtain favorable disposition of wartime contracts.[30]

The congressional inquiry uncovered no evidence of criminal conduct on Monroe's part beyond the highly published entertainment of prominent Washingtonians. Nonetheless, FBI interest in Monroe had been kindled and by December 1943 the businessman had become the target of an FBI bribery investigation involving allegations that he had arranged to secure the dismissal of an Office of Price Administration (OPA) suit against a Brooklyn cake company through his "connections in government circles" and his "alleged friend, Congressman [name withheld]."[31] The resulting FBI investigation failed to develop evidence needed to secure an indictment.

During this investigation, however, FBI agents learned from an informer that allegedly Monroe had bragged that "he had no fear of the F.B.I. inasmuch as he 'was the only one who had positive proof that J. Edgar Hoover is a fairy.'" This informer further claimed that Monroe was confident of his immunity because he had "slept with" Gladys Drexel, allegedly the niece of Attorney General Biddle.[32] These allegations dramatically changed Hoover's interest in this relatively unimportant case.

Briefing Hoover about the homosexual allegation, New York SAC E. E. Conroy attempted to explain his delay in reporting this information. For while an FBI agent had first learned of this information on 17 December 1943, Conroy only reported it to Hoover on 18 January 1944. Anticipating the FBI Director's criticisms, Conroy assured Hoover that "the series of situations of this type are being called to the attention of the [FBI] Supervisors [in the New York office]

[30] *New York Times*, 4 May 1943; 5 May 1943; 6 May 1943; 9 May 1943; 11 May 1943; 23 May 1943; 25 May 1943; and 2 June 1943.

[31] Memo, name withheld FBI agent to Conroy, January 18, 1944, Director folder, Nichols O&C.

[32] Memo, name withheld FBI agent, January 18, 1944; Highly Confidential Memo, name withheld FBI agent to Conroy, January 18, 1944; Highly Confidential Memo, name withheld FBI agent to Conroy, January 18, 1944; Strictly Confidential Letter, Conroy to Hoover, January 19, 1944; all in Director folder, Nichols O&C.

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at the meeting today [19 January 1944] and to the Agents at the next Agents' conference, with the warning that information of this nature should be conveyed to the Special Agent in Charge of the office immediately upon its receipt."[33]

Hoover reacted forcefully to Conroy's briefing, first complaining that "This was grossly mishandled" and then demanding to know "why the matter was not reported from Dec 17 to Jan 18." Insisting upon "vigorous action" for the "failure to promptly or properly report this," the FBI director further demanded that Monroe be made to "'put up or shut up' both as to his statements re A.G. [Attorney General] & myself."[34] Nichols was thereupon directed to meet Monroe to "dress down" on both statements and to threaten him with "Crim[inal] slander unless can prove." During a resulting meeting of 24 January, Monroe denied having made either allegation and agreed to sign a statement to that effect.[35]

Monroe's denial did not convince Hoover. One of the summaries of a 1945 FBI wiretap on Monroe records his intercepted conversation with Nichols in which Monroe inquired whether Hoover still believed he had stated he knew Hoover was homosexual. Nichols admitted that Hoover did so believe, adding "There was considerable evidence to that effect."[36] Furthermore, while Monroe was not indicted in 1943–1944, FBI officials remained interested in his activities and initiated another investigation in March 1945 of his possible involvement in a conspiracy to violate OPA price ceilings. This later investigation led to Monroe's arrest (on 18 September 1945), indictment (on 11 October 1945), conviction (on 29 March 1946), and sentencing to two years imprisonment and a fine of $100,000.[37]

Although the subject of an FBI criminal investigation in 1945, Monroe became the target of an FBI wiretap. The precise date of this installation cannot be established. Summaries of this wiretap, extant in Hoover's office file, seemingly document that the tap was temporarily installed in August 1945 (two summaries are dated 13 and 15 August), resumed on 5 September and continued daily thereafter until 22 December 1945. In addition, this folder also includes a routing

[33] Strictly Confidential Letter, Conroy to Hoover, January 19, 1944, Director folder, Nichols O&C.

[34] Routing slip, Hoover to Tolson et al., undated but ca. January 20, 1944, Director folder, Nichols O&C. Letters of reprimand were included in the personal files of all the FBI agents and officials who had handled this investigation, reprimanding them either for not reporting or acting upon this information immediately. They were further warned that "No repetition will be tolerated." See, Personal and Confidential Letter, Conroy to Hoover, January 21, 1944; Memos, Conroy to three names withheld FBI agents, January 19, 1944; Memo, Nichols for Personnel Files of Conroy and the three name withheld FBI agents, February 5, 1944; all in Director folder, Nichols O&C.

[35] Note card in Nichols's handwriting, undated but ca. January 20, 1944, Director folder, Nichols O&C. Do Not File Memos, Nichols to Tolson, (both) January 24, 1944 and signed statement of John Monroe, January 24, 1944; all in Folder #116, John Monroe folder, Hoover O&C.

[36] MO Summary, September 11, 1945, 2:25 PM, Folder #117, John Monroe Technical Summaries folder, Hoover O&C.

[37] *New York Times*, 19 September 1945; 12 October 1945; 21 March 1946; 30 March 1946; and 19 April 1946.

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slip, dated 17 October 1946, written by Hoover's executive assistant, Helen Gandy, calling attention to an attached wiretap summary dated 16 October 1946. The summaries seem to document that the FBI wiretap on Monroe began (in August) after the FBI's investigation of his OPA price violation activities had been concluded (in May), terminated (in December) prior to the start of his trial (in March), and resumed for a day (in October 1946) to avoid intercepting information pertaining to his appeal. Even were this the case, the FBI had intercepted Monroe's conversations involving pre-trial and trial strategy with his attorneys, business associates, members of Congress, and federal bureaucrats.

The extant Monroe wiretap summaries, however, are not a comprehensive record either of the duration of this tap or the records it produced. Because this folder contains five differently captioned wiretap summaries, the researcher cannot ascertain whether additional captioned summaries were created but are no longer extant. Nor are the extant captioned summaries complete. For one, two of the captioned summaries are not numbered consecutively, as each differently dated summary begins with the number 1. Second, another captioned summary, one page in length and dated 15 August 1945, is numbered 14A, confirming the absence of pages 1–14 and possibly succeeding numbered pages. Third, the first of the two summaries which are consecutively numbered, captioned MO, which begins on 5 September 1945 and ends on 22 December 1945, begins with numbered page 59, thereby documenting the absence of pages 1–58. And there are gaps in this extant summary numbered 59–356 between 61–69, 70–71, 74–91, 208–217, 286–290, 301–302, 311–313, and 314–316. Fourth, the second consecutively numbered summary, captioned MON and dated 16 October 1946, is numbered 36–42, confirming the absence of pages 1–35 and possibly succeeding pages after 42.[38]

Because Hoover's office file does not contain all the records of this wiretap or any policy document reporting why and when this tap was installed, we cannot date the beginning of this tap. Was it installed in January 1944 in response to Hoover's learning of Monroe's claim to information about his sexuality? Other FBI records confirm that the FBI continued to investigate Monroe after failing to secure evidence to justify the original bribery charge and that one purpose of this investigative interest was harassment. Indeed, the FBI wiretap on Monroe contains a record of his call to Nichols on 11 September 1945 (prior to his arrest) in which Monroe complained about the effect of FBI interviews with his business associates on his livelihood. Responding to Monroe's inquiry whether Hoover "still believes I said those things" and "has given instructions in any way possible to do a job on me," Nichols conceded that Hoover believed that Monroe had made this statement but denied that the FBI director was vindictive. The FBI had the responsibility to investigate allegations of criminal conduct, Nichols emphasized. Conceding this, Monroe nonetheless protested that the FBI's persis-

[38] See, Folder #117, John Monroe Technical Summaries folder, Hoover O&C.

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tence was hurting his consulting business: "your people going to my clients each time telling them I'm under investigation. It hurts me, . . . the thing gets around and it hurts my ability to make a living."[39]

Although the possibility that the FBI began wiretapping of Monroe in January 1944 cannot be discounted, it seems more likely that this tap was first installed in August 1945. That month FBI officials had discovered Monroe's relationship with one of the bureau's bureaucratic nemeses, Harry Cooper. During World War II, Cooper had been assigned as an investigator to the Surplus Property section of the Commerce Department. There he developed excellent contacts with other high-level officials in the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, as well as the wartime OSS. Following the end of the war and the fulfillment of his military obligation, Cooper was offered but eventually declined a permanent appointment to head Commerce's postwar investigating unit.

Cooper and Monroe developed a close friendship during the war years, and after leaving the government service Cooper first roomed with Monroe and later became his business partner. That Cooper's contacts within the federal bureaucracy might have been the catalyst to the FBI's tapping of Monroe is suggested by the fact that the first summary based on the Monroe wiretap included in Hoover's office file involved an interception not of one of Monroe's but Cooper's conversations. Whether or not Cooper was being indirectly targeted, the Monroe wiretap offered FBI officials invaluable advance intelligence through its interception of Cooper's conversations with other intelligence agency officials. This intelligence included information about these rival agencies' plans that conflicted with Hoover's bureaucratic ambitions and without the FBI incurring the risk of tapping these officials directly. The insecure FBI director found this intelligence of great value, given his concern that with the end of the wartime expansion other agency officials might attempt to retain investigative responsibility for contract fraud and other commercial crimes at the FBI's expense.

Through the Monroe wiretap, in fact, Hoover learned: Bernard Gladieux (Commerce Secretary Harry Wallace's executive assistant) intended to recruit army and navy investigators to improve Commerce's investigative capabilities and thereby prevent the FBI from acquiring responsibility to investigate Commerce Department cases; newly-appointed Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson intended to ensure that the FBI would not displace other departmental investigative units in order to "find work" for the wartime-expanded bureau (the number of agents increased from 898 in 1940 to 4,886 in 1945), because "if they can they're going to take every damned job any other investigating agency's got in the government service"; Commerce Department officials intended "not to turn anything which has a relation to the Department of Commerce over to the F.B.I. to investigate at any step of the game"; other government officials distrusted Hoover's megalo-

[39] MO Summary, September 11, 1945, 2:25 PM, Folder #117. John Monroe Technical Summaries folder, Hoover O&C.

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mania and manipulation of Attorney General Tom Clark; Monroe and Cooper sought to counteract Hoover's attempt to sustain the FBI's postwar role by bringing together leading members of Congress (including Senators Francis Myer and Kenneth McKellar) and prominent officials (including ONI Director Ernest King and James King, an assistant to OSS Director William Donovan); advance intelligence of the phasing out of the Surplus Property investigative division with its civil service personnel transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.[40]

The wiretap cases described in this article outline how Roosevelt's secret directive provided an opening that enabled FBI officials to acquire invaluable intelligence. The cited cases, however, only hint at the scope and the politics underpinning FBI wiretapping activities, which are more fully documented by a review of the Symbol Number Sensitive Source Index (now renamed the National Security Electronic Surveillance Card File) created by Hoover in 1941. This index records the targets and the dates of installation and termination of frequently cited FBI wiretaps (and also bugs and other sensitive investigative techniques). Only the inactive section of this index is releasable under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Yet even this section, numbering 13,500 cards, is not fully accessible. Withholding on claimed personal privacy grounds all cards identifying the individuals whom the FBI had tapped, the FBI has released only the wiretap cards where the target was an organization. An indisputably incomplete record of FBI wiretapping and bugging targets, this index documents that since 1941 the FBI tapped, bugged (or both tapped and bugged) thirteen labor unions, twenty-two civil rights organizations, and eighty-five radical political organizations.

The FBI's wiretapping of radical activists was not purposeless, insofar as any acquired information could not be used during criminal or espionage investigations. Hoover's interest was to learn about the plans and tactics of radical activists in order to contain their influence. And the FBI director was able to advance this conservative political agenda because he had assured the growth of the bureau's resources and the autonomy of its activities. A Do Not File memorandum of November 1945 graphically summarizes this underlying conservative purpose.

Briefing Hoover on the FBI's wiretaps of three CIO unions, FBI Assistant Director Edward Tamm reported that these wiretaps had "from time to time" uncovered significant information "which has constituted an 'item of interest' in connection with memoranda which we have prepared, either upon our own initiative or upon the request of an outside agency, for transmittal to the White

[40] SUPPLEMENTARY MO Summary, August 13, 1945, 1:20 PM, 1:23 PM, and 1:35 PM. MO SUPPLEMENT SUMMARY, August 15, 1945, 1:50 PM. MO Summaries, September 5, 1945, 9:20 PM; September 25, 1945, 6:20 PM; October 8, 1945, 10:10 PM; October 10, 1945, 11:45 AM; October 17, 1945, 10:10 AM; October 18, 1945, 10:45 AM; October 29, 1945, 9:00 PM; and October 31, 1945, 12:50 PM. MO Summary (Supplement), September 13, 1945, 2:00 PM. MO SUPPLEMENTARY Summary, September 15, 1945, 9:37 AM. MON Summary, October 16, 1946, 4:35 PM. All in Folder #117, John Monroe Technical Summaries folder, Hoover O&C.

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House, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, and others." Unfortunately, Tamm continued, "in spite of our information about these Communist activities in these units, in strikes, and in various every-day occurrences, nothing whatsoever is done by the policy-making agencies of the Government about this Communist activity." Decrying this failure to take "affirmative" action "upon the information which we furnish," Tamm ruefully concluded that "we might as well face the fact that our effort is practically wasted."[41]

Hoover did not share Tamm's pessimism. Assured of his independence and of the opportunity to contain radical activities, Hoover responded: "I do think there have been too many unproductive technicals [wiretaps] installed but in these 3 cases they are highly informative on an aspect of Communist activities of considerable importance."[42]

[41] Do Not File Memo, Tamm to Hoover, November 5, 1945, Wiretapping folder, Nichols O&C. Tamm's protest that FBI reports were being ignored referred to the White House's and other executive agencies' disinterest in the FBI's volunteered reports on communist influence in the organized labor movement. See, for example, Personal and Confidential Letter, Hoover to Vaughan, October 31, 1945, Truman Papers, PSF FBI C, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

[42] Do Not File Memo, Tamm to Hoover, November 5, 1945, Wiretapping folder, Nichols O&C. The FBI director, moreover, continued submitting reports alleging communist influence in the meat packing, telephone, maritime, railroad, and retail industries after November 1945. See Personal and Confidential Letters, Hoover to Vaughan: January 25 and 29, 1946, Truman Papers, PSF FBI M; November 15, 1945 and May 15 and June 10, 1946, Truman Papers, PSF FBI Maritime; August 7, 1947, Truman Papers, PSF FBI Personal-FBI; June 5, 1946; Truman Papers, PSF FBI Railroad Data, Truman Library. Personal and Confidential Letter, Hoover to Allen, December 13, 1946, Truman Papers, PSF FBI F, Truman Library.

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The Carter Administration's Policy toward Nicaragua: Images, Goals, and Tactics

MARTHA L. COTTAM

Academics and political activists alike have devoted a great deal of attention to U.S. policy toward Nicaragua in recent years. Oddly, current interest in that relationship has not resulted in many in-depth analyses of the Carter administration's actions despite every indication that they are far more interesting and puzzling than those of the Reagan administration. It is commonly argued that the Carter administration's foreign policies in general, and toward Central America in particular, were confused, incoherent, lacking in strategy, and inconsistent.[1] Inconsistencies in policy toward Nicaragua included termination of aid in 1977 followed by the release of twelve million dollars in military aid in 1978; criticisms of human rights abuses by Anastasio Somoza and the National Guard in 1977 but praise for Somoza's performance in that area in 1978 and efforts to prevent the destruction of the National Guard; the encouragement of democratic

[1] See, for example, Richard Feinberg, "The Recent, Rapid Redefinition of U.S. Interests and Diplomacy in Central America" in Richard Feinberg, ed., *Central America: International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982); John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Dennis Gilbert, "Nicaragua" in Morris Blachman, William LeoGrande, and Kenneth Sharpe, eds., *Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Stanley Hoffmann, *Dead Ends* (New York: Ballinger Press, 1982); and Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

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reform that would end the dictatorship but reluctance to push Somoza out when his days were clearly numbered. These patterns are attributed to Carter's lack of expertise in foreign policy and his inability to decide on policy under the pressure of many competing policy advocacy groups, both institutional and nongovernmental.

In the case of Nicaragua, conflict between human rights policy advocates and national security advocates (sometimes divided between liberal and conservative factions) are said to have affected the coherence and consistency of U.S. policy.[2] The former allegedly believed that the United States should support human rights before all other concerns, while the national security group preferred traditional containment of the Soviet Union and opposed any form of instability that might favor the Soviet Union politically. Either one supported human rights, which meant opposing pro-U.S. dictators of the right as well as repressive left-wing governments, or one supported national security goals, which meant supporting pro-U.S. right-wing dictators regardless of their human rights records. Inconsistencies in the Carter administration's foreign policy have been explained in terms of this trade-off: the administration believed in the human rights policy but would never place it above national security goals; it therefore shifted between the two.[3]

Numerous competing policy advocates attempted to influence U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during these years. But the picture of an administration torn by two competing policy positions overemphasizes both the disagreements among those advocates and their power. Disagreements were predominantly about tactics rather than goals. Containment was the consistent, central goal throughout the Carter years. Moreover, control of U.S. policy remained in the hands of Jimmy Carter and advisers fully representative of his view of the conflict in Nicaragua. Control did not vacillate between pro-human rights advisers and pro-national security advisers. In fact, the delineation of advisers along those lines is itself a simplification that obscures the nature of policy disagreement in this administration.

If the perceptions of competing policy advocacy groups are examined, a different description, set of questions, and analysis of the Carter administration emerges. The perceptual properties of groups within that administration can be linked directly to policy goals and strategic and tactical preferences. This does not mean that the administration was either consistent or inconsistent, but that its debates and actions are logical and predictable, given the perceptions of the various policy advocates.

The complexities of the Carter administration's policies and actions can be clarified through an analysis of the cognitive images of three different perceptual groups: traditional cold warriors, who supported traditional containment tactics; modified cold warriors, who accepted containment as a necessary global policy

[2] Hoffman, *Dead Ends*, 71–73; Rubin, *Secrets of State*, 179.

[3] William LeoGrande, Douglas Bennet, Morris Blachman, and Kenneth Sharpe, "Grappling With Central America: From Carter to Reagan" in Blachman et al., *Confronting Revolution*, 297.

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but felt secure enough in the late 1970s to accept the use of new tactics to pursue containment goals and additional foreign policy goals; and the so-called human rights group, which did not see containment as a necessary or adequate global policy. This group is strongly identified with human rights because these individuals held bureaucratic positions in the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department and the United Nations. Human rights may have been the focus of their bureaucratic role responsibilities, but the group's general world view encompassed many more issues. The central difference between the traditional cold warriors and the modified cold warriors was in their tactical preferences about how best to achieve containment. The core difference between the human rights group and the cold warrior groups concerned goals: that is, was containment necessary, and if not, what should the primary goals of U.S. foreign policy be?

This article explores the impact of perceptions on Carter's policy and argues three basic points. First, psychological images produce policy preferences in the form of general and specific goals and the strategies and tactics designed to achieve them. Goals are defined as the ends or objectives sought by policy makers. Goals vary in scope from very general and comprehensive to very specific and limited. They may be fully articulated or commonly assumed and rarely discussed. A tactic is a selection of specific pieces of leverage available to a state for use in achieving goals. A strategy is a set of coordinated tactics selected to achieve a goal. By these definitions, tactics can be chosen without a unifying strategy. Moreover, policy makers can agree upon goals and a general strategy for achieving those goals yet still disagree about specific tactics. In the case of Nicaragua, traditional and modified cold warriors consistently held a global goal of containment. They disagreed as to whether or not a human rights policy could be a useful general tactic for achieving containment. Debates among the modified cold warriors also occurred regarding tactics and were usually related to the question of whether or not the United States had the leverage a particular tactical selection would require for success. In each case, agreement and disagreement can be linked to differences in the world views of these two policy groups.

Second, one cannot trace changes in U.S. policy toward Nicaragua to shifts in the power of competing policy advocacy groups. The shift in tactics in late summer 1978, for example, was not a result of the transfer of power from the human rights group to the traditional cold warriors. Both of these perceptual groups were critical of the administration's approach to Nicaragua, and their effect on policy was sporadic and marginal. The modified cold warriors dominate policy throughout, and changes in policy were a result of their efforts to find an effective set of tactics to achieve fundamental containment goals in Nicaragua.

Finally, the perceptual group that really disagreed with the prevailing containment goals and strategy did not articulate that disagreement as an alternative. Those who do not approve of containment must provide a comprehensive alternative amenable to policy-specific debate. Without such an alternative, they are reduced to devil's advocates at best or ineffective complainers at worst.

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Perceptual Images and Policy Choices

The perceptual characteristics of the three groups provide a basis for explaining their different goals and tactical preferences. A growing body of work illustrates the importance of cognitive images in political decision making.[4] Images act as organizing devices permitting policy makers to simplify and comprehend an enormously complex environment. Images filter information for policy makers and facilitate the process of deciding which of the many pieces of information received are relevant for impending decisions. Information is accepted when it conforms with preexisting images.

Images do more for the perceiver than filter information, however. Each image provides summary perceptions of the power, sophistication, threat, or opportunity posed by a particular type of state. Once an individual state is perceived through an image, these summary perceptions influence the perceiver's expectations about the behavior of that state. They also influence the perceiver's selection of goals vis á vis that country, since they affect assessments of the threat or opportunity afforded by that state. Finally, images influence the selection of tactics and instruments used in the pursuit of policy goals.[5]

In this article, the operative images that will be explored are those of the enemy and dependent. The ideal-typical enemy is perceived as equal to the perceiver's state in capability, aggressive, evil in intentions, highly rational, capable of duping inferiors and planning schemes long in advance, inflexible and ruled by a small cabal of individuals who exist in a system that is completely opposite and an anathema to that of the perceiver. Because the enemy image is associated with evil intent, extreme threat, and is perceived as equal in power, the goals any group of policy makers should advocate in dealing with this kind of state should be highly defensive. One must be ever vigilant and constantly ready to respond and, if possible, control such a state. Moreover, the assumption may be that diplomacy is fairly useless and that this kind of opponent will not negotiate in good faith and cannot change. Containment in U.S. foreign policy is a strategy with goals similar to these. It is designed for the ideal-typical enemy.

The ideal-typical dependent is perceived as weak, maleable, ruled by a small number of corrupt individuals who along with the general populace are essentially childlike, culturally inferior, and non-nationalistic.[6] Except under certain circum-

[4] See Richard Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Martha Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Richard Herrmann, *Perception and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[5] Robert Wyer and Thomas Srull, "Human Cognition in its Social Context," *Psychological Review* 93 (Fall 1986): 323.

[6] The discussion of the dependent psychological image should not be confused with any objective measure of political or economic dependence. A country can be perceived in the dependent image despite many objective indicators of independence.

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stances, this image is associated with opportunity. Goals should reflect that perception. Moreover, the dependent image by definition is that of a weaker state resulting in a propensity to achieve goals through coercive tactics.

A number of policy-making patterns result from these images. First, studies have found a tendency for those who perceive themselves as more powerful to use that power; those who perceive themselves as inferior tend to submit.[7] In interactions with countries perceived as dependents, therefore, one can expect the perceiver to see little if any threat, to expect the dependent to conform to the dominant state's demands or suggestions, and to expect the dominant state to determine the best approach to a problem. Thus, while policy makers may use their available power to try to determine the course of events, they will not feel the need to act quickly, because the dependent state poses little threat.

If the enemy is perceived as a dependent of the perceiver's state, the weakness of the dependent and the power and threat inherent in the enemy image combine to motivate the perceiver to act quickly and as coercively as possible to eliminate the threat. It is one thing for a dependent to undergo revolution when it is isolated from the influence of others. But when an enemy is perceived as involved or even lurking in the shadows, threat is heightened—not just because the enemy is dangerous, but because the dependent is weak and incompetent and, therefore, unable to resist the evil machinations of the devious enemy. As the image combination changes so do perceptions of threatened goals. Now the goals at stake will be perceived as central, and the instruments needed to protect those goals will be selected from the full arsenal of the perceiver's state.[8]

Self-image is also an important factor. Eliot Smith argues that self-images are similar to images of others.[9] Policy makers have an assessment of their own power, capabilities, and sophistication that influences their evaluation of their own state's leverage. A weak self-image can lead to a failure to perceive options and leverage when they are available. The decision-making process is thus influenced not only by one's image of others, but also by a comparison of the image of others with the self-image. In this study self-image emerges as most important when tactics are considered.

These general patterns led to specific expectations concerning the policy preferences of the different perceptual groups in the Carter administration. The traditional cold warriors had extreme enemy and dependent images of the USSR and Central Americans. Given those images, they should have preferred a general containment strategy. When applying that strategy to a crisis such as the Nicaraguan revolution, they should have preferred strong coercive tactics to halt insta-

[7] D. Tjosvold, "Unequal Power Relationships Within a Cooperative or Competitive Context," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 11 (Spring 1981):137–150.

[8] Martha Cottam and E. Thomas Rowe, "Perceptual and Situational Factors in Interventions" (Paper presented at the 1987 American Political Science Association convention, Chicago, Illinois).

[9] E. Smith, "Attributions and Other Inferences: Processing Information About the Self Versus Others," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 20 (March 1984): 97–115.

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bility and ensure that no regime emerged in Nicaragua that would pose the possibility of incompetent Nicaraguans succumbing to inevitable efforts by the USSR to expand its influence. The threatened goals were containment goals from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the revolution. The modified cold warriors had modified enemy and dependent images and, therefore, should have perceived crises in Central America as less threatening. The general preference regarding tactics should have been a readiness to try slow-acting tactics that could achieve bilateral goals while enhancing or at least not damaging containment goals. They should still have adhered to containment-based strategic goals on a global level. Once they perceived the potential for an enemy presence in Central America, their images should have become more extreme. They would then be predisposed to join with the traditional cold warriors in the identification of threats to containment goals, although they could continue to disagree about the relative utility of certain tactics. The human rights group did not have either the enemy or the dependent images (with one important exception) and, therefore, should not have advocated policies with containment-based goals.[10] Theoretically, all three groups could argue about the utility of particular tactics resulting from differences in self-image. A traditional cold warrior could have an extreme enemy image of the USSR, believe strongly in containment, but also perceive the United States as lacking the leverage to achieve containment goals. In this case, the modified cold warriors tended to be the only perceptual group with real differences in self-image. They had fundamental agreement on goals but often argued about the utility of particular kinds of leverage in achieving those goals.

Perceptual Groups in the Carter Administration

Who made policy toward Nicaragua in the Carter administration and what were their perceptual properties? There were two phases in Carter's policy, but the same individuals and agencies participated and dominated policy formulation in both phases. Phase one lasted from 1977 through July 1978, when the main decision-making problem concerned human rights sanctions. Foreign aid and human rights decisions were made by the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, otherwise known as the Christopher Group. It was headed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and had representatives from the State Department, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, the

[10] When the judged object seems far from the prototype of any category, that is, when perceptions of others are "complex," people attempt to create subcategories and focus on specific attributes. See Susan Fiske, S. L. Neuberg, A. E. Beattie, and S. J. Milberg, "Category-Based and Attribute-Based Reactions to Others: Some Informational Conditions of Stereotyping and Individuating Processes," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 23 (October 1987):423. The need to simplify remains. If perceivers do not have an image appropriate for a perceived state, they may focus on specific attributes (such as particular political factions, etc.) that they have learned are important characteristics of states generally.

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National Security Council (NSC), and the Agency for International Development (AID). NSC Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's two assistants for Latin America were David Aaron and Robert Pastor. State Department personnel and agencies involved in formulating options during this time involved the Latin America desks, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America (Terence Todman, followed by Viron Vaky), and personnel from the Human Rights Bureau (including Patricia Derian and Mark Schneider). In Congress, interested members included human rights supporters (Ted Kennedy, Edward Koch, Tom Harkin, Lee Hamilton, Gerry Studds, and others) and supporters of Somoza (Charles Wilson, John Murphy, Eldon Rudd, Larry McDonald).

During the second phase of U.S. policy, from August 1978 to July 1979, many of the same agencies and individuals dominated policy. Representatives from the State Department task force on Nicaragua included Vaky and Anthony Lake (director of Policy Planning), his Latin America adviser, Richard Feinberg, as well as special negotiator William Bowdler, Lawrence Pezzullo, and members of the NSC Special Coordinating Committee including Robert Pastor, David Aaron, and representatives from the Defense Department and CIA. During the final offensive of July 1978, higher level officials were directly involved including Christopher, Brzezinski, Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and CIA Director Stansfield Turner. In short, there was no drastic turnover between phases.

While the traditional cold warriors are commonly associated with critics of the Carter administration, such as Ronald Reagan's supporters and promoters, they were evident within the Carter administration as well. They ranged from National Security Adviser Brzezinski to Carter's first ambassador to El Salvador, Frank Devine, to State Department career officers such as Myles Frechette, John Bushnell, and Walter Stoessel Jr., as well as many additional bureaucrats and nongovernmental activists. According to Robert White, Carter's second ambassador to El Salvador, this was the dominant view in the Pentagon.[11]

All images simplify the political complexities of the target country. In the dependent image this includes a failure to notice the importance of nationalism and simplification of the characteristics and motives of political groups in the target. The political "center" is seen as the political force that is most compatible with U.S. interests and as the group the United States should promote or even create, if it does not already exist. An externally directed left is seen as the most important cause of instability, while the right is friendly toward the United States. It is assumed that Latin American countries are plagued with "a 'banana republic' political culture," which is inferior, violent, and an invitation to the Soviets and

[11] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Situation in El Salvador, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. 18 March and 9 April 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1981).

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their agents, who can easily manipulate and dupe such incompetent people.[12] Lars Schoultz quotes one American State Department official as follows:

> I went to school in the 1960's . . . and so I've been through all the imperialism and dependency crap. This isn't what screws up Latin America. What screws up Latin America is the Latin Americans. And they'll always screw it up, because they're screwed up.[13]

In 1981 Walter Stoessel Jr., a career foreign service officer, gave an explanation of the causes of instability typical of those with the dependent image of Latin Americans and the enemy image of the USSR:

> Our actions with regard to El Salvador are being undertaken against the background of communist-inspired interference in the Caribbean Central American region. . . . The United States cannot stand idly by while a reformist government comes under attack by externally advised and armed guerrilla groups that lack popular support.[14]

Simplification of the left in Central America was profound and familiar. One hundred and twenty-five members of Congress with this particular world view called the Nicaraguan revolutionaries "Soviet surrogates" who will assist the USSR in controlling "an area bordering on two oceans stretching from Panama to the vast oil reserves of Mexico."[15] Other senators referred to them as Marxist-Leninists who sought to impose a "Cuban-style regime in Nicaragua."[16] The political divisions within revolutionary movements were ignored, while the non-communist revolutionaries were either regarded as nonexistent or "as little more than patsies, weak leaders who could not withstand the on-slaughts from disciplined Leninist cadres."[17]

Ambassador Frank Devine's memoirs illustrate the traditional cold warrior images. He described the left as composed of three "terrorist organizations," which dominated several popular organizations and duped their members, using them as "cannon fodder" in demonstrations.[18] He also described the left as directly or indirectly responsible for the horrendous violence of the right. Devine explained that "numerous factors pushed the nation toward violent resolution of its problems and relatively few forces worked for restraint."[19] However, when it came to specifying who did what, Devine wrote that "the political right was a willing audience" whose "violent instincts could be controlled while the left was the force opposed to peaceful dialogue and negotiation."[20] Its hostility was implic-

[12] Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 49.
[13] Ibid., 127.
[14] U.S. Congress, Hearings, 18 March 1981, 4, 5.
[15] United States Congress, *Congressional Record* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), vol. 125, 15125.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy*, 136.
[18] Frank Devine, *El Salvador: Embassay Under Attack* (New York: Vantage Press, 1981), 24.
[19] Ibid., 193.
[20] Ibid.

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itly attributed to its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nationalism and U.S. support for one repressive regime after another were not given consideration as causal factors.

Devine's view of the right, the traditional oligarchy in El Salvador and Salvadoran culture in general, was highly patronizing. The wealthy elite was "a class of people who had always been good friends of the United States."[21] He described the peasants as miserably poor but as having a "surprisingly high level of tolerance for an impressively low level of standard of living."[22] He noted that the peasants were becoming restless, however, due to human rights advocates who pressed for too much reform at too fast a pace—the Catholic Church and Liberation Theology and "communist agitators and other subversive groups [who] sensed that this might in fact be the soft underbelly of the system, which they wished to overturn."[23] He viewed violence as endemic in El Salvador, the result of cultural characteristics as much as or more than the efforts of the traditional elite to prevent change. While Devine did not deny the government's role in El Salvador's violence, he described it as either an understandable response to threat or as something that Salvadorans simply do:

> Looking back, I suspect that prospects for meaningful political dialogue were probably never very good during this period. Political passions ran too deeply, polarization had progressed too far, the level of political sophistication was not sufficiently advanced, and the undercurrent of violence ran dangerously close to the surface in all strata of society.[24]

Traditional cold warriors preferred traditional tactics of economic and especially military aid to pro-U.S. governments to achieve traditional containment goals. Once revolution appeared to be brewing in Nicaragua, the extreme enemy image of the USSR and the dependent image of the Third World combined to produce an inclination to prefer containment through rollback tactics. In this context, threat perceptions were augmented, and the inclination should have been to prefer policies similar to the ones used in Guatemala in 1954 and Cuba in 1960.

When combined with an enemy image of the USSR, the dependent image of Central America produced fear that the Soviets were about to infiltrate the region. Many individuals continued to hold the ideal-typical enemy image of the Soviet Union. Brzezinski maintained that the USSR "would like to be number one" and expressed fears of Soviet efforts to use military power to take advantage of instability:[25]

[21] Ibid., 24.
[22] Ibid., 25.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 110.
[25] Quoted in Jerel Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration" in Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perceptions, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 169.

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> . . . [W]hile the central military balance of the world has remained remarkably stable, its context has been complicated by the shift away from conventional conflict, usually across national borders, to unconventional conflict, usually within national borders. As a result of this development, these internal conflicts pose opportunities and temptations for external intervention. And this process, too, is far from over.[26]

He concluded that during this "continuing challenge" the United States would consult with its regional allies: "We remain the leader and must bear the burdens of that role."[27]

This set of images was widely shared in Congress, although its articulation tended to be less sophisticated and much more conspiratorial in tone. In 1977 Congressman Rudd complained that the Carter administration was bent upon destroying U.S. friends in Latin America in the name of human rights, really a cloak for a much more suspicious and devious effort to advance communist influence throughout the hemisphere:

> Either the administration's officials in the State Department are hopelessly naive and misinformed about the true situation in Latin America, or they are ideologically alined with the revolutionary elements that seek to overthrow the legitimate government of our allies.[28]

The traditional cold warriors plagued the Carter administration wth criticisms of its foreign policy, but the prevailing view was a modified cold-war one. Many of the most important members of the administration were modified cold warriors including Secretary of State Vance, Assistant Secretary Christopher, and Terence Todman, Viron Vaky, William Bowdler, Mauricio Solaun, Lawrence Pezzullo, and Robert White. Jimmy Carter was the most important member of this group, although he was not deeply involved in daily U.S. events and efforts to maneuver during Nicaragua's revolution.

In the modified cold-war world view, both the USSR and Latin America are classified with the same images used by the traditional cold warriors. The difference in perceptions is one of degree rather than kind, and there are particular characteristics associated with the modified enemy and dependent images that are consistently different from the ideal typical extreme images. Under conditions of high threat, one can expect this group to have a tendency to revert to more extreme enemy and dependent images. In the Nicaraguan case the reversion did occur. As a result their policy preferences appeared inconsistent, such as moving from human rights to diplomatic intervention in the Nicaraguan revolution in pursuit of containment. However, those policy shifts were changing in tactical

[26] Zbigniew Brzezinski, address before the Annual Convention of the International Platform Association, Washington, DC, 2 August 1979. See Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980* (Washington DC: GPO, 1983), 48.

[27] Ibid.

[28] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1978, 28085.

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preferences and were consistent with the operative images of this core group of policy makers.

Modified cold warriors' perceptions of Soviet capabilities and intentions differed from those in the extreme enemy image. They thought the USSR was less capable of harming the United States and conservatively supported the status quo rather than expansionism. This in turn produced diminished threat perceptions, but did not produce a rejection of containment as a global policy. Instead of seeing containment as an inadequate policy both in terms of its goals and its record of success, they thought containment was necessary in fewer situations and achievable through different tactics.

Jerel Rosati argues that Carter saw Soviet capabilities as limited and their intentions as peaceful, despite periodic bursts of opportunism.[29] In May 1977, for example, Carter explained that the international role and concerns of the United States had changed since the early post-World War II years:

> Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.[30]

Carter saw a diminished need for containment and less intense competition, although his was not a benign, nonenemy image of the USSR. He perceived the Soviets as principled opportunists rather than the essential source of instability in the Third World.[31] Carter argued that "we hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another."[32] But "[t]here also has been an ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts. . . ."[33] Secretary of State Vance expressed the same concerns in 1978 when he described the USSR as a serious competitor with "objectives in the world that are very different from ours"; at the same time he argued against a return to the "dangerous cold war spirit" of the past.[34]

Modified cold warriors saw Central American states as more complex than the ideal-typical dependent in that nationalism and multiple political contenders were recognized as important political variables. Nevertheless, many simplified

[29] Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior," 166.

[30] Jimmy Carter, address at Commencement Exercises at the Notre Dame University, 22 May 1977. See Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 6.

[31] Schoultz, *National Security*, 138.

[32] Carter, address at Commencement Exercises at Notre Dame, 8.

[33] Jimmy Carter, address at Wake Forest University, 17 March 1978 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 21.

[34] Cyrus Vance, address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 13 January 1978 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 17.

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characteristics were attributed to Central America. These included the sense of American superiority—particularly the assumption that the United States could teach democratic values and help create systems of democracy similar to its own—and the belief that the United States could create a political center that would permit some state planning for economic reform to limit the potential for Soviet influence.

One of the most important elements of this modified dependent image is its recognition of nationalistic hostility toward past U.S. domination. Secretary of State Vance's empathy with Panamanian nationalism is an example. He asked an audience in 1978: "Imagine . . . that a foreign country controlled and administered a ten mile-wide strip of the Mississippi River. How long do you think the people of this country would willingly accept such a situation?"[35] Carter also empathized and hoped to correct Third World impressions of American racism and militaristic imperialism: "We've gained new trust with the developing world through our opposition to racism, our commitment to human rights, and our support for majority rule in Africa."[36] But the key here is that Carter expected the United States to be regarded as a new moral leader. He believed that the United States could "use [its] great strength and influence to settle international conflicts in other parts of the world before they erupt and spread."[37] He recognized yearnings for national self-determination but perceived the United States as the natural leader. Carter stated, "[w]e can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue—confidently—our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead."[38] Influence would derive from moral and political leadership rather than military strength.

There is a subtle but important difference in perceiving others as not inferior and perceiving them as equals. The modified cold warriors' view of Third World people was the former. They were not ethnically or racially inferior, but the United States still had values and a political system that others would emulate if given a chance to do so. Vance's discussion of the prospect of change in Third World countries illustrates this. His argued that change should not be feared because it could and should be in America's interests. He understood that Third World states "will fiercely defend their independence. They will reject efforts by outsiders to impose their institutions."[39] However, he, like Carter, believed the Third World would want to adopt American values:

> . . . America can flourish best in a world where freedom flourishes.
>
> Should we not gain confidence from this expansion of democracy, which is taking place not because we force it but because of its inherent appeal? And what is that inherent

[35] Ibid., 14.

[36] Jimmy Carter, address before a Joint Session of Congress, 23 January 1979 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 25.

[37] Ibid., 24.

[38] Carter, address at Commencement Exercises at Notre Dame, 7.

[39] Cyrus Vance, address before the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges,

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> appeal? Surely it lies in the enhanced opportunity that democracy provides for the realization of fundamental human rights—the rights to political and religious expression, to political participation, and to economic justice.[40]

Modified cold warriors foreswore military intervention but planned to use any other available forms of leverage to influence the direction of political change. Vance stated this clearly:

> Let me state first that the use of military force is not, and should not be, a desirable American policy response to the internal politics of other nations. . . . We must clearly understand the distinction between our readiness to act forcefully when . . . vital interests . . . are threatened and our recognition that our military forces cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the purely internal problems of other nations.
>
> In helping other nations cope with such internal change, our challenge is to help them develop their own institutions, strengthen their own economies, and foster the ties between government and people. . . . We must maintain human rights policies which work in practical ways to advance freedom.[41]

The modified cold warriors understood Central American desires for independence, but whether or not they actually believed that they could withstand Soviet and/or Cuban machinations is another matter entirely and a crucial element in the dependent image. Carter worried that demands for rapid change in Central America might give Cuba a chance to intervene and "thwart the desire of the people of the region for progress within a democratic framework and we have been working closely with the governments in the region to try to aid in the developmental process of the region and are prepared to assist those threatened by outside intervention."[42] If traditional cold warriors saw Central Americans as children, the modified cold warriors saw them as teenagers in need of a benign guiding hand to steer and protect them.

In this context the full meaning of the human rights policy for modified cold warriors should be discussed. Far from manifesting a different image of Central America, the human rights policy was a fairly good indicator of the modified dependent image. Like the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, the human rights policy was seen as a new set of tactics for promoting U.S.-style democracy and thereby combatting communism. Its value was not only in saving lives but also in promoting containment objectives by teaching others how to treat their citizens. As Vance explained in early 1977:

> If terrorism and violence in the name of defence cannot be condoned, neither can violence that is officially sanctioned. Such action perverts the legal system that alone

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Chicago, 1 May 1979 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-1980*, 44.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, February 1980 in Department of State, *Bulletin 80: Special Supplement M.* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980).

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> assures the survival of our traditions. The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice in our societies—legal, economic, and social justice. Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence, more victims, and more terrorism. Respect for the rule of law will promote justice and remove the seeds of subversion.[43]

Put simply, the modified cold warriors believed that respect for human rights produced democracies. Democracies would be allies against subversion and communism and would share American values. This excludes right wing dictatorships as well as leftist revolutionary governments. From this perspective, it is easy to understand how the administration could pursue human rights as the primary thrust of its approach to some countries, particularly the gross abusers in Latin America, while pursuing standard containment tactics in policies toward others. The human rights policy was a set of tactics designed to pursue larger containment goals and therefore did not conflict in principle with traditional tactics, such as military and political support for anticommunist allies like the shah.

When confronted with instability in Central America, the modified cold warriors were predisposed to interfere. They still viewed Central Americans as needing U.S. guidance. Threat perceptions were low because the USSR was seen as weaker than in previous years. Hence, although the United States still had the responsibility to ensure that no Soviet ally emerged in Central America, containment could be pursued through slow acting instruments such as economic and diplomatic pressure embodied in the human rights policy. More coercive measures were both unnecessary and inappropriate.

Once context conditions changed and potential Soviet activity was perceived, tactical preferences shifted to traditional containment tactics, threat perceptions increased drastically, and more coercive instruments were adopted. In short, the dominant world view in the Carter administration had not moved far enough from the typical post-World War II cold-war set of images to produce a change in strategic preference.

There was a third world view in the Carter administration that is difficult to document for two reasons. First, its advocates still had to articulate their views in the context of standard American foreign policy and were often forced to discuss their policy preferences in a language acceptable and convincing to those who did not share their world view. Second, since they did not develop an alternative global strategy, their dispute with containment is often obscure. This group held neither the enemy image of the USSR nor the dependent image of Central America. Both were seen in complex terms. Lars Schoultz describes the members and political problems of this group:

> This group is . . . relatively small. [I]ts members went into exile or into deep cover during the Reagan years. But even during the Carter era, unabashed members of this

[43] Cyrus Vance, speech before the Organization of American States, 14 June 1977 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 1276.

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> group—officials like Mark Schneider, Patricia Derian, and Andrew Young—were few; most of those who tended in this direction found it inappropriate to tend too distinctly. In Congress, members of this group are more evident—Senators [Tom] Harkin, Kennedy, [Christopher] Dodd and Representatives [Michael] Barnes, [Samuel] Gejdenson, [Joe] Moakley and Studds are examples. . . .[44]

The human rights group did not fear instability and change, a reflection of two-image characteristics. First, they did not expect the USSR to threaten the United States by trying to take advantage of instability. Second, they believed that Central Americans could forge their own political futures without being duped by superior people. They perceived instability as not only inevitable but desirable, since it creates the opportunity for change.[45]

One of the most clearcut indicators of this world view is the articulation of the human rights policy. The ultimate aim is human rights, particularly safety from disappearance, torture, and murder by governments. Patricia Derian, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, described human rights goals as ends in themselves, not as a route to pro-U.S. democratic regimes.

> . . . [W]e try to shape policies which will help to create a more favorable atmosphere for the practical observance of human rights and for improvements where these rights are not respected. This is a difficult and complex process, and we have to take into account the wide diversity in regional and national situations. This diversity, as well as the varying complexity of U.S. interests throughout the world, means that our specific actions to promote human rights improvements will vary to some extent. We assess the situation in each country, try to ascertain whether there is a positive or negative trend, and then look at our available policy instruments to determine how we can and should proceed.[46]

Derian did not describe the limits upon the pursuit of human rights concerns in terms of a trade-off of instruments useful in pursuing security goals, but in terms of usable leverage and the political complexities of specific situations. Additional indicators of a nonenemy image of the USSR and a complex view of Third World political actors can be seen in this group's discussion of the causes and consequences of revolution in Central America and elsewhere. For example, in May 1979, shortly before the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, Edward Kennedy spoke on the crisis in Nicaragua. He did not mention any potential for the crisis to result in a radical government nor express fear of a situation out of control. Instead, he argued that the United States should not support a regime that murdered its own people. The United States bore a responsibility to terminate all aid to that regime, given its historical support for the Somoza dynasty. He thought Nicaraguans were capable of determining their own future and had no concern about Soviet or Cuban machinations.[47]

[44] Schoultz, *National Security*, 21.

[45] Ibid., 22.

[46] Patricia Derian, remarks at Florida International University, Miami, 18 May 1979 in Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, 1292.

[47] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1979, 10620.

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Because this policy group had significantly different perceptions of the USSR and Third World states, one can expect their policy preferences to be different as well. They should advocate policies with goals that are not containment based. Their sensitivity to nationalism would make them particularly hesitant to exercise U.S. power in a manner associated with imperialism.

A final important perceptual characteristic of this group is that the complex, nonaligned image of the Third World was not universally applied. They did continue to perceive many individual right-wing dictators in the traditional dependent image. Moreover, they were not necessarily anti-interventionist, but often saw intervention as both unnecessary and self-defeating. In cases where the dependent image still held, they would advocate nonmilitary intervention if it appeared to be an appropriate method of achieving their goals. The asymmetry of power and sense of superiority would still be operative in these cases.

NICARAGUA, PHASE ONE, JANUARY 1977—SEPTEMBER 1978

Using diplomatic pressure and military and economic aid sanctions, the United States sought to push Somoza toward political democratization and the elimination of abuses. The implementation of sanctions was not consistent, a pattern attributable to the dominance of the policy-making process by modified cold warriors. Congress held hearings in April 1977 concerning human rights and economic aid. The House Appropriations Committee accepted the amendment sponsored by Congressman Koch to suspend military aid to Somoza. The House Foreign Operations subcommittee made cuts in military assistance in late May 1977. In the following month the State Department and members of Congress such as Murphy and Wilson, who were supportive of Somoza, lobbied heavily to reverse the decision when the full vote was taken. They were successful in June 1977. However, the Carter administration assured the House that the aid would not be delivered to Nicaragua unless there was a demonstrated improvement in human rights.

When Somoza lifted a nearly four-year-old state of siege in September 1977, the Human Rights Bureau and the Inter-American Affairs Bureau of the State Department disagreed about the appropriate U.S. response. The Human Rights Bureau argued that lifting the state of siege was not enough to warrant releasing aid, while the Inter-American Affairs Bureau argued the opposite.[48] The decision ended technically in Somoza's favor in that the administration signed a military aid agreement with Nicaragua, but the funds were not released immediately nor were they approved with that intention in mind. Douglas Bennet, Jr., assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, explained that the State Department wanted to "preserve [its] options" but also that there had been a "diminution of charges of serious human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan National Guard,"

[48] Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

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along with the termination of the state of siege.[49] In May 1978, the administration provided two economic aid loans to Nicaragua and insisted that they did not constitute a change in policy.

The human rights policy was seen as a tactic to pursue different goals by different perceptual groups. For the human rights group the goal was to get the repressive regime to stop murdering people and if possible push Somoza out of office. The modified cold warriors saw the human rights policy as a means to promote democratization and to prevent instability from growing in Nicaragua. Although the core of the disagreement was over goals, the major articulated debate between these two groups during 1977 concerned tactics. Members of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, many of whom were modified cold warriors, argued that human rights reform in Nicaragua could be achieved best by combining rewards for reform and punishments for failure to reform. Their concern was partly that punishments alone would only produce further resistance. But they also argued that security concerns necessitated continuing aid to Somoza, including limited military aid for training and supplies. They said that if they lost access to aid funds, they would lose leverage. Security concerns were important, because containment was necessary. Assistant Secretary of State Terence Todman argued in favor of such aid in 1977 for fiscal year 1978:

> US security concerns in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America relate directly to our need for secure flanks and our commitment to hemispheric collective security under the Rio Treaty. Our objectives include prevention of the introduction of hostile forces and bases into the region, limitation of hostile influences, protection of lines of communication and maintenance of regional stability. . . . [F]urther attenuation of our influence in the region as a whole would weaken our security position in the hemisphere.[50]

Modified cold warriors disagreed among themselves about when and to what extent human rights tactics ought to be employed against a repressive regime. This was purely a debate about tactics. One major difference between Carter's first and second assistant secretaries for Latin America, Terence Todman and Viron Vaky, was a difference in the degree to which they believed that aid sanctions would serve American interests.

Because the modified cold warriors did not see the situation in Nicaragua as an immediate security problem, the underlying disagreement about goals did not emerge. They approved of withholding military aid to Somoza in principle but not of forgoing access to military aid in case traditional tactics for pursuing containment goals were needed. With threat perceptions low, short-term containment concerns were absent. This freed them to pursue long-term containment goals through slow-acting tactics that simultaneously satisfied their concerns about abuses of human rights.

[49] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1977, 39363.
[50] Ibid., 20582.

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For members of the human rights group, the goal of terminating human rights abuses required the complete implementation of aid sanctions. They objected to any signal that might be interpreted to mean that Somoza was making satisfactory progress, including requests for aid. In August 1977, for example, Senator Kennedy argued that the United States had "a special responsibility to dispel any previous misconceptions that the United States supports the Nicaraguan Government's suppression of dissent . . ." Nearly two years later he called for continued suspensions of aid and pressure.[51]

The traditional cold warriors saw the whole notion of imposing human rights-based sanctions on Somoza as dangerous and outrageous. Wilson argued that aid should be restored and that he did not believe Catholic Church indictments against Somoza for human rights abuses. He was suspicious of "radical preachers." Congressman Kika de la Garza worried that communists would take over in Nicaragua if aid did not continue. For these individuals, Somoza was a loyal friend, if not an equal, who provided a bulwark against the communist forces perpetually trying to take adantage of any U.S. weakness. Murphy argued that "Nicaragua . . . is a blocking position in Central America against the spread of Communist subversion. This is why it is a target for Communist infiltration from Cuba. . . ."[52] The enemy image of the USSR combined with a dependent image of Somoza to produce a policy preference of unflinching continuous support.

This episode demonstrates the extent to which similar policy positions are more complex and dissimilar than they may initially appear. In this case, modified cold warriors and human rights groups wanted to withhold aid to Somoza, but for reasons that only partially overlapped. For the first six to eight months of 1977 they both agreed that aid should be withheld. Soon they disagreed about how extensive the sanctions should be and whether or not they should be allocated in the budget, because the goals that aid sanctions were to serve were not exactly the same. An articulation of those differences would have required addressing the utility of containment as a general strategy for U.S. foreign policy. Actual policy followed the interpretation of human rights sanctions held by the modified cold warriors. Sanctions were implemented when they were deemed useful leverage in promoting democracy and reducing abuses, but they were only one among several types of leverage. During this phase, however, the administration sought to avoid the role of mediator in the conflict between Somoza and the opposition.

A number of events combined to change perceptions of the growing crisis in Nicaragua. In May through August 1978, the opposition reorganized into the Broad Opposition Front (the FAO) and called a general strike. In August a Sandinista force staged a dramatic successful takeover of the National Palace

[51] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1979, 16345.
[52] United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1977, 27175, 20582.

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and seized the town of Matagalpa. Moreover, the governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama were now openly hostile toward Somoza.

In the midst of these events, a major diplomatic problem erupted for the United States when a letter from President Carter to Somoza was made public. According to Carter, he sent the letter to encourage Somoza to uphold his promises in the areas of human rights. But it was leaked to the press as a congratulatory letter praising Somoza for his human rights performance. One important effect of the subsequent uproar was to force Carter and Brzezinski to pay closer attention to Nicaragua.[53]

The Second Phase, September 1978–July 1979

The changing context began to produce a shift in the salient portions of the modified cold warriors' world view and the resulting interpretation of events in Nicaragua. The human rights group was increasingly marginalized as the crisis in Nicaragua began to be perceived as potentially threatening. The administration was surprised by Sandinista strength and the decline in support for Somoza, even in the National Guard, where a group of officers actually attempted a coup.[54]

Increasing violence and chaos in Nicaragua activated different components of the world view of the modified cold war group. Their goals now shifted from how to get Somoza to reform to how to guide the direction of change in Nicaragua to prevent the Sandinistas from winning a revolution. Moreover, as the human rights group was marginalized, the traditional cold-war world view group took its place as the back bench advocates of a slightly different policy line. Traditional and modified cold warriors shared a fundamental acceptance of containment. Disagreement centered around how to achieve it.

In September 1978 the administration decided to become more directly involved in Nicaragua's revolution and to mediate the dispute between Somoza and his opponents. Although Carter reportedly understood that this constituted an important shift in policy, Robert Pastor described the change as "gradual" and easy to slide into.[55] Having accepted a deeper involvement, the issue now became what tactics should replace human rights aid sanctions, which had failed to produce reform and stave off revolution. Throughout the summer and into the fall of 1978 the traditional cold warriors in Congress and the Pentagon had pressured for renewed support for Somoza. However, the most articulate and persuasive members of the traditional cold war group were Brzezinski and possibly some members of the Pentagon, and they were not deeply involved in policy deliberations throughout September 1978.[56]

The modified cold warriors preferred a policy that would push Somoza out of

[53] Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*.
[54] See James Goodsell, "Samoza – Near End of Rule," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 August 1978.
[55] Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 83.
[56] Ibid.

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office in order to ensure a moderate government after his departure. They were divided about the best tactics for implementing their policy. These disagreements hinged in part on self-image perceptions and in part on perceptions of the moderate opposition in Nicaragua. Each group was without question concerned about a Sandinista victory. No one wanted that to come about, and they feared a repetition of the Cuban revolution. How to prevent it? All saw the Sandinistas as threatening, but intelligence reports continued to report no Soviet involvement. The positions taken varied in the extent to which the various policy advocates believed that the United States could and should control events and determine a particular outcome.

In September 1978 Carter's advisers discussed whether the administration should use a unilateral or multilateral approach to get Somoza out of office. Generally, those who believed the United States had a great deal of leverage, such as Vaky, advocated stronger measures to depose Somoza. Vaky "thought only the United States could solve the problem of Somoza, and that it should use whatever force necessary—barring assassination—to remove him."[57] Vaky feared the situation would become so chaotic that a Marxist victory would result if the United States did not grasp control and restore order. Others, including Pastor and Anthony Lake, believed that the United States should not ask Somoza to resign, since that would constitute old fashioned intervention. Instead, they advocated that the United States encourage multilateral mediation.[58] Both of these positions are compatible with the modified dependent image of Nicaragua, which is both distrustful of Nicaraguan competence but also somewhat sensitive to nationalism. The tactical disagreement was about the leverage available to the United States. Carter supported the multilateral approach.

Meanwhile, during September and October 1978, those with the traditional cold war world view called for renewed support for Somoza. Seventy-eight members of Congress, spanning partisan lines, asked Carter to support Somoza and accused the opposition of attempting to create another Cuba.

The multilateral mediation with Panama, Costa Rica, and Venezuela failed. The United States then took on the role of mediator itself, although the Dominican Republic and Guatemala were nominal participants. Now the fear was that civil war could not be avoided as long as Somoza remained in power. The United States insisted that the main opposition groups in the FAO be included in the negotiations, but it did not include the Sandinistas.[59] The hope was to create a transitional government quickly enough to preclude a Sandinista victory or major role in the post-Somoza government. Again, there were disagreements about how much leverage the United States had available to it. Vaky and William Bowdler continued to argue that the United States could force a resignation, but all others,

[57] Ibid., 79.

[58] Ibid.

[59] James Goodsell, "U.S. Presses Mediation Bid in Nicaragua," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 September 1978.

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including Carter, Vance, and Christopher, argued that the United States probably did not have that capability.

This tactical disagreement was also a result of dilemmas produced by the modified dependent image. While Vaky and Bowdler believed that the central concern was removing Somoza from office, Carter and most others worried about what would happen afterwards. First, they did not want to "reinforce the protectorate mentality of Nicaraguans" by removing Somoza directly.[60] Second, doubts about Nicaraguans' ability to control the outcome after Somoza left caused concern. What would happen to the National Guard, the only military force able to prevent a Sandinista victory? What assurances were there that the moderate opposition would not fall apart?

The United States pursued its role as mediator from October 1978 through February 1979. A number of twists and turns took place in the U.S. position. Somoza refused to resign, the FAO was difficult to deal with due to its internal diversity, and U.S. negotiators did not speak to the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), who did not trust Americans and disapproved of the mediation in principle. Negotiations commenced about the possibility of elections. The FAO's proposal included Somoza's resignation, the reorganization of the National Guard, elections for a Constituent Assembly, and a new government with a Council of State and three-person junta.

Concern about Somoza's response set off another debate within U.S. policy-making circles between modified cold warriors and traditional cold warriors. The latter, including Brzezinski and General Earl Smith from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and others, worried that Somoza should not be hurried out of office lest the opposition prove too weak to handle the situation, leaving an opening for the Sandinistas. The modified cold warriors, on the other hand, favored pushing hard with economic sanctions to force Somoza out, because the opposition's cohesion was so weak that it might not survive if Somoza rejected the FAO proposal and fighting erupted again. Each saw the Nicaraguans as weak and incompetent. Each feared a Sandinista take-over of the revolutionary momentum. Their disagreement was once again on the tactics that would prevent that outcome. In accordance with the traditional cold-war world view, Brzezinski and the JCS representative leaned toward maintaining Somoza as a bulwark against communism until the alternative was clear. Given their more contemptuous view of Nicaraguans, they opted to bide for time, in which "the opposition would learn to organize . . . so that when they assumed power, they could govern."[61] A compromise was reached. Some pressure was applied but not enough to force a resignation.

Somoza's response to the FAO proposal was to offer one of his own, a plebiscite. Negotiations regarding this option continued through December. Through-

[60] Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 97.
[61] Ibid., 104.

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out this period the FAO was disintegrating, yet the Carter administration doggedly pursued the idea that an election could be held and would produce a centrist government. On 19 January 1979, mediation collapsed completely with withdrawal of military and Peace Corps personnel, termination of all military aid (which had been suspended anyway), and a suspension of economic aid.

The Final Curtain

The United States became involved again in Nicaragua in June 1979. By then the momentum of the revolution had shifted to the Sandinistas. The FAO was replaced by the newly formed National Patriotic Front, which was dominated by the Sandinistas. The United States had minimized contact with the opposition and did not recognize the tide of popular support for the Sandinistas. No plan was devised for maintaining communication with the opposition or establishing contacts with the Sandinistas, despite the fact that during the spring the FSLN was endorsed by all of the major opposition groups.[62]

In late May and early June the Sandinistas launched their final offensive. In the United States, top level policy makers were called upon to formulate a response. The containment-based goal was clear. By this point, threat perceptions were high. Although the modified cold warriors still did not see the Soviet Union as directly behind events in Nicaragua, they believed that the Sandinistas would win if the United States did not stop them and that Cuba would use the FSLN to extend Soviet influence in the region.

Given the crystalization of goals at the global containment level, one should expect the modified enemy and dependent images, under threatening context conditions, to produce a preference for fast-acting, coercive instruments in a clear effort to intervene in order to determine events. Traditional cold warriors should be the strongest advocates of the quick, coercive course. This is precisely what happened.

Brzezinski came up with the first plan for trying to prevent a Sandinista victory. It called for a multilateral Organization of American States (OAS) peacekeeping force in which the United States would play a major role. Somoza would be ousted. The plan also called for direct efforts to shape the future government of Nicaragua. On 17 June, the Sandinistas announced a provisional government composed of a five-member junta, two of whom would be from the FSLN and three from the moderate opposition. The United States, on the other hand, proposed the formation of an interim government acceptable to all opposition groups. This provisional government was to have been composed of a junta appointed by the Nicaraguan Congress and composed of representatives of the major opposition groups. The Sandinistas would have had to negotiate with that junta to form a new government. The U.S. proposal also intended to point out

[62] Alan Riding, "The Nicaragua Crisis. Was the U.S. Off Guard?" *New York Times*, 27 June 1979.

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the Cuban role in the conflict. By this time, eight Latin American countries had either condemned or broken relations with Somoza. Costa Rica and Panama were shipping large amounts of supplies and material to the FSLN. Yet American policy makers believed they had to make Latin Americans aware of Cuban support for the FSLN, support which the others not only knew about but sympathized with.

Members of the modified cold warrior group, including Vance and Vaky, warned that the plan would not go over well with the OAS. Traditional cold warriors with the more extreme dependent image of Latin America, Brzezinski and Brown, began to think the unthinkable—the prospect of facing either a Sandinista victory or U.S. military intervention.[63]

Carter supported the multilateral force idea, and Vance was ordered to present it to the OAS, which in turn rejected it. Moreover, the Nicaraguan opposition endorsed the FSLN's proposed junta. At this point, the traditional cold warriors in the administration adopted the classic cold war strategy: Brzezinski urged Carter to intervene, a recommendation that echoed the views of the cold warriors in Congress. Brzezinksi warned that the United States had to demonstrate that it remained the "decisive force" in Latin America.[64]

Vance, Brown, and Carter all opposed the idea. A new search was launched for a diplomatic approach, and the policy makers ultimately embarked on an effort to get the OAS to approve external mediation in the Nicaraguan crisis. This they did get, and it was interpreted as permission for the United States to arbitrate a transition government. With this new mandate, the administration continued to press for the creation of an executive committee that would negotiate with the junta. The objective was to broaden the junta before Somoza was forced out, in order to diminish Sandinista power and to ensure that the National Guard not be dismantled after Somoza's departure.[65]

The promotion of an executive committee was a denial of reality. The course of the Nicaraguan revolution was rapidly coming to a close, and the Nicaraguan opposition insisted that the junta be treated as a provisional government. The Guard was hated and despised throughout Nicaragua, yet Carter administration officials continued to attempt to prevent the Guard from being dismantled after the revolution. The Nicaraguan opposition rejected this idea and announced that negotiations with the National Guard would only come after Somoza had been replaced with the new government. Again, the dominant assumption was that the United States could forge a political organization that could take control of the situation. Again, those closest to Nicaragua and most complex in their view, like Vaky, knew this would not work.

This was the final concern of the Carter administration during the Nicaraguan revolution. On 17 July 1979 Somoza resigned. A provisional president, Francisco

[63] Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*.
[64] Quoted in ibid., 162.
[65] Graham Hovey, "U.S. Weighs Nicaragua Strategy," *New York Times*, 3 July 1979.

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Urcuyo Malianos, was elected by the Nicaragua Congress to serve as president for a day and oversee the transition to the junta's rule. The United States hoped for a cease fire that would freeze the military holdings of the FSLN, but once Somoza announced his resignation, the National Guard fell apart. Moreover, Urcuyo decided to stay longer but fled when it became apparent that the revolution could not be side-tracked. The Sandinistas finished the military task of winning a revolution on 19 July 1979; the Junta, which was ultimately expanded to seven members, took over.

Conclusions

The impact of perceptual characteristics in this case suggests several conclusions about the Carter administration's policies and the analysis of foreign policy in general. First, the Carter administration's policy was quite consistent with the perceptual properties of the dominant core of policy makers. From 1977 through June 1979, containment was a consistent central objective in Nicaragua. Tactics to achieve that goal changed, but the change was consistent with perceptions. Throughout, there was some recognition of the importance of Nicaraguan nationalism and concern that the United States might offend those nationalistic sentiments if it attempted to shape Nicaragua's future. On the other hand, fear of instability, the remote possibility of a leftist government, and inability to credit Nicaraguans with the ability to construct a new government after Somoza led first to efforts to teach democratic values and then to efforts to prevent the revolution from producing a leftist government. The left and the center were both simplified, resulting in an inability to respond to the complex divisions within the center and an unwillingness to establish contacts with the Sandinistas. The relationship between perceptions and the two phases of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua is complex but not inconsistent.

Second, the delineation of policy advocacy groups along perceptual lines indicates that the shift in emphasis from human rights to more traditional cold war goals was not a result of a transfer of power from liberal human rights advocates to hard-line cold war hawks. Modified cold warriors dominated the policy process throughout. They were lobbied and pressured by the other groups, but they controlled policy nevertheless.

Finally, a perceptual analysis combined with attention to differences in strategic policy lines versus tactical considerations shows the extent to which people can support policies for different reasons and the extent to which those reasons can remain unarticulated. Moreover, it demonstrates the extent to which containment as a general strategy in American foreign policy is accepted without debate. In fact, even those policy advocates who did not have containment-based goals failed to challenge containment and had no alternative to containment to propose.

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Book Reviews

Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power *by James MacGregor Burns with L. Marvin Overby. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. 144 pp. $17.95.*

In this elegant set of lectures, James MacGregor Burns celebrates the American Constitution's past and frets about its future. The lectures begin with the customary filiopiety "two centuries ago . . . fifty men demonstrated . . . the most brilliant example of creative planning in the history of the Western world" (p. 8). Then Burns adds a more subversive theme; the "rickety" constitutional order as it now stands is growing too weak to handle either demands from the citizenry or challenges from abroad.

The root of our contemporary dilemma lies in the Founders' fear that majorities pose a threat to minority rights. It's the other way around, says Burns; each extension of the majority principle has strengthened minority rights. Why? Because American political culture is tolerant and moderate, the American majority sensitive and cautious. A popular groundswell produced the Bill of Rights. And that first majoritarian demand for rights was echoed by six more bills of rights, each extending participation and enhancing rights: an opposition party, judicial review, womens' suffrage, Franklin D. Roosevelt's economic bill of rights, and an expansion of social opportunities in the 1960s.

As participation expands, however, citizen demands multiply. (And as times grow more complex, the imperatives for action grow more urgent.) Of course, constitutional changes are grafted onto eighteenth-century institutions designed to protect minorities by blunting political action. Full of checks and balances—an old cart with a brake for every rider is Burns's metaphor—this fragmented state is not up to the demands that two centuries of reform now thrust upon it. But we're stuck with our system. Burns offers a quick review of alternatives (parliamentary democracy, neocorporatist bargaining, etc.) and concludes that they are nonstarters in the United States.

Instead, Burns urges us to reform the constitutional apparatus by overcoming the checks and balances that sap its strength. He would reinvigorate political

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parties (our nineteenth-century experience is his model), return to party caucuses and conventions, reform campaign finance, encourage straight party voting, and strengthen the party that is out of power (drawing on the parliamentary model).

Naturally, so ambitious a project will provoke critiques. The reforms proposed in *Cobblestone Leadership* have all been made before. More sweeping changes are waved away too easily. The cobblestone leaders—common people in the street who actually spark change—are largely implicit, despite the billing they get in the book's title. And, perhaps most fundamentally, Burns takes a quite rosy view of the past.

In different hands, the story of American bills of rights would be full of conflict and disappointment. Judicial review, for example, was used to deny rights long before it became an instrument for defining and defending them (a relatively recent, fast receding Court function). The Civil War amendments were swiftly gutted. The Nineteenth Amendment was far weaker than the Susan Anthony Amendment that came close in both the 1910s and the 1970s. Though Burns notes such caveats, those who read American history as more conflict than consensus will be eager to contest his genial vision of our political development.

Ultimately, however, such critiques are a consequence of the genre—public lectures. Readers who are keen to argue history with James MacGregor Burns have their pick of an extensive bibliography. The purpose of this volume is to provoke serious public discourse about the third century of our Constitution.

On its own terms, the book is a gem. It demonstrates the pleasure—and the power—of political science grounded in history. And it adds one more voice to the chorus calling on Americans to rethink their political institutions. It is a call we cannot hear too often, one that is rarely sounded so gracefully.

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The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals *edited by Colin Campbell, S. J. and Bert A. Rockman. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1991. 320 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $16.95.*

The first returns on the Bush presidency are now in. The president will be interested to learn that a group of distinguished political scientists, each one an expert on a particular aspect of Oval Office politics, has concluded that he is a "pastel personality in a pastel time" (p. viii); a "low-risk" leader (p. ix); a Tory with a "preference for incrementalism" (p. 21); "visionless" (p. 21); "agendaless" (p. 23); "not well anchored by a strong set of personal values" (p. 29); a weak national agenda leader whose "message is often garbled" (p. 146); a president who "seems to lack a game plan" (p. 185); a bad delegator (p. 214–5); a man who is hyperki-

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netic and has problems "making hard decisions in a timely way" (p. 217); and a president who "has not yet left bold footprints" (p. 294).

No doubt these opinions will interest Robert Dole, Michael Dukakis and Lloyd Bentsen, Manuel Noriega, Daniel Ortega, the Faribundo front in El Salvador, the instigators of the Philippines coup against President Corazon Aquino, the Committee for Public Order in the Soviet Union, Yasir Arafat, Saddam Hussein, Prince Hussein, and Yitzhak Shamir. And they should also prove consoling to the American civil rights community, the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (especially Ted Kennedy), and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee (especially Sam Nunn). Tell any of them Bush hasn't left bold footprints and they are likely to point to parts of their own anatomy in response.

In spite of their cutting generalizations about Bush, the authors of the essays in this volume have made serious attempts to explore the Bush presidency. They recognize that generalizations about Bush must be tentative, sometimes go the other way, and "in the end, of course, we tend to evaluate presidents with our goals, rather than theirs" (p. 293). Bert Rockman describes Bush as assertive, defiant, and risk taking in certain situations (p. 30). Larry Berman and Bruce Jentleson ask which is the real George Bush—the footnote to history president or the architect of the new world order (p. 95). They see him as both a pragmatist and a moral crusader. George Edwards III says he is weak in controlling the national agenda but terrific with the Washington press corps, giving him better ink than other recent presidents have gotten and less investigative flak. Barbara Sinclair points out that Bush's strategy of compromise with Democrats was based on political weakness and not a convergence of interests; therefore, at times Bush deviated from the strategy for tactical gain.

Sometimes grudgingly and sometimes admiringly, these authors often wind up giving Bush his due. Campbell provides a prescient discussion of Bush's political style: the man is a dealmaker who wants everyone to take a seat at the table and a play a hand and who gets impatient when people raise objections to playing. The Bush/James Baker approach to Middle East peace talks, which unfolded many months after this article was written, could have been lifted right out of Campbell's playbook. Joel Aberbach points out that Bush has replaced most of the Reaganites in the top echelons of the administration with closet moderates, and there is much less friction between careerists (more of whom are Republican centrists or conservatives now) and executive-level appointees than in previous administrations. Berman and Jentleson see a smoothly managed foreign policy apparatus-a welcome relief from the frictions of past administrations, though they fault it for being too closed and tight a circle.

Most of the authors see Bush as one of, if not the, key variable in the performance of American government during his term. But Anthony King and Giles Alston provide a theory of high-exposure American politics in which congressional fear of electoral disaster defines and limits the congressional approach to every issue and virtually makes Bush irrelevant. This may be an analysis that could only come from our British colleagues, since it emphasizes the parliamen-

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tary forum to the virtual exclusion of national security and administrative politics. Berman and Jentleson point out that a cash-strapped America no longer can project its influence effectively; and so "the fate of the foreign policy George Bush may be much more closely intertwined with the domestic policy George Bush than he, who would much rather lead the world than the nation, would prefer" (p. 123).

All seem to agree that in an era of public apathy and split government there isn't much a president is likely to try in the domestic sphere; and all seem to agree that it doesn't hurt Bush at all. There are three undeniable facts about Bush's first two years: he rode high in the polls; his legislative success scores in his first year were lower than his predecessors; and his success scores in his second year were lower than in any year since a count has been kept. How do we explain the popularity of a president who is neither a programmatic, activist FDR nor a telegenic right-wing Reagan? Nor, for that matter, is he a genial (at least in terms of public image) war hero like Eisenhower? An excellent essay by Charles Jones offers a theory of split government and a discussion of copartisanship in an attempt to evaluate Bush's political success and substantive failures.

The editors can be commended for rounding up a group of experts on the inner politics of the Oval Office, though the focus is so tight several articles deal at length with the same subjects (such as the 1990 budget fiasco). The book could have been strengthened if it included a least one article by a public law specialist who might have focused on the workings of the Justice Department, the regulatory agencies, and the Bush appointments to the federal courts; and one article by an expert on politics and the economy. In an administration with a limited legislative agenda, focusing on legislative success scores may miss the point: the domestic agenda is really being shaped in the regulatory arena, where Bush appointees promulgate regulations at odds with the plain language of the laws passed by Democratic Congresses and in the courts, where these regulations are now being upheld by conservative appointees.

Overall, this is a useful start on understanding the Bush presidency. But given the bold American strategic moves in the Middle East and in nuclear arms control that unfolded in Bush's third year, it seems clear that its main thrust is likely to need substantial revision when generalizations about Bush's entire presidency are made.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

An Essential Safeguard: Essays on the United States Supreme Court and Its Justices *edited by D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1991. 192 pp. $42.95.*

A collection of essays devoted to contemporary analyses of the characteristics and judicial doctrinal tendencies of several justices, this work contains contribu-

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tions by outstanding scholars and one former public official. The literary quality of each chapter is high, while the nature of the analyses varies from closely reasoned incisiveness to ancedote or from the objectively dispassionate to ideological polemic.

An elegant writer and long a keen observer of the Court, Henry Abraham provides a balanced and well informed analysis of the issue whether presidents really pack the Supreme Court. His answer, necessarily inconclusive in some eras, is generally affirmative. Similarly, Harold J. Spaeth's chapter on Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Walter F. Murphy's on Justice William O. Douglas, William M. Beaney's on the second John Marshall Harlan, Jesse H. Choper's on affirmative action, and James F. Simon's analysis of the leadership roles of all the chief justices are works of substantial scholarship illuminating academic understanding of the work of the Supreme Court and the doctrinal and leadership contributions of some of its members. The remaining two chapters depart in some respects from the previous chapters. Rex Lee's contribution deals with an exceedingly important executive branch office of intimate importance to the Court. Martin Shapiro's chapter is in part exhortion and advocacy and in part apologia for what has been perceived by some commentators as the limited leadership role of Associate and Chief Justice William Rehnquist through 1989.

A comparison of Rex E. Lee's examination of the office of the solicitor general and Martin Shapiro's "Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Court's Future" indicates an exceedingly wide range of purposes and analytical styles. Lee has occasionally been criticized for alleged ideological bias during his tenure as solicitor general in the Reagan administration. Yet he writes a straightforward historical treatment and balanced analysis of the origins and contemporary role of the office of solicitor general.

In contrast, Martin Shapiro opens his chapter with an ideological fuisillade reminiscent of Richard Morgan's *Disabling America: The Rights of Industry in Our Time.* A central argument in this portion of Shapiro's chapter is that "there is a constitutional law industry that manufactures constitutional law . . . announces what people are permitted to think about the Constitution, what lawyers are permitted to argue to courts about the Constitution, and what judges are permitted to say that the Constitution is. . . . New Deal Democrats dominated not only the Court but the whole academic world of constitutional law" (p. 147).

Shapiro, a Harvard Ph.D. and major contributor to the literature of the political jurisprudence of the post-World War II era, apparently chose to ignore troublesome contradictory evidence. Such evidence includes the facts that it has been generally law professors of the left rather than the right who have figured in a few well publicized tenure and promotion denials at Harvard; the University of Chicago Law School is deemed, rightly or wrongly, a legal reincarnation of the economic ideology of Milton Friedman; and, most importantly, law professors have for decades been deeply divided over judicial activism v. judicial restraint as well as a multitude of doctrinal issues.

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In short, the ostensible subject of Shapiro's chapter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, is discussed only briefly after a substantial attack on academics in law schools and a selective and exaggerated recital of the judicial consequences of the critical election of 1932. Shapiro's treatment of Rehnquist's leadership role is measured and precise in contrast to the long polemical introduction. This portion's shortcoming is the inexplicable omission of significant discussion of decisions that would enhance or curtail broad constructionist interpretations of executive power—the very core of the Republican political agenda from Richard Nixon through George Bush.

JOHN SCHMIDHAUSER
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Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem *by Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 258 pp. $19.95.*

This fascinating study had an unusual genesis. The two authors—one an anthropologist, the other a geographer—conducted separate research projects in the early 1980s. Only later, when they realized their findings and interpretations were complementary, did they decide to collaborate on a single manuscript, with each author responsible for writing alternating chapters. The technique works surprisingly well: Romann provides macrolevel analyses of spatial ethnic divisions, the structure of economic ties, and public service distribution; Weingrod's case studies of two neighborhoods (Abu Tur and Beit Safafa), specific places of employment (the Nimrod bakery and Hadassah hospital), administrative structures, and ongoing political processes give valuable texture to the fabric Romann has woven.

Following an introductory chapter that traces Jerusalem's political history and the patterns of Jewish-Palestinian interaction, the book explores the day-to-day interactions of the two groups, occurring as they do in a context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. These interactions are used to understand "how ideologies and power relations frame the encounters between members of these groups, or why conflicts may in fact erupt under certain circumstances" (p. 23). What comes through clearly is that despite nearly twenty-five years of Israeli control and modest integration, in many ways Jerusalem remains a divided and segregated city, one that Israeli Jews and Palestinians experience quite differently. As a result, Jewish-Palestinian social and work-related contacts are generally instrumental rather than multiplex. There are few cross-ethnic friendships either in neighborhoods or in the workplace. Furthermore, working together successfully doesn't necessarily enhance cooperation or interaction in other arenas. Both Palestinians and Jews "seek to carry on their contacts in those forms and domains

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that represent only a low level of integration" rather than actively seek to develop deeper ties with the other group (p. 224).

One theme woven throughout the book is how the existing structural arrangements reinforce the political and economic dependence of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem on Israeli Jews, while minimizing the dependence of Jewish Jerusalemites on Palestinians. This creates a situation in which Palestinians are—of necessity—far more involved with Jewish institutions and economic activities than the other way around. Furthermore, because of their dominant position, Jews have a greater ability to choose if, when, and under what circumstances they will interact with Palestinians. In contrast, Palestinians generally lack the option of avoiding Jews and Jewish institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that the authors find, for example, that Palestinian students are better acquainted with the Jewish sections of Jerusalem than are Jewish students with the Palestinian sections. Knowledge of West Jerusalem is more essential for Palestinian survival than is knowledge of East Jerusalem for Israeli Jews.

The authors, both Jewish Jerusalemites, clearly made an effort to be careful, scholarly, and fair in their analysis of this controversial, emotional subject. In most cases they were quite successful. Still, there were some slips. Palestinian actions against Jews were frequently labeled "terrorism," whereas Jewish actions against Palestinians were referred to as "reprisals" or simply "violence," far more neutral terms. Similarly, Israeli fighters are soldiers, while Palestinian fighters are terrorists. Gilo is described as a "large urban complex"—accurate but also misleading, since no indication is made that this is a Jewish settlement in the occupied territories whose legality is controversial under international law, notwithstanding Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and the surrounding area.

Furthermore, while the dispassionate treatment of sensitive topics added to the book's credibility, it also meant the authors often stopped short of asking key questions, the answers to which might have been revealing and fully amplified the implications of some of their observations. For example, in the discussion of urban development activities in Jerusalem, they write: "Needless to say, under the circumstances of 'united Jerusalem' Jewish land is never sold or in other ways transferred to Arab ownership" (p. 48). But they fail to elaborate on this critical point.

One disappointment is that the analysis is based on fieldwork conducted nearly ten years ago. In a concluding chapter, the authors argue that the fundamental dynamics of the day-to-day relationship between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem have not changed significantly with the *intifada* and other recent political developments, because "the basic unresolved issue confronting Arabs and Jews has been, and undoubtably remains, that of collective political rights, national identity, sovereignty, and control" (p. 243). True, and yet my own research prior to and during the *intifada* indicates that the authors might be surprised at what they would discover if they redid some of their fieldwork.

There is little question that the final political status of Jerusalem is likely to

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be one of the most difficult topics to be addressed in any comprehensive Middle East peace negotiations. By providing evidence on how Jews and Palestinians currently live—together and separately—in Jerusalem, this book hints at the types of practical and political issues that will need to be resolved in the future. Although its primary audience is likely to be scholars concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict, the volume should also be of interest to those interested in ethnic power relations or in comparative studies of mixed urban settings.

DEBORAH J. GERNER
University of Kansas

Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years *by Haynes Johnson. New York, W.W. Norton, 1991. 524 pp. $24.95.*

Washington Post national affairs columnist Haynes Johnson, a skillful writer and a perceptive reporter, has written a sorrowful and highly critical account of American public life in the 1980s. Although virtually all of Johnson's characters and topics will be quite familiar to any regular newspaper reader, Johnson more than succeeds in his goal of portraying Ivan Boesky and Oliver North, just like Wedtech and fraudulent televangelism, as related chapters—not disparate events—in recent American social history.

At one level, Johnson's unifying theme is as stark as it is depressing. The 1980s, he emphasizes, was an "ethical wasteland" (p. 371) and "an age of illusion when America lived on borrowed time and squandered opportunities to put its house in order" (p. 13). American life became "self-indulgent and imitative" as "entertainers became public leaders and . . . celebrities, not pioneers, scientists, or artists, became cultural heroes" (p. 461). The news media, "preoccupied with scandal," turned more and more toward "celebrity journalism in which entertainment masks as news" (p. 469) and the American people increasingly seemed "to withdraw from public affairs and distance themselves from public questions" (p. 468).

Despite the inclusiveness of Johnson's societal indictment, however, at a second level *Sleepwalking Through History* is primarily concerned with the cultural and political significance of Ronald Reagan's eight-year presidency. Reagan's election may indeed have reflected "a marriage of the New Right with the New Rich" (p. 21), but to Johnson, Reagan's importance was in large part accidental, not preordained. "Two events," Johnson writes, "transformed Ronald Reagan from a politician of dubious credentials and public achievements into a mythic figure in American life" (p. 153). "First and incomparably foremost was the assassination attempt" on 30 March 1981, which in Johnson's view served to "elevate Reagan into a place in the affections of his fellow citizens that he never lost during his years as president." The shooting, Johnson asserts, "strongly affected his ability to dominate Congress and win passage of his . . . legislative programs, and produced a strange

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yet not surprising suspension of public judgment on his presidential actions and policies that continued" (p. 153) until Reagan left office. Four months later, in August 1981, Reagan's new-found stature was further strengthened, Johnson argues, by his success in breaking the strike called by the nation's air traffic controllers. "Had the assassination attempt and the controllers' strike come late in his term," Johnson argues, Reagan "would never have been able to forge the commanding national presence that gave his presidency such power and force, for better or worse" (p. 154).

Such an analysis may or may not be as persuasive as it is provocative, but it accurately captures the energetic style of interpretation that Johnson offers. *Sleepwalking Through History* may be at its best in Johnson's deft portraits of the Iran-contra probers and their principal suspects, but he also convincingly surveys the many sins and excesses of the Boesky and Milken-style Wall Street investment bankers. Johnson is exceptionally proper and commendatory in acknowledging the contributions made by earlier books that have surveyed one or another part of his comprehensive story, and if he errs at all it is in his occasional tendency to overstate the historical preeminence of the Reagan period. Many observers of the 1960s, for example, might take issue with Johnson's assertion that "the eighties were the most important years since World War II" (p. 13). Nonetheless, *Sleepwalking Through History* is a top-notch journalistic achievement, and few readers will likely quarrel with Johnson's concluding observation that "America's greatest test in the nineties lies not beyond its borders . . . but within" (p. 464).

DAVID J. GARROW
Virginia Center for the Humanities

Roosevelt: The Party Leader 1932–1945 *by Sean J. Savage. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1991. 232 pp. $25.00.*

It is a delight to have a doctoral dissertation become a readable and enlightening work, as this author proves that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was "one of the most successful and effective party leaders in American history" (p. 187).

FDR attained at least two major goals—conversion of a disorganized and conservative-oriented party into a highly organized, liberal democracy and making the Democrats an enduring majority in Congress with long-time control of the presidency.

Starting in 1920, FDR sought unsuccessfully to make the party a liberal, functioning institution. Within two years of his race for New York's governorship in 1928, which he won by 25,000 votes, FDR created a viable liberal party upstate, a permanent press bureau, and addressed rural and urban issues.

FDR's selection of James A. Farley to head the Democratic State Committee was an ideal choice. He attained Roosevelt's organizational goals and with the

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aid of Eleanor Roosevelt attracted large numbers of able women by affording them prominent and influential party roles. And all this Farley continued on the national scene. Aided by these changes, a liberal legislative program, and the developing Great Depression, FDR overwhelmed his Republican gubernatorial opponent in 1930 with a 725,000 vote margin.

It was FDR, Farley, Harry Hopkins, and others who helped convert a national "tweedle dee, tweedle dum" party into a modern, liberal democracy, partly through patronage and the recruitment of young, brilliant "service intellectuals"—an academic elite—who were committed to the ideas of "positive government."

New York's Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr. influenced FDR to become more favorable toward unions as an economic interest group and as a vital source of political support. It was Wagner's social, housing, and labor legislation that helped transform northeastern and midwestern urban, industrial areas into Democratic bastions. And building upon historic populist strains, FDR secured initially the support of most southern Democrats.

After the 1938 congressional elections, however, which substantially increased Republican representation, a GOP-southern conservative coalition obstructed further New Deal initiatives. Nevertheless, southern influence in the Democratic party waned considerably. In 1920, southerners comprised 82 percent of Democrats in the House of Representatives and 70 percent in the Senate. By 1936, only 35 percent of Democrats in both Houses were southerners. FDR made the party more of a social democratic, liberal organization, a source of power, status, and access for blacks, women, urban ethnics, and labor.

The most challenging chapter by Savage highlights the close, constructive relationship between FDR and party bosses like Frank Hague of Jersey City (otherwise known as Hitler on the Hudson), Ed Kelly of Chicago, Tom Pendergast of Kansas City, and Ed Flynn of the Bronx. They accorded Roosevelt's liberal reformation of the party its strongest base of political support.

These machines delivered large blocs of pro-Roosevelt delegates at nominating conventions and mobilized urban votes on election day. In turn, these bosses tended to act liberally on race and New Deal issues and became the most ardent advocates of Roosevelt's cooperative federalism in which Washington played a greater role in the cities' public policies, public infrastructure, and fiscal affairs.

This fascinating work makes clear that FDR insured the party's profound transformation, as well as its survival long after his death. He united and mobilized the Democratic party to win federal elections and to achieve historic legislative victories. But he went much further to insure an enduring majority, a coalition of voting blocs, interest groups, and an ideology and policy agenda that still influences our electoral politics and public policy.

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The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 *by Michael R. Beschloss. New York, HarperCollins, 1991. 816 pp. $29.95.*

This long, detailed, dramatic account of the "crisis years" pictures them as a direct personal struggle between its protagonists—a gripping story, vividly told. The author aimed at writing both a best seller and a serious history. He has succeeded better at the first. As serious historical analysis, it has three important flaws. There is far too much emphasis on John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev as dramatic actors and too little on the political context. Second, there is too much speculation—for example, "Kennedy must have known," "Khruschchev must have thought." Finally, the attention and space given to the sensational and scandalous, most of it irrelevant to the significant events, reflects the first aim and does little for the second. Another irritation from the scholar's viewpoint is the extremely compressed and incompletely specified footnoting. Figuring out who said what where is itself a research task. Perhaps the publisher is more at fault here than the author.

The central thread of Beschloss's narrative is the repeated frustration of the desire that Kennedy and Khrushchev shared to improve U.S.–Soviet relations and achieve some measure of both détente and disarmament. Their misperceptions and misunderstandings of each other and their failures of communication made it impossible until too late. This contains much truth but is hardly a complete or balanced account. It underplays the genuine political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over Germany and Europe, and the deeply-rooted hatred of communism and anxiety about Soviet expansionism shared widely across the U.S. political spectrum.

Beschloss sees a "tacit understanding" between Dwight Eisenhower and Khrushchev that the United States would not brandish its military might, and this allowed Khrushchev to pursue détente and the improvement of Soviet living standards despite pressures from Soviet generals and other hard-liners. Kennedy broke that understanding by his announced build-up of conventional forces, by boasting of U.S. nuclear strength, and by referring in a March 1962 interview with a journalist to the possibility of a U.S. first strike. Thus he provoked Khrushchev and stimulated him to the quick fix of installing missiles in Cuba.

This is both entirely speculative, and deeply unhistorical. It is hard to accept the tacit understanding in the context of the build-up of U.S. strategic forces under Eisenhower—first the B-52's; then, after Sputnik, accelerated deployment of Atlas and Titan missiles; and finally the initiation of both the Minuteman and Polaris programs. While Kennedy sped up the pace of both, his final deployment goals were not too different from Eisenhower's. Nor was the missile gap simply an invention of Kennedy's election campaign. The Eisenhower-initiated Gaither and von Neumann Committees and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were its fathers. The target plan under which SAC operated during this time was essentially a first-strike plan. *Aviation Week* was read not only by Americans, and surely Soviet intelligence was no more restrained in describing the enemy than was American intelligence.

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Equally stretched are the speculations that Kennedy in effect invited the building of the Berlin Wall, or that by failing to warn Khrushchev earlier and explicitly, brought on the Cuban adventure. Would such a warning have shaken Khrushchev's confidence that he could conceal his deployment until he chose to reveal it in such a way as to command world-wide sympathy and thus force Kennedy to swallow it? Had such a warning been given with no effect, would Beschloss see it as another example of Kennedy's provocations?

Perhaps it is appropriate that an American writer should mark Kennedy on a harsher scale than Khrushchev; Beschloss speaks of Kennedy's luck in escaping an accounting for his errors.

Enjoy, but use a large saltshaker!

CARL KAYSEN
Massacusetts Institute of Technology

Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah *by Marvin Zonis. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 350 pp. $29.95.*

Marvin Zonis's first book, *The Political Elite of Iran*, sketched a convincing portrait of those around the shah who helped keep the regime in place; but the shah himself was strangely absent from his narrative. Now Zonis fills that gap, arguing strongly for the centrality of the shah as an individual and personality in any interpretation of the Iranian revolution. This is psychobiography carried about as far as it can safely be taken without falling prey to excessive reductionism. Indeed, some will no doubt feel that Zonis minimizes other reasons for the downfall of the Pahlavis—socioeconomic causes, for example.

But whatever the readers intellectual predispositions, Zonis's argument should be taken seriously. Certainly those who were in touch with the shah during the momentous events of 1978 felt that something was strange in his behavior. Time and again, he would turn to the American and British ambassadors and ask them what he should do. How could this behavior be squared with the image of His Imperial Majesty? Zonis provides the best clues to date.

The shah, according to Zonis, suffered from "narcissistic grandiosity"; but the jargon can be skipped with little loss. What he means is that the shah, like many political leaders, was absorbed with his own importance. At the core, however, was a rather weak and ambivalent personality. Crucial to his ability to function effectively as imperial ruler were four points: first, he needed the adulation of the Iranian people and the luxurious trappings of his station to feel important; second, he depended heavily on a few very close personal ties for emotional support; third, he believed that God had chosen him for a special mission; and fourth, he counted on the unquestioning support of the United States.

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Not surprisingly, Zonis places emphasis on the role of the shah's authoritarian father in creating a rather accommodating tendency on the part of the son. The shah, once in power, had to struggle to overcome this softer side of his character. His twin sister, a much more forceful character than he, often lamented the weakness in her brother's personality.

In successive chapters, Zonis shows how the props that had allowed the shah to play the part of supreme ruler were progressively knocked away. The onset of cancer was a sign that divine protection was no longer available. Zonis gives a full account of the progression of the disease that took the shah's life. Certainly one cannot understand the shah's behavior in 1978 without knowing that he was aware that his end was near. He talked often of the need to prepare for the succession for his son. This was one of the reasons he gave for refusing to resort to what he called the iron fist policy of a military crackdown.

As the shah's health slipped away, so did the affection of the Iranian masses. By 1978 there was no mistaking the depth of the alienation of the Iranian people. In one of the most original parts of his analysis, Zonis shows that the shah also lost at about this time the support of those who had been closest to him. For example, his boyhood friend and later prime minister, Assadollah Alam, died in November 1977. Finally, the shah became convinced that the United States wanted him replaced. Jimmy Carter's policy was essentially supportive, but Carter also adopted a stance that the shah should make decisions for his country. The United States would not tell him what to do. The shah seemed to read this as indifference, or worse. And some of Carter's public comments added to the shah's confusion. Ironically, it was not until the moment in early 1979 when the shah could no longer be helped that Carter and his top aides supported the use of force to suppress the revolution. By then it was too late.

With all of these means of support eroding by late 1978, the shah reverted to his indecisive self, unable to make decisions. Those who opposed the regime sensed his hestiancy to use force, and the revolution became an unstoppable wave. But, Zonis insists, the revolution was not inevitable. It happened because the shah was unable psychologically to make the tough decisions that might have stopped or at least delayed it.

Zonis dwells on the effect of U.S. policies on the shah's downfall at some length. By showering Iran with arms after 1972, the United States helped to trigger the xenophobia of the Iranian people. Then, when the shah came under siege the Carter administration sent mixed signals. Zonis's brief chapter on lessons for U.S. policy is not, however, particularly helpful. In the end, if the shah was the architect of his own political demise, which Zonis argues throughout the book, it is hard to see what the United States could have done to save him.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

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Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator from Georgia *by Gilbert C. Fite. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 556 pp. $29.95.*

For political scientists, Richard B. Russell, Jr. is known as the quintessential member of the U.S. Senate and the informal leader of its ruling establishment in the 1940s and 1950s. Had he wanted it, he could have been the Senate's formal leader as well. The man whom he picked for that job, Lyndon Johnson, said of him: "If the membership of the Senate were to cast a secret vote on the man they believed best qualified to be President of the United States, they would choose Richard Russell" (p. 550). For visitors to Capitol Hill, the Russell Senate Office Building memorializes this massive reputation. For all of that, however, the senator from Georgia is not among the best remembered public figures of his time. How he achieved such collegial esteem and what difference it made—for him, for the Senate and for the country—have not been widely understood. Gilbert Fite, a University of Georgia historian, has remedied the situation with this fine, full-length biography. It is a carefully researched, well crafted, and fair-minded treatment of the man, the senator, and the changing political landscape of his time.

Political scientists hoping (as this reviewer did) for a fresh, first-hand, inside look at how William White's *Citadel* actually worked will be disappointed. There are frequent generalizations about Russell's legislative prowess; but not much by way of hard evidence or ancedote is offered in support. The problem, however, is as much Russell as it is his biographer. During thirty-eight years in the Senate, he was a consummate inside player, rarely out front crusading on the issues, rarely pushing himself toward the newspapers, the microphone, or the television camera, rarely turning a memorable phrase, rarely writing a revealing letter. Russell was not an easy subject.

The career-long sweep of Fite's book permits, however, the telling of a different story—one of political success and political failure. On the success side of the ledger there was ambition, handed down from an obsessed father who felt he had failed in politics. Ambition took the son to the Georgia House of Representatives at the age of 23, to the governorship at 33, and to the U.S. Senate at 35. His success was built, second, on a thirst for the acquisition of usable knowledge—the avid reading of history, the meticulous preparaton for substantive legislative matters, the study of Senate rules. Third, there was Russell's strength of character—his integrity, fairness, loyalty, independence—which helped him to build the supportive person-to-person networks he relied upon so heavily in Georgia and in Washington.

These ingredients were displayed in his ardent support of the New Deal, especially its agricultural programs for family farmers, and in his own triumphant authorship of the School Lunch Program. They underpinned his finest hour on the national stage—his masterful handling of the Douglas MacArthur hearings which cooled off a national frenzy in the wake of President Harry Truman's 1951 dismissal of the charismatic general.

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The failure side of Russell's ledger contains but a single entry—his total, bitter-end devotion to the white supremacist, segregationist racial policies of his native South. As the movement for racial justice grew nationally, Russell grew increasingly alienated from the mainstream of his Democratic party and underwent a gradual transformation from national to regional politician. As the acknowledged leader of its Southern Bloc, he prevented Senate votes on civil rights bills eleven times between 1938 and 1963. In the same role, he ran a doomed campaign for the presidental nomination in 1952.

This story—of a politican of commanding talent and stature fighting on the wrong and the losing side of an historic social movement—is the most fascinating part of the book. Fite tells it with empathy; but he assesses the costs with a cool historian's eye. He calls it "the tragedy of Richard Brevard Russell, Jr." that he wasted his abilities defending "a social system that was indefensible" (p. 501). It is an appropriate conclusion to an excellent biography.

RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.
University of Rochester

Live from Capitol Hill: Studies of Congress and the Media *by Stephen Hess. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1991. 178 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

What can media scholars learn from a study of media coverage of Congress that is based on careful analysis of thousands of news stories gleaned from local television and local newspapers throughout the United States? Plenty. Foremost, as Stephen Hess, senior Brookings fellow and highly regarded media expert, tells us, we learn that media coverage is far less important for Congress members than most standard accounts suggest. Coverage does little to advance Congress members' legislative programs or further their reelections.

These conclusions are based on a fascinating, extraordinarily meticulous analysis of previously unavailable data about congressional press coverage. They include information about the unique system developed for operating congressional press galleries and information about major demographic characteristics of the Washington press corps in 1988, compared to ten years earlier. Hess also describes Washington news bureaus and independent news services that produce Washington news for out-of-towners. He provides data on the activities of congressional press secretaries, including details about the types of stories they like to write and the types of publicity preferred by legislators for various purposes.

When Hess discusses success rates in placing congressional news stories, such as op-ed pieces and press releases, he makes important distinctions that have been

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neglected by other investigators. For instance, he distinguishes between people who are seen, seen and heard, or merely mentioned in local television newscasts. He notes whether Congress stories have a local or national focus and comments on coverage differences related to media market size. He provides rankings of congressional committees in terms of the media attention they receive, and he compares coverage of especially prominent Congress members with more routine treatment.

The reasons for the limited impact of press coverage on the fate of legislators, as Hess sees it, is the nature of congressional coverage. It is haphazard and fragmented, dictated more by the unplanned patterns emerging from diverse journalistic and political pressures than by any attempt to tell a coherent story or accomplish a well defined purpose. Legislators rarely receive enough concentrated time on audio-visual media or command enough newspaper space to draw sufficient attention to themselves to make a lasting impression. Even at best, coverage is sparse. When Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill became the most televised speaker in history because he personified the opposition to Reagan during his first two years in office, he still appeared on only 7 percent of the network evening news programs. By contrast, presidents receive almost 100 percent coverage with at least one story a day, and usually two or three.

Why do Congress members spend so much time to secure favorable press coverage when their efforts accomplish so little and why do they believe that their efforts pay off? Congress members, Hess concludes, love the publicity game for its own sake. They enjoy seeing themselves on television and find it ego-inflating to be the center of attention in a news story. They often falsely equate the creation of news stories with publication and impact. The fact that cameras are present on many occasions and that Congress members are interviewed gives them the impression that they are receiving coverage even when most of these stories are never published at all or make it only into a very few news programs.

In addition to the careful data analysis in the text, the book contains two appendixes that present most of the information in tabular form. These appendixes are goldmines for analysts who may want to carry the analysis even further than Hess did. It is unfortunate that the author did not update the local television news data that were collected from February 1979 to June 1985. They therefore antedate the period when C-SPAN began to cover Senate proceedings and leave the reader wondering about the impact of that important development. However, the data do include C-SPAN coverage of the House, which began in 1979 and which is the main focus of the book.

While Hess's data clearly support his conclusion that coverage is sparse and therefore not very important for most members of Congress, one can take issue with his claim that "this has been a book about the unimportance of the press" (p. 102). Though unimportant for individual legislators, coverage may still be very important for Congress as an institution. After several spectacular televised confirmation hearings in recent years, and after watching congressional debates

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about U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf, can claims of unimportance really stick? I doubt it.

DORIS A. GRABER
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Welfare and Freedom American Style: The Role of the Federal Government, 1900–1940 *by Richard K. Caputo. Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1991. 145 pp. $41.25.*

This short book is the first in a series focusing upon the role of the federal government in assisting persons in need. The principal theme is the major shift in responsibility for child welfare from subnational governments to the federal government via conditional national grants-in-aid.

The issue of states' rights was prominent in the period under consideration and earlier in the century had been highlighted by the controversy over the creation of the United States Children's Bureau. The author identifies "the collapse of private relief" during the Great Depression as the impetus for congressional action and notes that "much of the New Deal legislation depended on the states as agencies for its implementation" (p. 132).

This overly ambitious book inadequately examines the changing roles of states, local government, and the national government. Unfortunately, major developments are glossed over as illustrated by the one sentence devoted to the United States Supreme Court's changing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The description of the Social Security Act of 1935 is inaccurate: old age insurance was not mandatory for everyone in 1935. Although the act has been labeled social insurance, the two programs (retirement and unemployment compensation) established by the act are not based upon actuarial principles; and, contrary to the author's description, only the retirement program requires contributions from employees.

A major weakness of the book is reliance upon secondary sources of information when primary sources are readily available. Furthermore, the author does not understand that the Congress is a government of delegated powers and lacks constitutional authority to provide services, other than postal services, directly to citizens of a state. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to understand the reliance of the national government on conditional grants-in-aid and tax credits to persuade states to implement national policies.

The concluding chapter is primarily a summary and does not contain conclusions based upon findings made in earlier chapters. The reader is left wondering what is the significance of the study in terms of understanding the post-1940

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period and the current Medicaid program. What are the lessons from the earlier period that can be applied to the post-1940 period and the future?

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN
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Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt Divide Europe *by Remi Nadeau. New York, Praeger, 1991. 259 pp. $45.00.*

Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order *by Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1991. 335 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.*

The destruction of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 followed by a tidal wave of independence, which swept through Eastern Europe in the wake of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, signaled the end of the cold war, a watershed event for this generation. The division of Europe into East and West had come to an end. That astonishing spectacle gives rise to a number of important questions. What led to the division of Europe between East and West in the first place? Could it have been prevented? What led to the establishment of such a confrontational, intense, and immensely dangerous postwar order? Remi Nadeau seeks to answer the first two questions, and Woods and Jones the second in their recent impressive volumes. Nadeau probes the questions and facts surrounding the division of Europe between East and West during World War II, while Woods and Jones trace the course of evolving tensions from the Yalta Conference and the breakup of the Grand Alliance to the formation of NATO and the Berlin blockade.

Nadeau sees the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, not as a product of the postwar period as is commonly assumed, but the result of the failure of Allied efforts to block Stalin during the war itself. He demonstrates in well researched, persausive, and vividly written arguments how Roosevelt's failure to throw U.S. strength into the political balance was not confined to the Yalta Conference in 1945, but was a policy that Roosevelt followed in East-West encounters throughout the war. Misunderstanding Stalin's intentions, Roosevelt repeatedly failed to support Churchill's attempts to block Stalin with diplomatic bargaining and military preemption.

Nadeau argues that the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe in the postwar years 1945–1948 was a foregone conclusion once Stalin had gained power through Red Army occupation; he was unrestrained by prior Allied agreements with teeth. However, Nadeau sees this European tragedy not as a product of American wrongdoing but of American innocence. He believes the lofty idealism that made Roosevelt a surpassing global figure in winning the war also kept him from winning the European peace. Although British initiatives were not always right, American responses, at least from hindsight, were more often wrong. Nadeau

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concludes that while all of Eastern Europe might not have been saved from Stalinism, if U.S. power and will had been thrown into the political balance, much of it, like Finland and Austria, might at least have been kept neutral and free. If Eastern Europe was to be saved from Sovietization during the war, it could only be done through prior military occupation and binding agreements enforced by quid pro quos, where the western powers could withhold their part of the deal in case of Stalin's nonfulfillment. Nadeau's dramatic account rests upon a wealth of American, British, and Soviet manuscripts and published primary sources.

Beginning where Nadeau ends, Wood and Jones present the first comprehensive account of the origins of the cold war in more than a decade. In contrast to Nadeau they see the division of Europe between East and West as inescapable, given the mutually exclusive interests of the two sides. Attempting a synthesis of orthodox, revisionist, postrevisionist, and corporatist scholarship, their evidence best supports an orthodox or realist interpretation of the cold war. Maintaining that in the late 1940s, Congress, the White House, and the American people perceived that the Soviet Union despite its weakness was bent on world domination; they failed to recognize that Stalin, a consummate pragmatist, did not want war with the West and that his aggressivness in Eastern Europe and repressiveness at home were as much products of domestic considerations as other factors. The essentially conservative men who ruled the United States and Britain feared Soviet imperialism and felt threatened by communism as a political and economic system. By 1947 the Truman administration perceived the Soviet Union to be directing a global campaign to destroy self-determination, democracy, and capitalism and to substitute communist totalitarianism in their place. American policy makers equated the national interest with the security of the noncommunist world and proclaimed the nation's welfare to be an integral part of that security. Seeking to keep the cold war from developing into a shooting war, American strategy sought to harmonize means with ends, while tacitly recognizing Soviet spheres of influence. Seeking to contain perceived Soviet aggression in the Near East and Western Europe, the Truman administration adopted the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. During the Berlin crisis, the White House even considered using the atomic bomb; but it ultimately adhered to a measured response that was commensurate with the danger.

Solidly researched, clearly written, and enriched by the myriad of memoirs, monographs, and scholarly articles that have appeared in the last decade, Woods and Jones have provided an invaluable guide to one of this century's most important historical phenonmena, perhaps the best guide yet to appear in print. In conclusion, here are two books that ought to be on the shelf of every student, lay person, and scholar interested in the early origins and development of the cold war.

BETTY MILLER UNTERBERGER
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Ethnic Conflict and International Relations *by Stephen Ryan. Brookfield, VT, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1990. 200 pp. $49.95.*

This book is unusually heavy with errors. Broken letters, misspellings, wrong hyphenations, poor grammar abound. Occasionally whole pages are printed twice. Can it be that the publisher permitted no proofreading either at the galley proof stage or at the page proof stage? The reader's annoyance over this technical matter is then further compounded by the author falling between two stools as regards the book's organization. On the one hand, the author wished to write a strongly structured, architectonic, type of book, which is fine. On the other hand, his "narrative" propensities—which are also fine—often get the better of his organizational plans. Thus he permits himself to pursue an interesting, tangential, narrative trail for several paragraphs or a few pages; but then he pulls himself (and the reader) up short with the announcement that (here I paraphrase) this argument (or analysis, or theme) will be pursued further in a later chapter; here we must return to our main line of argument in this chapter. Or, before proceeding with the logically next point here, I interpolate such-and-such an exploration. The reader feels whiplashed and irritated. Since the book has no index, and the table of contents is very broad, the reader has real difficulty in relocating any particular train of facts or points or analysis in the book.

Substantively, the best parts of the book are an opening assessment of the reasons why the community of international relations scholars was late and stingy in recognizing the impact of politicized ethnicity on its own state-centric theories; and a later discussion of the procedures, usually abortive, by which the governments of states have sought to cope with politicized ethnic minorities—from denial, to forced assimilation, to expulsion, to genocide—before finally coming to terms with the need to grope for political, structural, constitutional, and negotiated solutions. The book's motor of analysis, indicated in the title, is the tension between the two contrasting principles to which the contemporary world of international actors is committed: the principle of the self-determination of peoples and nations (which appears to legitimate ethnopolitics in the international arena); and the clashing principle of the sovereignty of states and the impermissability of interfering in their internal jurisdictions (which appears to deny it). The problems of this issue are handled well in the book.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

Chile Under Pinochet: A Nation of Enemies *by Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela. New York, Norton, 1991. 367 pp. $24.95.*

Every journalist and most political scientists would like to have written a book like this. Constable and Valenzuela recount seventeen years of complex Chilean

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political history with enough detail to enlighten specialists and with sufficient drama and suspense to appeal to the general reader. Why did the Chilean middle class abandon its democratic traditions to collaborate for so long with undemocratic rule? How could something good—the basis for economic prosperity—emerge from something as wicked as a military dictatorship? Drawing on extensive contacts with individuals from all strata of society, the authors to a large extent allow the words of Chileans themselves to describe the experience of drastic political and economic change under authoritarian rule.

If ever there was a leader made by circumstances, it must be Augusto Pinochet. According to Constable and Valenzuela, the general was virtually dragged into the coup by the vehement anti-Allende sentiment of other senior officers. None of Pinochet's pre-coup associates perceived him as a rabid rightist; indeed, down to the end, Chile's homegrown fascists heartily despised his economic policies.

Apparently Pinochet viewed no economic doctrine with special favor until, convinced by the intellectual pyrotechnics of Chile's young free-market economists, he made their ideas his own. Whatever credit Pinochet achieves in history will be due to his sponsorship of their economic program of reforms. The authors' review of the statistical evidence suggests that the issue of the social costs of Chile's free market reforms is more complex than many believe. The socioeconomic impact of Pinochet's policies was to improve the health and education of the poorest, even as it pushed many struggling members of the lower middle class further down the social scale.

Political scientists may find this work disappointing in that it focuses great attention on the psychological mechanisms involved in the emergence and consolidation of military rule. For example, in explaining Pinochet's determination to transform the Chilean political system, the authors place great weight on the declining social prestiage and consequent social resentment of the military officer class. Yet the military men came to view political parties with indignation and contempt only after the civilian politicians clearly failed to resolve their differences without calling on the men of arms. What needs explanation is the inability of civilian political elites to avoid destructive forms of competition, which rendered Chile progressively ungovernable.

In apportioning blame for the sixteen-year hiatus in Chile's democratic tradition, Constable and Valenzuela implicitly reprove the middle class for its passivity and for elevating protection of its right to property over democratic norms. But in Chile, as in most of the world, democracy is stable precisely when citizens are not called upon to face harrowing alternatives. The notion that democracy fails in Latin America because citizens have insufficient democratic values has been challenged strongly in recent years by many political science researchers. In the Chilean context, it is belied by behavior of the Constitutional Tribunal, a panel of "conservative regime-appointed jurists" (p. 303), which insisted on fair procedures for the 1988 plebiscite. It is contradicted by the millions of Chileans who registered to vote. Indeed, it is contradicted by the behavior of Pinochet himself, who in assuming the "vulnerable and humiliating existence of a retired dictator,"

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(p. 297) testified, perhaps unexpectedly, to the strength of Chile's democratic traditions.

Members of Chile's political class have had years to meditate on the defects of the pre-1973 political game and to deplore the demagogic excesses and ideological extremism of that time. The inclusion of more of their self-critical assessments would have greatly added to the value of this work for political scientists (although it probably would have bored the general reader). For it is on the depth of the ideological and institutional transformations since 1973 that the fulfillment of Patricio Aylwin's promise to the Chilean people depends: "Never again will our differences convert us into enemies" (p. 316).

RHODA RABKIN
Cornell University

The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process *by D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 286 pp. Cloth, $34.00; paper, $12.95.*

Kiewiet and McCubbins have written a wise and witty essay that will be useful to many political scientists. Its substantive concerns are the role of congressional parties and, somewhat tangentially, the appropriations process. Its analytic concern, the logic of delegation, gives it another dimension of interest, yet diminishes its usefulness on substance.

The authors identify the frequently supposed weakness of congressional parties with abdication of power to committees, the president, or the bureaucracy. Defining abdication as a principal-agent problem, they argue that delegation need not be abdication. They test the abdication hypothesis on the appropriations process, especially the House Appropriations Committee, arguing that who gets money for what is both partisan and measurable. They refine the test as whether the "guardian of the treasury" model of appropriations fits the process worse than a model that posits the majority party as agent. Finally, they discuss other aspects of delegation: are delegations of a budget-preparation role to the budget bureau and of budget execution to agenices evidence of party weakness? They think not.

One can cite only a few of the many valuable points Kiewiet and McCubbins make about authority in federal budgeting, the influence of parties in congressional procedure and policy outcomes, and delegation. Parties delegate because it can serve their interests. The guardian model was always flawed, and the party is a more plausible principal than the House. Partisan concerns pervaded historical battles over appropriations jurisdiction. Chapter 5, on committee and subcommittee assignments, is a superb piece of data analysis—though it mostly shows that neither guardianship nor party-control explain much. Chapter 6, on

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conferences, is one of the best refutations yet of Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast. Chapter 7 demonstrates partisan impact on spending decisions and provides grist for other arguments, such as the political-business cycle debate. The impoundment provisions of the 1974 Act *are* a net loss for Congress, which found a form of delegation that once fit its needs no longer did.

Yet some arguments seem forced. To say "the key rationale" (p. 39) for party organization in Congress is members' investment in the party label contradicts the fact that much of what they do through their party organs is try to smudge the label. The guardian model did not predict self-selection of conservatives to the committee. Nor is it so current as they claim, and I do not think my dissertation (which the authors cite) supports it. The data in Chapter 6 hardly shows that the majority party is the beneficiary of conference committees (though it's an interesting thought).

Because of the way they pose questions, the answers Kiewiet and McCubbins find might not have the implications they suggest. If the guardian model is wrong, a partisan model still might not be right. Parties might be weak because of difficulty forming, not enforcing, preferences. Power over committees need not be understood in principal-agent form; the full House could be just as important as the party, simply because the need to pass legislation constrains committee entrepreneurship. Since "agent" appropriators are paid by control over district benefits, they have incentives to satisfy both party and chamber on policy matters.

These objections mean only that this book is not, and is not meant to be, a basic text. Its significant data and arguments, fine writing, and original analysis should enlighten and engage any professor or graduate student interested in American politics, legislatures, budgeting, or formal theory.

JOSEPH WHITE
The Brookings Institution

The Feminization of Poverty: Only in America? *edited by Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg and Eleanor Kremen. New York, Praeger, 1990. 231 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $15.95.*

This important and informative cross-national study begins with what might seem to be a paradox: as the women's movement flourished in the 1960s and 1970s and American women entered the labor force in unprecedented numbers, millions of women were falling into poverty. Goldberg, Kremen, and their coauthors examine the causes of what has come to be known as the feminization of poverty and raise the question of whether this phenomenon is unique to the United States or whether it exists in other industrialized countries. In each society—the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Sweden, Poland, and European Russia—the authors examine labor market factors; policies to promote the labor market

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equality of women; social welfare benefits or government income transfers; and demographic factors such as rates of divorce, remarriage, and teenage pregnancy. Finally, the authors offer some thoughts on a social and economic policy that would reduce the numbers of women living in poverty in the United States.

Much has, of course, changed in several of these countries since this research was completed. A conservative government has been elected in Sweden, and it is as yet unclear to what extent social and economic policies will be modified. The Soviet Union is in the midst of cataclysmic change, and it is certainly unclear how far that society will go in moving toward a market economy. The changes in Poland have been ongoing, and it is still difficult to predict the impact of these changes on the status of women.

Despite these rapidly changing conditions, the authors draw some valuable conclusions about the economic status of women in all seven countries. While it is not uniquely American and could occur in most, if not all, advanced industrialized countries, the feminization of poverty, they found, is most pronounced in the United States. They learned, furthermore, that women's lives were characterized by economic inequality in all seven countries and that women are most likely to be poor when there are both insufficient efforts to reduce poverty through labor market or social welfare policies and where single motherhood is widespread. These two conditions are clearly present in the United States. Single motherhood is nearly as prevalent in Sweden as it is in the United States, but because of more than forty years of sustained labor market and social policies, Sweden has achieved a relatively low rate of poverty among female-headed families. In contrast, Japan also has a very low rate of women living in poverty; but this is not due to labor market policy, since women remain extremely disadvantaged. It is due, rather, to the very low rate of single motherhood—about one-fourth the rate of Sweden and the United States.

The observations about Canada are noteworthy, particularly at a time when the Canadian health care system is increasingly viewed as a model for the United States. As the authors point out, Canadian women suffer from relatively high rates of unemployment, a significant wage gap, and occupational segregation. Canada has had, however, a wide range of social welfare programs but seems to be moving toward more restrictive social policies, which may offer less protection for single mothers in the future.

As the U.S. poverty rate continues to climb and millions of women and their children suffer the harsh consequences of inadequate housing, health care, nutrition and education, *The Feminization of Poverty: Only in America?* provides important insights and recommendations for economic and social policy. It is an valuable resource for students, academics, and policy makers concerned with the crucial and troubling problem of the feminization of poverty.

RUTH SIDEL
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Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution *by Sylvia Snowiss. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 228 pp. $25.00.*

It is beyond dispute that Chief Justice John Marshall had an extraordinary impact on the development of American constitutionalism. In this well researched and well written volume, Sylvia Snowiss traces the beginnings of judicial review and the law of the constitution to present an in-depth and somewhat revisionist perspective on Marshall. She begins with the period before the revolution and continues through Marshall's Supreme Court term, identifying three key periods: from independence to *The Federalist* No. 78 – where there was basic controversy over the notion of judicial review; from *The Federalist* No. 78 to *Marbury v. Madison* – where a coherent defense of judicial review developed; and from *Marbury* to the end of Marshall's term – with the emergence of judicial supremacy and the beginnings of the United States Constitution's status as "supreme ordinary law."

As for judicial review, Snowiss shows that at the formation of the union there was an emerging consensus that courts had some role in refusing to enforce legislation. It occurred in those situations where to enforce legislation would result in a clear violation of constitutional rights. In a careful analysis of cases and commentaries, she shows Marshall doggedly – "singleminded deviousness" is how she describes it – enhancing the scope of review and narrowly circumscribing the authority of other government actors. That development leads to the point where the scope of judicial review is so inclusive that the Court becomes the preeminent determinant of whether acts by states, the federal legislature, or the chief executive accord to the requirements of the Constitution. From the point where the standard of judicial review had been whether other government actors were "clearly wrong," Marshall extended the scope of review to the point where judges were free to substitute their own judgments, limited only by the political obstacles that courts might have to surmount.

The second key aspect of the work revolves around the nature of the Constitution itself. Here Snowiss's analysis is most intriguing. While most believe that Marshall had an enlarged view of the constitution – recalling *McCullock v. Maryland's* "it is a Constitution we are expounding" – Snowiss contends that Marshall's definition was narrowly confined to a text. She charges that he transformed constitutionalism from the "enforcement of explicit fundamental law, anchored in natural rights, into routine application and enforcement of supreme written law." For his contemporaries and the founders, she argues that the Constitution went well beyond the text of the Constitution. She contends that early courts and commentaries did not limit the American Constitution, but rather, in the British way, saw the meaning as much more encompassing. In several situations, they argued, the Constitution's enumeration of rights was incomplete, awaiting enlargement of rights, much as is done with natural law. Marshall, she argues, painstakingly and without revealing his motives, transformed the scholarship about the Constitution to a form of statutory interpretation. He did it by powerful opinion writing, dominance of the Supreme Court, and various techniques such

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as the elimination of seriatim opinion writing and striving to reduce dissents and concurrences. In this way, the Constitution of the United States is only a document and not the richer tradition that encourages the amplification of citizen rights. The Constitution is more like ordinary law than fundamental law. She argues that the "loss of access to the original meaning of fundamental law has left us with no conception of the Constitution but that of supreme ordinary law."

The implications for Snowiss's analysis are profound. She argues that a broader reading of the Constitution would have helped develop citizen rights in areas such as Japanese-American relocations during World War II and the denial of basic rights and protections to blacks for almost a century after Reconstruction. It is hard, however, to concede this point given the fact that, if anything, courts were at the forefront of guarantees and were limited by their political perspective rather than by the search for intent in the text of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is worth pondering whether a Supreme Court in the years ahead could better be able to expound a Constitution without being limited by the text of a document and persistent claims of the intent of the Framers. It is, to be sure, more limiting to apply rights enunciated more than two centuries ago rather than to find rights in the spirit of constitutionalism. Snowiss concedes that it is not an either/or proposition, arguing that scholars like Alexander Bickel and judges like John Marshall Harlan have given balance to the task of respecting both judicial restraint and bold vision in their constitutionalism.

Snowiss further suggests another real issue, although she does not address it. Limitations on judicial review, if accompanied by a stronger sense of the meaning of the American Constitution, will invest other political actors with a more developed responsibility to find their own meaning for our fundamental law—our constitution, if you will. In a sense, constitutional law will not simply be the work of judicial review in defining rights according to a written text. Constitutional law will be the work of the entire body politic in a search for the affirmation of those enduring and developing principles that shape our political system. It represents a fuller—and fundamentally more participatory—rule of law.

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Yeshiva University

"We Have A Duty": The Supreme Court and the Watergate Tapes Litigation *by Howard Ball. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1990. 184 pp. $39.95.*

Judicial intervention ordering Richard M. Nixon to surrender tape recordings ultimately forced the president from office. This volume retells the saga of *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) "*from the perspective* of the justices" (emphasis in original, p. xi), using special materials such as the docket books, conference notes, and files of Justices William J. Brennan and William O. Douglas,

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interviews and correspondence with several justices, and an insightful interview with Phillip A. Lacovara, special assistant to Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski, as well as a broad array of secondary sources.

Fascinating is the intra-Court consideration of Jaworski's petition for expedited review directly from the district court to the Supreme Court. Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell apparently influenced Chief Justice Warren Burger to call a hurried conference on the petition. Only Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall initially favored expedited review; among its opponents was Nixon's long-time enemy, Douglas. But Brennan's forceful argument that Supreme Court intervention was needed to help the nation resolve the Watergate crisis persuaded six of his eight colleagues (Justice William Rehnquist recused) to grant the petition, only the sixth in the Court's history and the first since the Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, in 1952.

The central tale, however, is the intra-Court maneuvering that shaped the final unanimous opinion. Chief Justice Burger assigned the opinion to himself; but pressed by time, he circulated various sections of the opinion as they were written in rough draft. Burger's drafts were unsatisfactory to his colleagues. Other justices, "in almost every segment of the opinion, either preceded him in the drafting of the section or substantively modified the language and direction that Burger had taken" (p. 116). Consequently, the finished opinion included a statement of facts drafted by Justice Harry Blackmun, a section on appealability by Douglas, and language on the applicability of Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Justice Byron White. Burger's drafts became, however, the basis for the final decision establishing a constitutional doctrine of executive privilege, even though pressure from others forced him to abandon arguments that executive privilege was absolute with respect to certain "core functions" (p. 123–124) of the president and that a claim of executive privilege could be overridden only by a showing of "compelling need" (p. 125).

Ball sharply criticizes the constitutional doctrine of executive privilege established in the Nixon case. There is no basis in the text of the Constitution, he argues; and the Court simply failed to seek any evidence of the Framers' intent. Yet Ball characterizes the Court's decision as "a dramatic example of interpretive judicial review" (p. 147). This is at odds with his definition of interpretivism as judging "constrained . . . by the words of the Constitution and/or by the intent of the framers" (p. 67).

Ball heaps disdain on Chief Justice Warren Burger. On the initial draft of *United States v. Nixon*, "Burger's work was extremely poor" (p. 116), and in a remark attributed to Justice Potter Stewart, "would have got a grade of D in law school" (p. 136). Because of "the stubbornness and ineptitude of the chief justice" the final decision lacked the "one strong hand that has molded the outstanding opinions in our legal history" (p. 135).

Yet the decision in favor of presidential power occurred because a majority, "especially two Nixon appointees (Burger and Powell) had insisted that the presidency had to have the constitutional prerogative" (p. 143). Despite Ball's criticism,

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the chief justice emerges as the most influential force in shaping the constitutional doctrine of executive privilege established in *United States v. Nixon*.

Although useful for its insights into the internal deliberations of the Court, this volume writes again the history of an already well known case and does so slightly off center because of the author's overly intrusive views about executive privilege and Chief Justice Burger.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America *by Nicolas Lemann. New York, Knopf, 1991. 410 pp. $24.95.*

Nicholas Lemann's book is the dramatically told story of the uprooting and dispersal of southern black sharecropper society after World War II, as black sharecroppers abandoned their traditional economic and social base in America to seek jobs and new lives in the urban industrial centers of the North. In a loosely drawn three-part construction, Lemann moves between Clarksdale, Mississippi; Chicago; and Washington, DC to depict the cultural, economic, and political forces at work in the period. He traces how technological change in the world's richest cotton country—the Mississippi delta—ripped black cotton workers from the dismal plantation culture in which they lived and worked, pushing them northward for jobs. There, as Lemann tells it, they evolved into the huge dysfunctional urban underclass that we see today. To epitomize the ordeal of this great black migration, the author follows the fortunes of one Ruby Lee Daniels and her extended family and nonfamily network as they resettled from Clarksdale to Chicago and back again. The third leg of Lemann's account is the national government's failure through mismanagement of the War on Poverty to respond to what he sees as the pathological underclass culture that grew up in the northern ghettos.

I liked this book for the author's earnest commitment to renewing national interest and activism in service of the poor. Yet, it falls short on other counts. A contributing editor to *The Atlantic*, Lemann provides an outstanding narrative based in large part on interesting material gathered from hundreds of interviews and appropriate written records, including the oral history collections of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon presidential libraries. Lemann's style is poised between serious journalism and serious scholarship, and therein lies the problem. The author glosses over theoretical and practical material, ignoring analytical subtleties and distinctions. The anecdotal evidence that he handles so skillfully promotes microanalysis at the expense of a broader political and technical analysis that would have served him better. Lemann's treatment of the barriers to black employment is a case in point. A strong advocate of an increased government role in jobs programs for the poor, the author fails adequately to situate

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the plight of his jobless black subjects within the larger economic picture of the 1960s. In 1963, when the politics of antipoverty policy making were being played out in Washington, there was a nationwide black job crisis. Somewhat glibly, Lemann describes the personalities and conflicts that circulated around the creation of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the omnibus legislation for the War on Poverty; in particular, he does a disservice to Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and his forceful advocacy of jobs policies. He could, however, also have offered a more thorough analysis of the larger issue of unemployment. Structural unemployment needs to be addressed, as do the arguments between economists in the Council of Economic Advisers and labor market experts in the Department of Labor favoring measures to combat structural unemployment. The outcome of these debates had important consequences for jobless blacks.

The strength of *The Promised Land* is that Lemann gives the great migration the significance it deserves and so far has failed to get. He tells perceptively the story of sharecroppers and their families and the extent of their misery and dependence. And he depicts how impossible it was to imagine alternatives under the economic and social arrangements available to these desperately poor people. At the same time, however, he incorrectly links the culture of the black southern migrants to the pathology he sees in the northern ghetto. As William Julius Wilson (*The Truly Disadvantaged*) and others have demonstrated, southern blacks who migrated North did better than their northern born counterparts. Lemann aptly credits Lyndon Johnson for his role in the struggle for racial justice, though he could have offered further evidence from the black oral histories that he undoubtedly came across at the presidential libraries.

Lemann's recommendations are sound ones. He observes that any undertaking that can hope to affect the nation's sinking inner-city populations will have to be immense. It is imperative that the nation take on the problem of urban poverty, which given its magnitude is a job for the federal government. He speaks out against the current trend among concerned poverty experts to cloak antipoverty policy in the guise of universalism. Lemann persuasively argues that such attempts to bury the real nature of the crisis miss a critical point: they lose the sense of moral urgency needed to engage the cause of the black ghetto poor. Lemann once said elsewhere that he would trade his favorite antipoverty program for a contemporary version of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* that would force the public to confront the crisis of urban poverty. This would still be a good trade today.

JUDITH RUSSELL
Barnard College

Dual City: Restructuring New York *edited by John H. Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1991. 477 pp. $39.95.*

This book is the second volume on New York City in a projected series sponsored by a committee of the Social Science Research Council. The initial 1988 volume,

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Power, Culture, and Place: Essays on New York City, examined the historical patterns of New York's political, economic, and cultural development. *Dual City* probes the political, social, and economic character of the postindustrial transformation of New York City during the last several decades.

It might be thought that because New York City is so different from other American cities in size, politics, and the compexity of its social organization that it has little relevance to the rest of urban America. Not so. The various contributors to this volume convincingly describe how New York City is undergoing a social, political, and economic restructuring in response to postindustrial changes of a global nature. They attempt to explore the extent to which this process of change is creating a "dual city" characterized by increasing polarization in respect to income, race, culture, politics, social class, neighborhood, and other characteristics.

The editors conclude that the dual city metaphor is flawed as an accurate description of what is happening to New York City and its people, even though they do find powerful polarizing tendencies. The distribution of incomes has grown more unequal, the numbers of poor have grown as upper-income groups have fled to the suburbs, and yuppies compete with less advantaged and typically nonwhite groups for neighborhood space. In addition, other forms of inequality based on race, gender, and social position are found to abound in New York City.

Nevertheless, the contributors find that the complexity of the city's inequality defies simple dichotomy between black vs. white, yuppies vs. the underclass, Manhattan vs. the outer boroughs, and the like. In chapters that are rich in empirical detail the analysts document how the two New Yorks are actually closely intertwined, and that social divisions of class, race, ethnicity, and gender do not simply overlap and reinforce each other. For example, racial differences do not explain the growing income inequality that is found in New York City. Instead of lagging uniformly behind whites, many blacks have joined the ranks of the city's middle class, increasing inequality among blacks. Further, disproportionate black access to jobs in government and social services has enabled them to make greater economic gains than Latinos, who have been concentrated more in declining sectors of the city economy.

Much other evidence renders the notion of a dual city inaccurate. For instance, ethnic conflict among the poor is at least as salient as gentrification as a source of neighborhood animosity. Gender as a source of income inequality is blunted in part by the growth of a large professional female workforce; similarly, white working professional women suffer separation from their children as do the poorer minority women whom they employ to render child care. Political inequality in the city has now been challenged by a new political coalition that comprises many previously excluded groups since David Dinkins's mayoral victory.

This volume's greatest strength is the almost uniformly high quality of the empirical analysis in the various chapters—they are thematic, careful, and exhaustive. The book can be faulted, however, for the somewhat unconvincing

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attempt by the editors to provide an interpretation of the social dualism that is uncovered by the research. They suggest that postindustrial New York takes the form of a contrast between an organized core of cohesive professional and managerial elites who are politically dominant and a disorganized periphery of poorer, more socially subordinate groups. Yet there is not much evidence in the various chapters to support the idea that there is a very cohesive elite at work; indeed, the volume conspicuously lacks a single chapter on the business and financial elites that are thought to be so important. Finally, the general pattern of social stratification and organization/disorganization noted by the editors hardly seems a product of postindustrialization. Did not this pattern of stratification exist a hundred years ago?

Nevertheless, the contributors and editors pull together to make this a rich and stimulating book. It is essential reading to all who are interested in the politics, economics, and social life of the postindustrial city.

PAUL KANTOR
Fordham University

City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles *by Mike Davis. New York, Verso Press, 1990. 462 pp. $24.95.*

Mike Davis's book is the most provocative work on Los Angeles politics since the heyday of Carey McWilliams in the late 1940s. Davis tells the tale of the region's unparalleled century of growth—and of its powerful, repressive underbelly—in unusual ways, befitting his varied background as an historian, cultural critic, and journalist. The author's analysis of the "Great Gatsby of American cities" takes into account far more than the usual players in urban growth politics—real estate developers, bankers, newspaper publishers, politicians, and planners. Thrust into unaccustomed limelight are the city's intellectuals, architects, minorities, police, and Catholic church.

City of Quartz starts with culture, not political economy—the fashioning by intellectuals of the city's image in print and film. The author trenchantly dissects L.A.'s cultural status as both the utopia *and* dystopia of advanced capitalism. Davis's real concern is with the utopia makers—the generations of intellectuals willingly suborned to boosterism by the city's all-powerful growth coalition.

Architects also serve as handmaidens of the downtown elite, systematically destroying public space in the interests of corporate and residential security. For Davis, downtown L.A.'s so-called renaissance during the Thomas Bradley years has produced a fortress city, effectively walling off the wealthy, new corporate/financial center from the city's immigrants and poor. Los Angeles' growth makers now face a challenge straight out of "Bladerunner": a mushrooming non-Anglo underclass. Davis critiques the conventional wisdom that the Bradley administration has assimilated the city's minorities. He points out (correctly in my judgment)

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how little minority economic incorporation has occurred under twenty years of biracial coalition rule. Threatened from below, the downtown elite has enlisted the police (for blacks) and the Catholic church (for Latinos) as potent instruments of social control.

Davis offers a compelling dialectical analysis both of the evolution of L.A.'s power structure and of recent slow-growth challenges to it by wealthy homeowners' groups. In the pre-World War II era, the downtown growth elite's own development strategies—real estate speculation and branch-plant location—proved its partial undoing. Spreading subdivisions radically decentralized the city, weakening the economic and political hold of downtown. Industrialization pluralized—and unionized—the region's once fiercely open-shop economy.

Likewise, the elitism of the wealthy Valley homeowners' associations that spearheaded the Proposition 13 tax revolt and now challenge high-density development has proved their undoing. In response, developers have successfully embraced populism, enlisting renters and minorities in a pro-growth coalition blessed with deep pockets and electoral strength.

Davis is a native traveler journeying into the past of his own city. He ends—as he begins—on a sentimental note: utopian roads not taken. These abandoned futures range from the short-lived desert socialist commune of Llano del Rio to the ruins of the Kaiser steel plant in Fontana—a prototype of welfare capitalism for the working class.

The book is least convincing as a political history of the pre-World War II era. Early L.A.'s power structure was not nearly as monolithic and *Los Angeles Times*-controlled as Davis would have us believe. Powerful and independent public bureaucracies such as the Department of Water and Power were at the core of the region's early growth coalition, successfully opposing the arch-conservative *Times*' privatization schemes for water and power.

City of Quartz is passionate, visionary, muscularly argued, and politically knowing. At its core, Davis's book is a radical planner's Jeremiad. It is an anatomy of failure that chronicles the transformation of the dream city of Progressive reformers, real estate developers, and Hollywood producers into a postmodern Bladerunner nightmare that is the dark underside of Pacific Rim boosterism.

STEVEN P. ERIE
University of California, San Diego

Educational Renaissance: Our Schools at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century *by Marvin Cetron and Margaret Gayle. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 352 pp. $21.95.*

This book examines current issues in education and makes predictions about future developments. Few of these predictions are unusual, based as they are on

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current trends, although some are dubious. The fundamental weakness of the book is its failure to discuss any one of these problems in depth. Questions of analysis and prediction aside, the book is a readable review of current questions in education, one which could introduce the public to certain issues confronting schools in the coming decade. Even popular thinking about educational problems, however, ought to go beyond the analysis offered in this volume.

The basic premise of the book is that there is a great promise in the current wave of school reform. The authors cite a wide range of reform efforts in different areas of education, most of which are familiar to scholars in education. The various plans allowing for students to choose among different schools from Minnesota to California are described and deftly evaluated. Cetron and Gayle recognize that choice is no panacea, but still present it as a promising reform direction. They do not cite academic studies of the issue. The authors also paint positive pictures of school-based management and such curricular reform concepts as the Paideia program and Theodore Sizer's Essential Schools movement without exploring any of these innovations at length. Although they hint at problems in Sizer's program, their remarks are difficult to interpret. In the end, although one has the impression that a good deal is being done, the book offers little in the way of systematic evaluation. Because the authors do not emphasize the minute scale of these efforts in relation to the totality of American education, it is not clear just *what* is being accomplished by school reformers today.

A wide range of other reform trends are treated in similar fashion. Vocational education is described as an important area of curricular development, one essential to the future of the economy (despite being fundamentally at odds with the Paideia program and other reform programs). New directions in teacher training are mentioned, along with evidence of greater interest in education from the business community. But neither of these issues is subjected to serious analysis. The usual predictions are made about computers in the schools, but there is little examination of the many curricular and instructional issues connected to their use.

The book contains some rather extended discussions of exemplary school districts in various parts of the country, but it fails to explain why reform seems to succeed in these instances rather than others. There seems to be an implicit emphasis on leadership at the superintendent level as a primary mode of explanation. Even this, however, is not examined carefully. The authors tip their hats to the politics of education, acknowledging that community support is essential to reform. But they do not address the most basic questions in the politics of education, those which face the school systems that suffer debilitating problems. As a consequence, the book's positive assessment of the impact of reform will be of little reassurance to educators in the nation's major cities, where poverty, crime, racial tensions, and budget constraints present enormous obstacles to improvements in schooling.

Cetron and Gayle offer suggestions for improving schools that most educators would find quite palatable (raising standards, extending the school year, spending more money). I think they are essentially correct in arguing that American schools

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are not as bad as many people (judging from opinion polls) and the press seem to believe. They do not, however, offer compelling evidence that dramatic changes are imminent in the schools, particularly those in greatest need.

JOHN L. RURY
DePaul University

What Older Americans Think: Interest Groups and Aging Policy *by Christine L. Day. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990. 164 pp. $24.95.*

When the history of the twentieth century in the United States is written, surely one of the most dramatic demographic changes that will be described will be the increase in the proportion of the population who live to old age. In 1900, 4.6 percent of the American population was aged 65 and over, by 1950 the percent had risen to 8, and by 1988 it had risen still further to 12.3. By the year 2020, demographers project that fully 17 percent of the American population will be elderly. The elderly are not only a rapidly growing proportion of the U.S. population but also an increasingly powerful force in the political arena. Christine L. Day writes about one very important aspect of senior citizen politics – political interest groups.

Day's book is important in that it puts the evolution of interest groups for older Americans in theoretical, historical, and political perspective. By the late 1980s there were more than one thousand aging-based groups in the United States, not counting local chapters of national organizations. How did these groups emerge? Why do they attract members? Do they really represent older adults? What impact have they had on the development of social policies for older people? Day attempts to place these questions in the context of what is known theoretically about interest groups.

She examines the controversy about which of two related perspectives best explains the role of interest groups in old-age politics. The social movement perspective stresses the importance of collective action on the part of both elderly and nonelderly groups to forward their mutual interests. The interest group pluralism perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes competition among groups, with each group seeking its own favorable political outcome; thus, elderly persons might work in their own self-interest at the expense of other groups. Which perspective best describes what happened?

By examining the history of the senior movement, Day shows the ways in which each perspective has explanatory power at different stages in the evolution of elderly interest groups. For example, prior to 1935 old-age politics are best described by the coalition formation framework in that the political gains of older

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people were achieved both by organizations of older people and by other groups and individuals working to help them. In the late 1980s, Day sees coalition building beginning to resurface in importance as Generations United, a coalition of groups representing children and the elderly, attempts to counter claims from organizations such as Americans for Generational Equity, which contend that the old are receiving too many benefits at the expense of the young.

Having established the strength of current senior mass membership organizations, Day probes the extent to which they will survive, especially given both the increasing diversity of older people and the "free rider" problem that most interest groups face. She argues for survival based on three general factors that seem from past research to promote group maintenance—material, purposive, and solidarity incentives. The major age-based organizations (American Association of Retired Persons, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the Gray Panthers, the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and the National Alliance of Senior Citizens) are adept at providing all three of these—material incentives in the form of newsletters, insurance discounts, and travel clubs; solidarity incentives such as opportunities to meet and be with other members; and purposive incentives like supporting political causes.

Despite its excellent overview of the growth of elderly interest groups from their beginnings to their current position as major policy actors, Day's book is not without its weaknesses. First, the title is misleading. This book is not really about "what older Americans think." One chapter reviews the results of survey findings from the 1970s and early 1980s in order both to describe the political attitudes of the elderly in general and of various subgroups among the elderly and to examine how these attitudes differ from those of younger age groups. The larger purpose of including this chapter in the book seems to be to understand how well old-age-based interest groups represent old persons. I am hard pressed to understand why Day did not use the subhead "Interest Groups and Aging Policy" as her book title, for it better describes what the book is about. Did some editor think more readers will be gained by the catchier *What Older Americans Think*?

Second, elite opinion data collected for the book is underreported and underdiscussed. In Chapter 1, Day says that part of the data for the book comes from interviews with fifty-four leaders and staff members of interest groups, congressional staff members, and administrative agency officials dealing with aging policy. Other than a footnote (p. 10) listing which particular interest groups and congressional committees are represented among interviewees, Day gives no details about how the interviews were done, when they were done, what type of instrument was used, and who conducted them. She presents no systematic analysis of the interview data; instead, references to the interviews and quotations are scattered infrequently throughout the book.

This was not an easy book to write. Older people are a heterogeneous group. So are their organizations. Although most push for expanding or at least maintaining programs for elderly adults, one—the National Alliance of Senior Citizens

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(NASC)—urges cutbacks in federal programs for the old! Day tries to do justice to the heterogeneity, while weaving a story that for the most part has clarity and integrity.

FAY LOMAX COOK
Northwestern University

On Reading the Constitution *by Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991. 117 pp. $18.95.*

This short work offers no grand theory or final word about how to read the Constitution. The authors prefer to think of it as a modest contribution to an ongoing "constitutional conversation" among scholars and Supreme Court justices. Consequently, much of the argument is in response to what others have written. The authors contend that theirs is a middle position between those who advocate originalism and those who seem more intent on rewriting the Constitution than on reading it. By learning "how the Constitution's text *channels* choice without *eliminating* it" (emphasis in original, p. 33) one can acknowledge that judges make choices about constitutional meaning when they decide cases without concluding that judges are free to impose their predilections.

The current constitutional conversation, the authors believe, reveals two interpretive fallacies: "dis-integration," by which interpreters focus on individual clauses without considering how those clauses relate to the whole Constitution, and "hyper-integration," by which interpreters read the Constitution as if it espouses a unitary theory. The authors' middle way grounds judicial choice in specific constitutional provisions while paying attention to the broad relationship among provisions.

The central conversations, both intellectually and emotionally, are responses to two recent Supreme Court opinions. Contrary to *Bowers v. Hardwick*, the authors argue that the constitutional text does protect homosexual behavior. The Due Process Clause protecting substantive rights, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Ninth Amendment's rule of interpretation combine to provide textual support for unenumerated rights in general; and the First, Third, and Fourth Amendments combine to establish privacy as one of the Constitution's "tacit postulates" (p. 43).

How does one decide whether that unenumerated privacy right precludes Georgia's sodomy laws? In *Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, Justice Antonin Scalia proposed that the Court treat as fundamental only those rights that are grounded in historical tradition. The authors disagree: there are practical and analytical problems in knowing which of the competing traditions is *the* tradition that determines whether a right is fundamental. The better approach, they argue, is to discern the "central value" of the applicable constitutional clause by drawing from the arguments in the legal precedents a unifying principle that applies to the case at

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hand. That still involves judicial choice, especially in deciding "*at what level of generality should the right previously protected, and the right currently claimed, be described*" (emphasis in original, p. 73). But it is a choice that follows from the constitutional text. Equally important, that method allows bold innovation in constitutional law. Applied to *Hardwick*, it would result in a right to consensual intimacy that encompasses homosexual relations.

This is a provocative, well argued book that demonstrates how clever thinkers can make reasonable arguments for constitutionalizing rights that others regard as political in nature. The authors work hard at demonstrating that there is nothing radical in the way they declare fundamental rights. They distance themselves from constitutional commentators on both the right and left, and they join the growing chorus of writers who appeal to Justice J. M. Harlan's defense of marital privacy in *Poe v. Ullman* as proof that the Constitution contains a bevy of unenumerated rights. Not surprisingly, none of those commentators, including Tribe and Dorf, notes the degree to which Harlan's due process-common law reasoning in *Poe* and elsewhere relies on the historical traditions the authors deny. Nor do they pay attention to Harlan's explicit caveat in *Poe* that the privacy right probably does not extend to homosexual behavior. In short, they pay homage to a single Harlan opinion, but the method they offer in this book *sub silentio* rejects Harlan's constitutional interpretation in favor of the jurisprudence of William Brennan.

JOHN MOELLER
Luther College

The Justice from Beacon Hill: The Life and Times of Oliver Wendell Holmes *by Liva Baker. New York, HarperCollins, 1991. 783 pp. $29.95.*

At the fiftieth reunion of the Harvard Class of 1861, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that "Life is painting a picture, not doing a sum." It became one of his quotable aphorisms. For a successful biography, however, an author must both do a sum *and* paint a picture. In other words there must be a combination of in-depth research and a selection and interpretation of evidence. Liva Baker's study of Holmes is based on a comprehensive reading of primary and secondary sources, which she has used to portray the face of a man full of expression, a nearly complete Holmes. This is not an easy task. Holmes was at times ambiguous, enigmatic, contradictory, even unpredictable. He was also ambitious, self-centered, and intolerant of others. Baker does not back away from noting Holmes's human frailities, but as this is far from a debunking biography she also sees in him bravery (in war and at the law), uncommon intelligence, a voracious appetite for work, and a keen understanding of what government, particularly in America, was all about. Add to these qualities a quick wit, a genuine flair for expression (oral and written), and a sense of duty, whatever the cost. These

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various characteristics had much to do with his career as soldier, scholar, and judge. The great strength of the book is, therefore, a graceful melding of character and career, an approach especially effective in the treatment of Holmes's work while on the Supreme Court. Wisely, Baker has devoted half of her study to the justiceship in what emerges as the most authoritative biography of Holmes to date.

Holmes's life is well known: Boston Brahmin, Harvard educated, thrice wounded infantry officer in the Civil War, friend of William and Henry James, and Henry Adams among many, author of *The Common Law*, law school professor, state jurist before becoming an associate justice of the Supreme Court where he served for thirty years and became famous for his dissents and his defense of civil liberties. Liva Baker neatly dissects each phase of the Holmes saga, often accepting what others have discovered in Holmes, frequently offering fresh interpretations, and adding new ideas while maintaining an even hand whether in praise or blame. In places it might be thought she has taken unwarranted liberties—for example, by discussing the possibility that Holmes was impotent—but she keeps her speculation well in hand.

Far more important is the contribution Baker makes for an enhanced appreciation of Holmes as a human being who had the law as a calling. Holmes argued in one instance that though he did not believe that human rights were absolute, he hoped he was as ready as any man to die defending them. He had seen this principle played out during the Civil War in the life and death of his close friend, Henry Abbott. Abbott was a Copperhead who did not believe in the war's purposes, but he was ready to fight and die for the cause, nonetheless. And die he did, much to Holmes's sorrow. Baker shows that what might appear to be double talk in the abstract was real enough in the concrete. This kind of insight and resolution of Holmes's complex psychology is a consistent part of Baker's study.

Summing up, Baker has written an intensely human study of Holmes, one suffused with empathy and understanding. Her treatment of the labyrithine ways of the law is expert and her grasp of history sure. This is a book for the general reader of politics, history, and law and for the specialist as well.

DAVID H. BURTON
Saint Joseph's University

Original Intent: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Course of American Church/State Relations *by Derek Davis. Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books, 1991. 202 pp. $24.95.*

Why do we persist in trying to understand William H. Rehnquist's decision making from a purely legal perspective? Most studies (my own included) of the current chief justice of the United States Supreme Court reflect an innocence of

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legal realism, political jurisprudence, and the growing influence of the critical legal studies movement. Derek Davis's examination of Rehnquist's positions on the religion clauses is no exception. In *Original Intent* Davis analyzes Rehnquist's opinions and votes in terms of "distinct doctrines that guide [the justice] in his decision-making" (p. 14).

Although Davis focuses on Rehnquist's decision making, the author's stated purpose is to provide a "better understanding of the fundamental dynamics that shape the direction of church-state relations in America today" (p. xvii). Consequently, Davis considers the historical context of the religion clauses, the development of judicial doctrine, and the policy implications of the Supreme Court's recent decisions. Perhaps in part because of the breadth of enterprise, there are a number of problems with *Original Intent*.

Consideration of Davis's treatment of constitutional interpretation, Rehnquist's judicial philosophy, and the results of the Supreme Court's recent decisions—three themes that run through *Original Intent*—will illustrate some of those problems. First, Davis reduces the vast complexities of constitutional interpretation to a choice between two models—strict constructionism and evolutionism. His treatment is simplistic and apparently innocent of most of the scholarly literature. Moreover, many readers may recall how effectively Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously* demonstrated the vacuousness of the term strict constructionism. Thus, it is surprising that Davis employs the label, and it is astonishing that he relies on Dworkin for support. Rather than refer to Dworkin's discussion of strict constructionism, however, Davis refers to Dworkin's explanation of positivism, leading the reader to believe that the author is not aware that the two are not synonymous. Subsequently, Davis ceases to use the term strict constructionism and adopts instead the language of original intent.

Davis devotes much of his book to an examination of the intent of the Framers concerning the religion clauses; he compares various understandings of the purposes and scope of the clauses. Rehnquist's understanding of the historical documents, which has led to his narrow interpretation of both the free exercise and establishment clauses, is incomplete, according to Davis. Always lurking beneath the surface, the problems inherent in relying on original intent to interpret constitutional provisions never receive explicit attention. Instead, Davis seems to assume that it is possible to discern the intent of the Framers and that interpreters in the twentieth century must use that intent rather than evolve principles of justice as their guide. The constraints of that approach are readily apparent. Davis contends that Rehnquist's position is based on an incomplete or incorrect understanding of the intent of the Framers. Still, we are left with the mistaken notion that there is a correct reading of the Framers' intent.

A second theme that is central to *Original Intent* is Davis's assertion that Rehnquist's decision making is based on a legal philosophy. His opinions and votes emerge from his understanding of the meaning of the religion clauses, his perception of the role of the states in the federal system, and his conception of the role of the judiciary in the American political system. Davis seemingly never

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gives a thought to the possibility that Rehnquist makes his commitment to implementing a conservative policy agenda—essentially one of increasing the power of both state and federal governments in relation to the individual—with the language of constitutional interpretation.

Finally, policy seems to be an important aspect of Davis's study. Separation of church and state, he alleges, will lead to increased independence and strength of religious institutions as well as to the protection of religious liberty. Additionally, an expansive interpretation of the free exercise clause will protect religious minorities. The positions that Rehnquist has taken with regard to the religion clauses—and the direction in which the Supreme Court appears to be going—will lead toward the destruction of religious liberty.

Considering that dismal prospect plus the evidence that Rehnquist's decision making is based on political considerations rather than constitutional theory, Davis reaches a conclusion that is no less than astounding. He contends that "Rehnquist is . . . a constitutionalist. As a constitutionalist he seeks to examine the Constitution, and with all of his capacities uphold it. No person who has examined William Rehnquist as a man, scholar, and jurist holding this nation's highest judicial office could ever assert that he seeks to do anything less. In so doing, he serves well his office and his country" (p. 170).

SUE DAVIS
University of Delaware

The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles *edited by Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1991. 513 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $19.95.*

Few institutions are as important as the U.S. Supreme Court, yet as a collective body whose members intermittently assume office for life rather than for fixed terms, it is more difficult to describe than some other governmental institutions. Lamb and Halpern make an important contribution to an understanding of the Court in this study of the justices during the years (1966–1986) that Warren Burger was chief justice. Altogether, twelve men and one woman served during this period. Each is treated in a separate chapter of the book, each written by a different scholar, with the first and last chapters (both by Lamb and Halpern) putting the Burger Court in context and assessing its likely place in history.

Of the thirteen justices surveyed, some like Hugo Black, William Douglas, and John Marshall Harlan were more associated with the controversies of the Warren Court than with those of the Burger era. Others, like Sandra Day O'Connor and William Rehnquist, seem destined to be identified more with the Rehnquist Court than its predecessor. Indeed, Lamb and Halpern argue that the Burger Court may mark a period of transition from the heavy concentration on civil liberties cases to other, largely unspecified, future concerns. They confirm the current

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conventional wisdom that the Burger Court, which rendered its own "activist" decisions (*Roe v. Wade*, for example), did not so much reverse as trim the expansive civil libertarian precedents of the Warren years.

The essayists reflect a diversity of viewpoints almost as varied as the justices they describe. Some, like Howard Ball, Wallace Mendelson, and Jacob Landynski obviously warm to their subjects—Justices Black, Harlan, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. respectively; others, like Beverly Cook—who writes on Justice O'Connor—express reservations. While individual formats differ, most essayists include at least some relevant biographical data, analysis of the justice's judicial philosophy (or lack of it), the justice's ability to work with colleagues, his or her place among the Court's voting coalitions (a point often reinforced by the use of statistics), a discussion of major cases, indications of a justice's consistency or change on the Court, and assessment of the justice's place in history. Sometimes the authors get mired in discussions of individual cases, but overall the essays are lucid, and the collective picture that emerges is coherent. There are occasional omissions. Sue Davis, for example, makes almost no mention of Rehnquist's path-breaking view of the establishment clause; and other authors, like the justices themselves, emphasize some areas of individual interest over others.

The resulting picture is not a portrait of a Court composed of giants but of individuals honestly struggling, apparently without the strong leadership of a superchief, to judge fairly, flexibly, and pragmatically. If anyone among the solid core of the Burger Court (excluding Brennan who will always be chiefly identified with the Warren Court) emerges as an influential ideologue, it is Rehnquist, whose transformation from a Lone Ranger to a chief who now writes more majority than dissenting opinions may well mark the transition that Lamb and Halpern anticipate. Still, they emphasize that to the chagrin of Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, predictions of a Burger Court counterrevolution proved premature, and the same could be true of the Rehnquist Court. One hopes that it will get as fair and as comprehensive a treatment as that which Lamb and Halpern offer its predecessor. This book may well be the standard work on the Burger Court for years to come; its format may further be usefully adapted to other judicial eras.

JOHN R. VILE
Middle Tennessee State University

Declarations of Independence: Cross-Examining American Ideology *by Howard Zinn. New York, HarperCollins, 1990. 350 pp. $25.00.*

Thomas Jefferson thought that the tree of liberty needed to be watered with blood every so often. Only through intermittent reenactments of the revolution, he believed, would American ideals retain their vitality. Howard Zinn's latest

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book offers a valuable alternative for a nuclear age. "Whatever in the past has been the moral justification of violence," he points out, "must now be accomplished by other means" (p. 289). Zinn's remedy for "an obedient, acquiescent, passive citizenry," a disease he correctly considers "deadly to democracy" (p. 5), is a vigorous interrogation of the ideas that implicitly structure mainstream American thought. His work promises "declarations of independence from all nations, parties and programs—all rigid dogmas" (p. 8).

For the most part, Zinn conducts a successful crossexamination of American ideology. His chapters on American foreign policy, in particular, should intrigue both students and professors. *Declarations of Independence* will challenge anyone to explain how repeated examples of malicious and frequently unrealistic national goals can be justified in the name of realism. Zinn also offers a thought-provoking attack on American participation in World War II. Although he does not deny the legitimate reasons for entering into that global conflict, Zinn presents evidence that strongly suggests that the desire to free civilization from murderous and expansionist fascist regimes does not explain the course of American policy during the war and afterwards. Public recognition of this distinction between circumstances that might justify military intervention and the actual policies leaders pursue during wars might have reduced enthusiasm for recent U.S. forays in the Persian Gulf.

Foreign policy, however, receives too much emphasis in this work. Although Zinn does devote chapters to such matters as civil liberties, racism, and the distribution of wealth, he repeatedly attributes the failure of Americans to live up to their ideals to the demands of the national security state. Thus, he fails to crossexamine mainstream assumptions that economic growth is a necessary good that justifies material inequities or sacrifice of the environment, or that all citizens should strive to be rich. This latter aspect of American culture may help explain why many Americans support regressive tax policies that disproportionately benefit affluent citizens.

Declarations of Independence works better as a crossexamination than as the statement of a case. Indeed, when defending his political beliefs, Zinn occasionally makes statements that contradict the claims he makes when questioning conventional ideals. Thus, after demonstrating that lack of a good scientific basis for asserting that human beings are inherently violent, he blithely states that human beings are innately altruistic. Moreover, for a scholar devoted to the power of ideas, Zinn seems surprisingly contemptuous of everyone who disagrees with him. Those persons who advance mainstream beliefs are in his view either stupid or corrupt. Nowhere in *Declarations of Independence* is there any hint that the central problems facing the United States are difficult or that their causes and solutions may be the subject of good-faith debate. In this respect, Zinn seems quite similar to his nemesis, John Silber.

In spite of these faults, *Declarations of Independence* will enliven any introduction to American government or history. Zinn is provocative, but readable; indeed, his work demonstrates that radicals need not speak fluent post-

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structualism to critique the influence of class, race, and (with much less emphasis) gender in the United States. Although few students or professors will agree with Zinn's conclusions, if they learn that "it is a crucial act of independent thinking to be skeptical of someone else's thinking" (p. 11), their undergraduate education will not have been in vain.

MARK A. GRABER
University of Texas at Austin

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REFERENCE BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST RECEIVED

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Vol. 4, The Difficult Search for Peace, parts 1 and 2 *edited by John Norton Moore. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 1960 pp. $199.00.*

The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol. 8, 1930 to the Present *edited by Leslie Bethel. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 919 pp. $89.50.*

Federal Domestic Outlays, 1983–1990: A Data Book *by Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1991. 294 pp. $45.00.*

Historic Documents on Presidential Elections 1787–1988 *edited by Michael Nelson. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1991. 902 pp. $72.95.*

The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and their Economic Consequences, parts 1 and 2 *edited by D. L. Bethlehem. Cambridge, England, Grotius Publications, 1991. 985 pp. Paper, $150.00.*

Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present *edited by Ron Christenson. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 1991. 552 pp. $49.95.*

Popular Images of the Presidency: From Washington to Lincoln *by Noble E. Cunningham. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1991. 312 pp. $44.95.*

State and Metropolitian Area Data Book *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1991. 440 pp. Paper, $26.00.*

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 111th edition *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC, GPO, 1991. 986 pp. Cloth, $34.00; paper, $28.00.*

Suggested State Legislation 1992, vol. 51 *developed by the Committee on Suggested State Legislation. Lexington, KY, The Council of State Governments, 1991. 176 pp. Paper, $30.00.*

The Supreme Court Yearbook 1990–1991 *by Joan Biskupic. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1991. 273 pp. Cloth, $27.95; paper, $16.95.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

In his review (PSQ 106 [Spring 1991] 132–134) of my *China's Unfinished Revolution*, a book written specifically for general, nonacademic readers, Richard Lufrano was inaccurate, irresponsible, gratuitously hostile, supercilious, and not unwilling to attempt to advance himself at my expense.

The tone—and, I think, the intent—of the review is set early on, when he says that I failed to draw upon my "own experiences in China" (how could *he* presume to know what experience *I* utilized?) and that I am an "unwary neophyte," and later that I am "without deep knowledge of China."

He does not clarify the basis or the necessity for his dismissive remarks. However, it is suggestive that when he says only that I have "frequently visited China" he withholds the significant fact, which he knew, that I also worked there for a Chinese publisher for extended periods in 1986 and 1988.

And what other than bumptiousness causes him to imply—knowing absolutely nothing of my preparation or research—that I am without sufficient knowledge of China to write an easily accessible but accurate book about its reforms? Has he—or has anyone else—pointed out significant errors or lacunas in the book? No. The book has been favorably—even enthusiastically—reviewed in more than half a dozen other national and international publications.

Is the book without flaws? Of course not. Could it be improved upon? Certainly. But does it have serious flaws that justify a trashing? It does not. Mr. Lufrano was generous with distortions, unfounded criticisms, and eccentric interpretations, and it is possible to detail only a couple here.

First, I must condemn his curious claim that I fail to analyze my material and instead engage in "bland equivocations." He cites a pair of sentences totaling two dozen words and then a mere *clause*, for heaven's sake!—both without their context. The longer example comes from a detailed four-page discussion, with a definite point of view, of official corruption and the party's feeble "crackdowns." His excised clause is equally misleading. Mr. Lufrano may personally believe my treatments are inadequate, but that does not justify leading readers

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to believe that the snatches he quotes summarize or characterize my treatment of the subjects. If he did not merely search for points about which he could make disparaging remarks on any pretense that would read well, it is hard to imagine how he alighted upon these few words.

Finally, as an example of what might charitably be called his eccentric interpretations I cite the irrationality of his criticism that "if the regime has lost the trust of the people [as I had related], then the revolution is indeed finished and [Ethridge's] discussion of prospects for the pre-1989 reforms is meaningless"—just as though trust is a necessary precondition for much of the change that is desirable.

I appreciate this opportunity to comment.

JAMES M. ETHRIDGE

Dr. Lufrano replies:

I regret that Mr. Ethridge has misunderstood the spirit in which I considered his book. I do, however, stand by my review.

RICHARD LUFRANO

To the Editor:

Professor Wilbur Edel's thorough examination of the "serious distortions" found in two volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series published in the 1980s ("Diplomatic History—State Department Style" (*PSQ* [Winter 1991–92] 695–712), raises important concerns about the scholarly integrity of future volumes in the series and the objectivity of the Department historians who are charged with compiling and editing the record of U.S. foreign policy for posterity.

In weighing those concerns, your readers will be interested to know that the "remedial legislation," which Professor Edel thought had "an uncertain future" when he wrote his article, was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992–93, is now the basic authority on and directive for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series by incorporating and extending the longstanding Department regulations for the series that were issued by Secretary of State Kellogg in 1925. The five major provisions of the statute are:

1. Acceleration of the *Foreign Relations* series to a thirty-year publication line that must be reached within three to five years after enactment of the statute;
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4. Declassification review and transfer to the National Archives within one to two years of all Department records thirty years old or older;
5. Establishment of a Department Advisory Committee for Historical Diplomatic Documentation with full access to classified historical documentation and with responsibility for providing advice on the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series and the opening of the Department's thirty-year-old records.

The State Department is currently implementing all provisions of the new statute. Research and editing of the series is proceeding in accord with the law's mandate, declassification procedures are being appropriately modified, and the new Advisory Committee will be named and convened shortly.

But this statute, as Professor Edel also recognizes, is only part of the answer for the scholarly credibility of the *Foreign Relations* series. The statute's mandate must be seriously and conscienciously implemented, for the official record of U.S. foreign policy cannot afford to be colored by sins of omission or commission. In this respect, it is my job as the new General Editor of the series to make sure that the story we tell in the Department's *Foreign Relations* volumes is as much "the whole truth" as can be known. I am committed to this guiding principle in shaping each volume that we publish. When extraneous forces prevent us from publishing all that we would like to publish, either because of the strictures of national security or the protection of individual privacy, we will inform the readers of our volumes of what has been left out or where the complete story may be found.

The *Foreign Relations* series has entered a new era. As far as the State Department's Office of the Historian is concerned, we are committed to publishing an accurate record of U.S. foreign policy according to the letter of the law and within the modern conventions of documentary publication. Alfred North Whitehead once said, "The more history I read, the less I think of historians." Here at the State Department, we hope our efforts will eventually allow Professor Edel and others who share his concerns to think more rather than less of our forthcoming volumes and to feel confident that the official history of U.S. foreign policy is in good and able hands.

GLEN W. LAFANTASIE
Deputy Historian and General Editor
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

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

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